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Abstract 
Currently most international investment disputes are settled through 
investment arbitration. Investment arbitration is not carried out by a single 
omnipotent body or court; rather, it is carried out by a number of different bodies 
(including permanent arbitral institutions as well as ad hoc tribunals). These 
different institutions and tribunals often produce diametrically opposing 
decisions (which are final and binding), in cases where similar or even the same 
facts are at stake. This is possible because binding precedent and stare decisis 
do not operate in international investment arbitration. The conflicting decisions 
that are being made are causing a crisis of consistency and uniformity in 
international investment arbitration.  
In order to address this crisis and reduce the capacity for inconsistent 
decisions to occur, commentators have suggested various reforms to the 
system of international investment arbitration. One suggestion that has been put 
forward is the introduction of an appeal mechanism. The primary objective of 
this thesis is to examine this proposal in detail. The thesis explores the debate 
around the possible establishment of an appeals facility, analysing the basis of 
the call for, as well as the potential advantages and disadvantages of an 
appellate mechanism. It is submitted that the basis of the call has been 
established and that the benefits would outweigh any demerits. Accordingly, the 
thesis moves on to explore how an appeals facility might best be introduced. A 
few suggestions have been made in this regard in the past, including the 
creation of a centralised world investment court. This and indeed others will be 
closely examined in this work, Finally, the thesis will consider whether any 
existing international or regional dispute settlement mechanisms could serve as 
inspiration for any future reforms to the system of international investment 
arbitration. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General background 
 Throughout the history of modern civilisation, trading and investment has 
not been restricted to within national borders. Gradually, the international law of 
foreign investment evolved in order to regulate such activity. Accordingly, the 
international law of foreign investment is one of the oldest divisions of 
international law. Notwithstanding its maturity, foreign investment law was until 
relatively recently, a comparatively underdeveloped area of international law. 
More recently, however, the area has witnessed a period of rapid expansion, 
and it is now regarded as one of the fastest growing areas of international law.1 
Jackson crystallised the difficulties posed by these recent developments when 
he said,   
that any attempt to follow the developments of international economic law “is 
like trying to describe a landscape while looking out of the window of a moving 
train- events tend to move faster than one can describe them”.2  
The investment statistics are testament to this rapid growth; in the early 
1980’s the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) was around $50 billion per 
year.3 In little over 20 years this figure had risen to $1.9 trillion per year, as 
recorded in 2007.4 Undoubtedly due to the global economic crisis, this figure 
dropped to $1.18 trillion per year in 2009.5 In 2010, the latest year for which 
statistics are available, the value of worldwide FDI was $1.25 trillion.6  This 
recent increase suggests that the drop in FDI was temporary and due to the 
general instability of the economic climate. As the global economic climate  
                                            
1 See S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 7 for an in depth explanation of the evolution of foreign investment. 
2 See J Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd Edition, West 
Publishing 1999) as cited in C Tietje et al, ‘Once and forever? The legal effects of a 
denunciation of ICSID’ (2008) <http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft74.pdf> accessed 31 January 2012. 
3 See the latest statistics available on foreign direct investment ‘UNCTAD: FDI 
Statistics’ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88> 
accessed 9 March 2012. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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improves, it is expected that FDI levels will continue to increase.7  
Despite the slight (probably temporary) drop in FDI, investment has 
skyrocketed, particularly within the last two decades. This rapid expansion in 
international investment caused the law that regulates the area to develop in an 
awkward manner, merging traditional customary international law principles and 
rules developed in investment treaties in a clumsy way. International investment 
agreements can take many forms8 , one of the most common are bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).  
BITs are agreements between states which establish the terms and 
conditions for investment by nationals and companies of one state in the other 
state. Foreign investment has long been seen as an important vehicle for 
economic development; this explains why all countries seek to attract FDI. In 
order to attract FDI, countries create BITs which are thought to promote and 
protect foreign investment.9  By the end of 2011, around 6,100 international 
investment agreements had been concluded, 2,800 of which took the form of 
BITs.10 Of course, with the increase in FDI and in the number of international 
investment agreements, the number of investment related disputes has also 
risen significantly. From less than 5 cases being recorded annually in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, to around 40 to 45 cases being recorded annually in 
                                            
7
 This sentiment is echoed in the ‘UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011’ 
<http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf> accessed 9 March 
2012 at 2, which states that FDI rose by 5% in 2010, but remain 15% below pre 
financial crisis levels. Nonetheless, UNCTAD expects FDI to have recovered to its pre-
crisis levels by 2013. 
8 For a discussion of different types of international investment agreements see K 
Vandevelde, ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 12 
University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157. 
9 Recently there has been some debate as to whether or not BITs do actually promote 
and attract FDI. See K Sauvant and L Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment 
Flows (OUP USA 2009), J Salacuse and N Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work? An 
evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard 
Journal of International Law 67, E Neumayer and L Spess, ‘Do bilateral investment 
treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?’ (2005) 33 World 
Development 1567 and P Egger and M Pfaffermayr, ‘The impact of bilateral investment 
treaties on foreign direct investment’ (2004) 32 Journal of Comparative Economics 788. 
10 See ‘UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011’ (n 7) 100 for in depth discussion of 
the number of international investment agreements and bilateral investment treaties in 
operation. 
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the years 2003-2005.11 The number of recorded cases has dropped slightly in 
the last few years, with 25-35 new disputes having been recorded annually in 
2006-2010. This small decrease is in correlation to the slight dip in FDI as a 
result of the global economic crisis.12  
One way in which international investment agreements (more specifically 
BITs) promote and protect investment is through the provision of guidance on 
the settlement of any disputes which may arise during the course of 
investment.13 Investors are keen to ensure that in the event that a dispute may 
arise with the host country, they will be able to resolve the dispute fairly and 
without excessive delay. In this way then, the existence of an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism greatly contributes to a favourable investment climate in 
the host country. 14  Generally, BITs provide for any disputes to be settled 
through arbitration. 
That the settlement of the majority of international investment disputes 
relies heavily on arbitration is not in itself especially problematic; in fact, there is 
much evidence that arbitration is an efficient and effective means of settling 
disputes. 15  The central problem is with the operation of the system of 
investment arbitration. Disputes are settled by a number of different arbitral 
bodies; there is no single, authoritative institution which is solely responsible for 
hearing investment disputes. Rather, numerous arbitral bodies, including both 
ad hoc and permanent institutions are settling investment disputes, and in many 
cases are reaching diverging conclusions on even the most basic of investment 
                                            
11 See K Sauvant, ‘The rise of international investment, investment agreement and 
investment disputes’ in K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment 
Disputes (OUP 2008) 12 for recent investment dispute statistics. 
12 See ‘UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011’ (n 7) 101 for discussion of the number 
of international investment disputes registered. 
13 S Subedi (n 1) 96-98. It is thought that BITs provide assurance to foreign investors 
that their investment will safe because the host state would not risk potentially costly 
arbitral proceedings. 
14 ‘UNCTAD Investor- state disputes arising from investment treaties: a review’ 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf> accessed 13 January 2010. 
15 S Franck, ‘Development and outcomes of investment treaty arbitration’ (2009) 50 
Harvard International Law Review 435 discusses the efficacy and integrity of 
investment arbitration, concluding that the system is working relatively well and 
provides a fair method of settling disputes. Furthermore, the relatively high number of 
cases brought to arbitration (see ‘UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011’ (n 7) 101) 
could be seen as testament to the popularity and success of international investment 
arbitration. 
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principles16. This divergence of decisions is hindering the development of a 
single, coherent body of law built up through the consistent jurisprudence. As a 
result of this, most international investment disputes are being decided on an 
individualistic basis. Consequently, international investment law is unclear, 
incoherent and unpredictable; this unpredictability is contrary to the fundamental 
rule of law.17 
 
1.2 Central research questions 
 This research will analyse the system of international investment law 
arbitration, discussing its present state and investigating the possibilities for its 
future development. More specifically, it will examine the proposed creation of 
an appeal mechanism. The central question which the research seeks to 
address is whether the creation of such an appeal mechanism is actually 
necessary? In order to fully answer this question, a number of secondary 
questions will undoubtedly arise. The first of these ancillary questions is 
whether the current system of international investment arbitration functions 
adequately and effectively. This then begets the question whether any 
suggestions for improvement would be beneficial to the system, particularly the 
proposed establishment of an appeal mechanism. Finally, alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms, already in existence will be examined to establish 
whether they could be effective models for international investment arbitration.18 
                                            
16
 For discussion of the operation of the system of international investment arbitration 
see M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 5-10. 
17 See S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law through inconsistent decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 
for discussion of how inconsistent decisions in international investment arbitration have 
a destabilising effect on the entire framework of the law of foreign investment. See C L 
de Secondat (Montesquieu), Defense de l’Esprit des Lois [in English: The Spirit of the 
Law] (1748, reprinted by CUP 1989) and A Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution (1915, reprinted by Liberty Fund Publishers 1982) and T Bingham, 
The Rule of Law (Allen Lane Publishing 2010) for discussion of the rule of law; 
discussion of the concept that reasoned decisions are based on legal principles, as 
opposed to arbitrary solutions and that everyone is equal before the law. Inconsistency 
and unpredictability in international investment arbitration are therefore unacceptable 
and contravene the rule of law. 
18 See for example B Legum, ‘Options to establish an appeal mechanism for 
investment disputes’ in K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment 
Disputes (OUP 2008), A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment 
arbitration?’ in P Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
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 Some literature has been generated which touches on part of the central 
research question of this study. Various academics have offered opinions on 
whether an appeal mechanism is necessary in international investment 
arbitration. Much of this literature has focused on whether the need for an 
appeal mechanism has arisen. The debate surrounding this question centres 
largely on the alleged crisis of consistency in international investment arbitration. 
A number of experts have argued that inconsistency has become a feature of 
international investment arbitration and that it is damaging to the system itself. 
Inconsistency is thought to be damaging as it leads to unpredictability, 
incoherence and a general lack of faith in the system.19  Others argue that 
inconsistency has not become a feature of the system and is grossly 
exaggerated. Some experts go on to say that even if the system of international 
investment arbitration did suffer inconsistency in the future, it in itself should not 
be feared or avoided, as it is a natural phenomenon that will remedy itself when 
one judicial solution is found to be favoured over another over the course of 
time. 20  The debate surrounding inconsistency in international investment 
arbitration and the establishment of an appeal mechanism as a response to 
such inconsistency will be explored in greater depth in the thesis. 
Other literature has focused on the purported advantages and 
disadvantages of the introduction of an appeal mechanism. The most often 
cited advantage of the introduction of an appeal mechanism is greater 
                                                                                                                                
Investment Law (OUP 2008) and M Goldhaber, ‘Wanted: a world investment court’ 
(2004) 3 Transnational Dispute Management 26. 
19 See Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law through inconsistent decisions’ (n 17),  Dimsey, The Resolution of 
International Investment Disputes: International Commerce and Arbitration (n 16) 36-
42, M Sornarajah, ‘A coming crisis: expansionary trends in investment treaty arbitration’ 
in K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (n 11) 73 
and A Reinisch, ‘The proliferation of international dispute settlement mechanisms: the 
threat of fragmentation vs. the promise of a more effective system? Some reflections 
from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in J Crawford et al (eds), International 
Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (Brill Publishing 2008) 107. 
20
 See J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ in Sauvant (ed), Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (n 11) 241-265, Legum, ‘Options to 
establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes’ (n 18) 231-240 and J Gill, 
‘Inconsistent decisions: an issue to be addressed or a fact of life?’ in F Ortino et al 
(eds), Investment Treaty Law Current Issues: Volume 1 (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law 2006) 23. 
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consistency and coherence of the system overall.21 Other purported advantages 
include the creation of a more sustainable system22 and enhanced objectivity23. 
Opponents of an appellate mechanism argue that it would reduce the flexibility 
of the system24, damage the principle of finality25 and there is a risk that the 
system would be re-politicised26. These and indeed other purported advantages 
and disadvantages of an appeal mechanism will be explored later in this work. 
A detailed examination of the proposition to create an appeal mechanism will 
provide some answers to the central and secondary research questions 
described above and will underpin the thesis as a whole. 
Some commentators have gone beyond examining the need for an 
appeals facility and commented on how an appellate mechanism should be 
introduced. Suggestions that have been put forward in this regard include 
introducing an appeal mechanism under the auspices of ICSID27, creating an 
additional layer of arbitration in existing dispute settlement mechanisms28 and 
                                            
21
 See K Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (2006) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/36052284.pdf> accessed 16 July 
2009 192. 
22
 See D Bishop, ‘The case for an appellate panel and its scope for review’ in F Ortino 
et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law Current Issues: Volume 1 (n 20) for a discussion of 
issues surrounding the sustainability of the system of international investment 
arbitration. 
23
 A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ (n 18) 1157. 
24
 At present, the parties involved in investment arbitration are able to exercise a high 
degree of control over very flexible proceedings. It is thought that this control and 
flexibility might be compromised if an appeals facility is introduced.  
25
 See J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is 
there a need for reform?’ (2009) 26 Journal of International Arbitration 437 for a 
thorough treatment of the principle of finality in investment arbitration and also 
Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (n 21) 194. 
26 De-politicisation of dispute settlement is thought to be one of the greatest 
achievements of the system of international investment arbitration; disputes no longer 
escalate to harm international relations and threaten world peace. It is thought that 
establishing an appeals facility might have the indirect effect of re-politicising dispute 
settlement. See Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute 
settlement: an overview’ (n 21) 195. 
27
 See for example C Tams, ‘Is there a need for an ICSID appellate structure?’ (2004) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341268> accessed 18 January 
2011 and C Tams, ‘An appealing option? The debate about an ICSID appellate 
structure’ in C Tietje et al (eds), Essays in Transnational Economic Law 
<http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/Heft57.pdf> accessed 26 January 2010. 
28
 See A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ (n 18) 
1160. 
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the establishment of a world investment court29 to name but a few. These and 
indeed other proposals will be considered in later chapters. 
 This study will summarise the state of international investment arbitration, 
analysing the literature that has been produced on the topic and seek to identify 
whether the system of international investment arbitration, as it currently stands, 
provides an adequate and effective means of settling international investment 
disputes. The work will then go on to investigate whether the system would 
benefit from reform, most specifically from the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism. Finally, the thesis will examine how an appellate mechanism might 
best be introduced into the system of international investment arbitration. 
 
1.3 Originality and significance of the research 
 A thorough discussion of the proposal to establish an international 
investment appellate body will be of significant academic value; a study 
analysing this proposition exclusively and in such depth has yet to be 
undertaken. Thus, there is scope for valuable original contribution to the topic, 
and this thesis will undoubtedly advance the debate on this subject and further 
knowledge in this field.  
Whilst there is much generalist writing on the field on international 
investment, only a small number of articles discuss the establishment of a 
bespoke appeals mechanism30 . The sum total of this literature is relatively 
modest when compared with other aspects of international investment law that 
have attracted a substantial amount of research and literature. The possible 
establishment of an appeal mechanism has been discussed in a number of 
books and articles, however there is no single comprehensive analysis of 
current state of international investment arbitration and the debate surrounding 
the establishment of an appeal mechanism. This study will therefore provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the current state of international investment 
                                            
29
 See M Goldhaber, ‘Wanted: a world investment court’ (n 18). 
30 See for example M Goldhaber ibid, M Dimsey, The Resolution of International 
Investment Disputes: International Commerce and Arbitration (n 16), F Ortino et al 
(eds), Investment Treat Law: Current Issues Volume I (n 20) C Rogers and R Alford 
(eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (OUP 2009), K Sauvant (ed), Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (n 11) and M Waibel et al (eds), The 
Backlash Against Investment Treaty Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 
2010).  
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arbitration and the debate surrounding the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism.  
None of the literature analyses in as much depth whether or not the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism is necessary or desirable, let alone 
suggest how the establishment of an appellate investment body might be 
achieved. This study will provide the detailed analysis of the different means by 
which an appeal mechanism might be introduced which is missing from the 
current literature on the subject. The lack of literature on this subject is 
especially surprising, considering its potential contribution to the field. It is 
intended that this thesis will fill the gap in the current literature. This work will 
therefore be of considerable value in terms of its contribution to academia and 
the ongoing debate concerning the establishment of an appeal mechanism. 
Furthermore, this work may also have an important practical value, 
should an appeal mechanism be introduced in the future. It may provide a 
springboard for discussions as to the practicalities of introducing such a 
mechanism. International investment experts have put forward numerous 
suggestions as to how an appeal mechanism could and should be introduced, 
however few ideas have been considered seriously and in any great depth 
before. This study analyses the most prominent suggestions such as 
incorporating appeal into the ICSID mechanism as well as creating an 
independent world investment court in detail, outlining the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of each proposal. 
This topic is also of great significance given that total worldwide FDI 
accounts for trillions of dollars each and every year; this amount of international 
investment is incomprehensible to most people. Any legal framework governing 
transactions involving such huge sums of money must ensure that it operates in 
the most optimal manner in order to best serve its users. Furthermore, this topic 
is of increased importance given the need to stimulate FDI given the economic 
difficulties that so many countries are currently experiencing  
Additionally, a large number of disputes arise from FDI; such disputes 
often involve huge sums of money being at stake, as well as important issues 
such as human rights, environmental protection and the rights of states to 
regulate their internal affairs which overlap with other areas of international law. 
Accordingly, international investment arbitration must ensure that it is operating 
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within the broader framework of public international law and be fully 
accountable, complying with the rule of law. 
 
1.4 Methodology and overview of the thesis 
 This thesis is the product of extensive legal research in the field of 
international investment law, more specifically investment arbitration and the 
possibilities for its future development. The legal approach adopted combines 
the positivist approach (describing what the law is and how it operates currently) 
and the normative approach (proposing what the law ought to be and how it 
ought to operate).  
 The research is based on an extensive survey of the relevant literature in 
this field. Every endeavour has been made to ensure that the research 
highlights all of the most recent and most relevant literature on the subject of 
the state of the system of international investment arbitration and the creation of 
an appeal mechanism. Thus, the thesis is a comprehensive guide to the dispute 
settlement system in international law as it currently stands, and as to how it 
may develop in the future. The research was carried out by consulting a variety 
of different sources of literature including, but not limited to: books; journal 
articles; the decisions of tribunals; discussion papers and websites.  
 In order to answer the central research question, and indeed the 
secondary questions which will be raised, the thesis is divided into eight 
chapters. The present chapter provides a general introduction to the subject, 
including background information, introduces the central and the secondary 
research questions, discusses the importance of the research and describes the 
methodology employed and presents an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
Chapters two, three and four provide a brief history and overview of the system 
of international investment law and the settlement of investment disputes. The 
chapters will show that arbitration has become the preferred method for the 
settlement of investment disputes, before going on to evaluate the system of 
investment arbitration and highlight its strengths and weaknesses. Chapters five 
and six will discuss how the current system of international investment 
arbitration might be improved upon, focusing on the proposal to create an 
appellate mechanism. In light of this, chapter seven will investigate whether any 
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existing international and regional dispute settlement mechanisms might serve 
as a model for international investment arbitration and inspiration for reform. 
Chapter eight will provide a conclusion to the discussion and answer the central 
and secondary research questions. 
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The law of foreign investment evolved in order to regulate the activities of 
those doing business abroad.1 Accordingly, international investment law has a 
lengthy, interesting history. The roots of the law of foreign investment can be 
traced back to customary international law principles; they provided the 
international minimum standard of protection which foreign investors can expect 
when investing abroad. However, since then, several distinct attempts have 
been made to formalise the regulation of the international law of foreign 
investment. In the 1950’s, the framework of international investment law was 
permanently changed by the proliferation of BITs. The customary international 
law roots, the attempts to formalise international investment law regulation and 
the phenomenon of BITs will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
The next section will move on to examine the history of international dispute 
settlement. The chapter will examine various dispute settlement mechanisms 
that are traditionally used to settle general international disputes, from 
diplomatic methods of dispute settlement such as negotiation, mediation and 
conciliation to judicial settlement of disputes through courts and arbitration. 
The chapter will then consider the means by which international investment 
disputes may be settled. Traditionally, two methods of dispute settlement were 
frequently used in investment cases; allowing the national courts of the 
investment host state to settle the dispute, and diplomatic protection.2 Both of 
these will be examined before going on to consider why these methods of 
dispute settlement fell out of favour and were ultimately replaced by 
international investment arbitration.  
The chapter will examine the origins of arbitration and the reasons for its 
popularity, before going on to discuss international investment arbitration 
specifically. The system of international investment arbitration is rather 
                                            
1
 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 7. 
2
 Ibid 12-16. 
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complicated; it does not operate in a manner which is comparable to domestic 
legal systems. Arbitration is not carried out by a single, authoritative court-like 
body. Rather, arbitration is undertaken by numerous different tribunals, 
recourse to which is set out in the BIT under which the investment dispute 
arises. Furthermore, these tribunals are both first and last instance; generally 
there is no possibility of appeal.3 Two different types of tribunal hear investment 
disputes; ad hoc tribunals that are appointed to settle one single dispute, and 
permanent arbitral bodies that hear more than one case. Both ad hoc and 
permanent tribunals will be discussed in this chapter.  
The central aim of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the 
system of international investment law and the means by which general 
international disputes, as well as international investment disputes were 
traditionally settled, as well as how they are settled today. 
 
2.2 The history of international investment law 
2.2.1 Treatment of aliens and state responsibility in public 
international law 
Vattel once stated that ‘an injury to a citizen is an injury to the state’.4 The 
relationship between an individual and state gives rise to two important 
principles: 
i) The state is responsible for the acts of its citizens of which its 
agents knew or ought to know and which cause harm to the legal 
interests of another state.  
ii) The state has a legal interest in its citizens and in protecting this 
interest the State may call to account those harming its citizens.5 
In the Mavrommatis6 case, the PCIJ declared that a state is entitled to 
protect its citizens when another state commits an act contrary to international 
                                            
3See M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 160. 
4 E de Vattel, Les Droits des Gens [English Translation: The Law of Nations] (1758, 
reprinted by Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics 2008) as cited in I Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (7th Edition, OUP 2008) 519. 
5 A Kaczorowska, Public International Law (4th Edition, Routledge 2010) 443 
6 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) [1924] PCIJ Rep Ser A No 2, 12, 
‘it is an elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect its 
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another state, 
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law which injures that citizen, where they have been unable to seek redress 
through ordinary channels. If a state chooses to take up the case on behalf of 
its citizen through diplomatic protection, in reality it is asserting its own right to 
ensure respect for the rules of international law. The defendant state’s duties 
are not owed to the injured alien, but rather to the alien’s state. 
The national standard of treatment is the standard of treatment preferred 
by newer, less economically developed nations. This standard affords aliens the 
same standard of treatment as nationals of the state in question. This standard 
does not apply universally; some issues, such as participation in public and 
political life are exempted.7  
The international standard of treatment of aliens, which is generally 
supported by older and more economically developed nations, is based solely 
on international law. The law is not concerned with equality of treatment 
between host state nationals and aliens; rather, it ensures a common 
international standard of treatment of aliens. This is the standard that is 
favoured by a large number of international courts and tribunals.8 
The conflict between the national and international standard of treatment 
is largely due to political and economic differences between states. In its debate 
on the Second Report on State Responsibility in 19579, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) attempted to move away from the conflict by linking the 
question of the treatment of aliens to the protection of human rights. The ILC 
Rapporteur proposed that, 
The state is under a duty to ensure to aliens the enjoyment of the same civil 
rights, and to make available to them the same individual guarantees as are 
enjoyed by nationals [the national standard]. These rights and guarantees shall 
not, however, in any case be less than the ‘fundamental human rights’ 
recognised and defined in contemporary international instruments [the 
                                                                                                                                
from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. 
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own 
right – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law’. 
7
 See A Kaczorowska, Public International Law (n 5) 445. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 In 1955, the ILC appointed Garcia-Amador as a special rapporteur. Between 1956 to 
1961 he submitted six different reports on the subject of state responsibility for injuries 
to aliens. 
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international minimum standard]. In consequence, in case of violation...with 
respect to aliens, international responsibility will be involved only if 
internationally recognised ‘fundamental human rights’ are affected.10 
 With the rapid growth in the area of human rights since 1957, it is 
generally accepted that the ILC Rapporteur’s view is correct. Accordingly, the 
standard of treatment to be afforded to aliens is that established by the 
international law of human rights. Traditionally this standard ensured that aliens 
were not directly wronged, for example by being tortured or killed in the host 
state. Furthermore, it ensured that if they were mistreated, they would have 
access to justice. However, more recently, these traditional areas involving 
state responsibility and diplomatic protection have become less important. New, 
so-called ‘indirect’ wrongs have emerged, including issues such as the 
protection of the property of aliens (such as their foreign investments).11 
In the early 1960’s, the ILC worked towards the codification of rules 
concerning state responsibility. Progress was slow and steady, and in August 
2001, the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts12 were adopted. The Draft Articles represent one of the ILC’s 
longest running and most complicated works. On 12 December 2001, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 56/83 which ‘commended [the articles] 
to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future 
adoption or other appropriate action.’ 13  The articles form the basis of the 
international law on state responsibility and the treatment of aliens. 
2.2.2 Customary international law roots of the law of foreign 
investment 
Formal regulation was not a prominent feature of the law of foreign 
investment during its earliest days. Instead, customary international law 
                                            
10 F Garcia-Amador, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc.A/CN.4/106 
(1957) <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_106.pdf> accessed 27 
August 2012 as cited in A Kaczorowska, Public International Law (n 5) 446. 
11 Ibid A Kaczorowska. 
12 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, available 
at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf> 
accessed 8 August 2012.  
13
 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83, UN Doc.A/RES/56/83 12 December 2001, 
<http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/477/97/PDF/N0147797.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 
27 August 2012. 
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principles were central to the governance of international investment activities.14 
The key challenge in regulating foreign investment activities is determining 
which nation’s laws should govern foreign investment.15 Early scholars such as 
Grotius16 and Vattel17 were of the opinion that the law of the investment host 
state (local law) should not be applied to foreign investors, as they were already 
subject to the law of their home state. The consequence of this was that 
investors’ assets could not be expropriated by the host government enacting 
legislation. Many early investment treaties provided for this home state rule.18 
Consequently, under the early international investment law regime, it was 
largely accepted that host states could not nationalise the assets of foreign 
investors. The origins of international investment law clearly display the 
intention that it should strive to protect aliens investing abroad.19  
When colonies began to gain independence, they also began to reject the 
idea that home state law should apply (because it basically affords foreign 
investors greater protection than nationals of the host state20). Relying on the 
doctrine of state sovereignty and sovereign equality, they asserted that the law 
of the host state should reign supreme. By definition, sovereignty implies that 
the host state is supreme within its own territory and therefore its laws are also 
supreme therein. Consequently, they asserted that foreign investors’ assets 
could in fact be expropriated by the host state government, provided that the 
investor was properly compensated. However, advocates of host state rule did 
concede that if the local law was considered to be below minimum standards of 
justice and equity, the international minimum standard should be applied to 
investors. In order to ascertain the standard of minimum treatment, one would 
need to examine the sources of international law. In the absence of 
internationally agreed treaties, other sources, such as customary international 
law would be taken into consideration. Essentially, this meant relying on the 
                                            
14 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 1) 7. 
15
 Home versus host state rule was a highly contentious issue during the early days of 
the law of foreign investment. 
16 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Tres (1625), translated On the Law of War and 
Peace, and reprinted (Kessinger Publishing 2010).  
17 E de Vattel, Les Droits des Gens (n 4). 
18
 See S Sutton, ‘Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID 
Secretary General’s Screening Power’ (2005) 21 Arbitration International 119. 
19
 S Subedi (n 1) 8. 
20
 E Borchard, ‘The minimum international standard in the protection of aliens’ (1939) 
33 American Society of International Law Proceedings. 
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standards of the investor’s home state because the commentary and case law 
on foreign investment tended to originate from investor home states.21  
Once the idea that the international minimum standard should be applied to 
foreign investment (rather than host state law) gained impetus, attention began 
to turn to the definition of that minimum standard. It was accepted that the 
traditional principles of fairness, justice, equality and the practice of states 
should be taken into consideration. However, it was also submitted that human 
rights principles should also be taken into account, particularly in view of the 
fact that it is widely understood that they encompass property rights. In effect, 
the inclusion of international human rights law in the international minimum 
standard extends the application of the investor states’ national property laws to 
foreign investors. This means that property belonging to state nationals or 
foreign investors alike could not be expropriated without the provision of 
compensation. Thus, state sovereignty and states’ rights to regulate foreign 
investment had to be balanced with international human rights principles.22 
Turning back to the central issue of tension between home versus host state 
regulation, any discussion of the matter cannot overlook the views of Argentine 
jurist Carlos Calvo. He led a great movement of opposition to the submission 
that home state rule (poorly disguised as the international minimum standard) 
should prevail. He, and indeed many others, believed it unfair to accord a higher 
standard of treatment to foreign investors than to local investors (as was the 
case under the international minimum standard). Instead, Calvo campaigned for 
equality of treatment for national and foreign investors. Calvo and his 
supporters were concerned that newly independent colonies and lesser 
economically and juridically developed states could offer foreign investors a 
higher standard of treatment that it would be able to provide to its own nationals. 
The Calvo doctrine supported the assertion that foreign investors should be 
treated in the same manner as national investors. Another central element of 
the Calvo doctrine provided that in the event that a dispute arose, local 
remedies should be exhausted before resorting to international arbitration.23 
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 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 1) 10. 
22
 See A Newcombe and L Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer 
2009) 13. 
23
 Ibid. 
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The Calvo doctrine was particularly popular in Latin America, with essential 
aspects of the doctrine being incorporated into many Latin American state 
constitutions and investment treaties. After both the Mexican and Russian 
revolutions in the early twentieth century, the respective governments asserted 
their ownership of all the land and many foreign investors’ assets were 
expropriated without payment of appropriate compensation. These actions were 
rationalised with reference to the Calvo doctrine. However, many other 
(particularly Western states) saw the expropriations as Calvo doctrine 
extremism. Mexico did agree to provide some compensation, though it was not 
necessarily prompt, adequate or effective. A claims commission between the 
USA and Mexico was established in order to hear the claims of American 
investors whose assets had been expropriated by the Mexican government.  In 
spite of this, the Commission did not hear a single claim, and after almost ten 
years, the USA increased its efforts to seek justice. What resulted was a series 
of diplomatic exchanges between US Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the 
Mexican government.24 
Hull articulated his position on the matter, which subsequently became 
known as the Hull formula. Hull asserted that; 
The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. It is 
confiscation...The whole structure of friendly intercourse, of international trade and 
commerce, and many other vital and mutually desirable relations between nations 
indispensible to their progress rest upon the single and hitherto solid foundation of 
respect on the part of the governments and of peoples for each other’s rights under 
international justice. The right of prompt and just compensation for expropriated 
property is a part of this structure.25 
The Mexican Foreign Minister of course disagreed, replying; 
No rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which makes 
obligatory the payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred 
                                            
24 For a detailed discussion of the diplomatic exchanges between the USA and 
Mexican governments, see A Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (OUP 2008) 475-
481. 
25 Excerpt from G Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol III (US Department of 
State 1942) 655-661. The complete USA-Mexican exchange of correspondence in 
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compensation, for expropriations of a general an impersonal character like those 
which Mexico has carried out.26 
Basically, in his communication, Hull expressed his support for 
compensation for expropriated assets as contained in the international minimum 
standard of treatment for foreign investors (essentially favouring the notion that 
home state rule should prevail in foreign investment). 
The matter between the Mexican and American government was eventually 
resolved by means of an accord which compensated US investors whose 
assets had been expropriated.27 
By this time, it was the end of the 1940’s and the conditions in which 
expropriation could take place had been clarified through state practice and also 
through the emergence of customary principles. Foreign investment law was 
beginning to find its place as a distinct discipline. The Hull formula was popular, 
sweeping aside the opposing Calvo doctrine. It was generally accepted that 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation was to be provided should 
expropriation occur.28 
 
2.2.3 Attempts to formalise the regulation of international  
investment law 
- Havana Charter 
 Up until the 1940’s the regulation of foreign investment activities had 
largely relied upon the development of customary law principles. Attempts to 
formalise international investment rules were made once the Second World War 
had ended. The end of the war signalled the establishment of the United 
Nations (UN), the new world order, and attempts to regulate international 
foreign investment by newly established international economic institutions. The 
newly created UN held a conference on Trade and Employment between 21 
November 1947 and 24 March 1948 in Havana, Cuba. The outcome of the 
conference was the draft Havana Charter which laid the foundations for the 
International Trade Organization (ITO). However, the Havana Charter and the 
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ITO never did come into existence, partly due to repeated rejection by US 
Congresss.29  
 
- Abs- Shawcross Convention 
In 1959, some of the major capital-exporting states attempted to 
introduce an international treaty on foreign investment which was known as the 
Abs-Shawcross Convention 30 . Being the brainchild of the capital-exporting 
countries, it mainly served to protect the interests of foreign investors. 
Unsurprisingly, the convention attracted strong opposition from the capital-
importing countries who would effectively pay the price of having to honour 
higher investor protection provisions. Consequently, the convention was not 
adopted. An attempt to revive many of the provisions of the convention was 
seen in the OECD’s Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 
However, this too was never adopted.31 
 
- Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
 The UN’s work in the field of international investment continued through 
various initiatives, such as the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources.32 The sovereignty and sovereign equality of states is an 
important principle of the UN. A critical aspect of the principle involves each 
state having sovereignty over its territory and natural resources. However, 
newly independent states often found themselves inheriting old agreements 
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Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 
32 ‘Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 1962’, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962 UN Doc. A/5217 full text 
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accessed 27 August 2012. See A Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (n 24) 486, 
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whereby their natural resources were controlled and exploited by foreign 
investors/companies. These newly independent states therefore sought to rely 
on the doctrine of sovereignty in order to find a way out of the old agreements 
and regain control of their own natural resources. In order to achieve this, the 
UN Declaration affirms the principle that sovereign states have the right to 
expropriate foreign investor’s assets in certain circumstances (which included 
providing payment of appropriate compensation). The Declaration is often seen 
as successfully providing a delicate balance of developing nations’ concerns 
about retaining sovereignty, and investors’ concerns about the safety of their 
investments.33 The Declaration became the first international instrument to gain 
almost universal support for the concept that states did have the right to 
expropriate the assets of foreign investors under certain conditions (including 
the payment of compensation). The Declaration is therefore seen as ‘[meeting] 
the aspiration of the developing countries…[and embracing] part of the Hull 
formula preferred by developed countries.’34 Accordingly, it remains one of the 
most widely accepted international investment instruments and is seen as 
representing the customary international law principles on the matter.35 
 
- Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order 
The UN also instigated the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), a revision of the Bretton Woods regime. It 
was thought that the original Bretton Woods regime was not well balanced and 
that it unfairly favoured the interests of the developed nations that created it. 
The NIEO was introduced to remedy this bias, aiming to promote the interests 
of developing countries and improve their trading conditions. An important item 
on the NIEO agenda was the reform of investment regulation, in order that it be 
organised in a manner that would be more favourable to lesser developed 
nations. For example, developing nations were particularly concerned about the 
powers of large multinational corporations who could relatively easily intervene 
in the governance of developing nations. The UN Declaration on the 
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Establishment of a New Economic Order attempted to tackle this and other 
important issues.36 
 
- Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
Approximately six months after the NIEO was introduced, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties.37 The Charter is 
not a binding legal instrument. Nonetheless it is a comprehensive, far reaching 
document. In terms of the regulation of foreign investment, Article 2 of the 
Charter sets out its position, reaffirming individual states’ right to permanent 
sovereignty (including over its own natural resources). It also confirms a state’s 
right to regulate foreign investment in accordance with its own policies and aims. 
Furthermore, it asserts the right of states to regulate the activities of 
transnational corporations within their own jurisdictions. Lastly, Article 2 
highlights a state’s right to expropriate the assets of foreign investors, subject to 
the satisfaction of certain conditions. The NIEO also required the 
implementation of two codes of conduct; one on the subject of technology 
transfer and one on the regulation of transnational corporations.38 Interestingly, 
the NIEO and the Charter are often seen as part of customary international law, 
reiterating the general principles that have come to be accepted in international 
investment law.39 
 
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World 
Bank 
Another institution that had a vested interest in foreign investment  
(specifically its promotion) is the World Bank (also known as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD). It is generally accepted 
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that foreign investment is associated with increased economic development and 
prosperity within the investment host state. Given that most investment host 
states are less economically developed nations, it is easy to see why the World 
Bank is keen to promote foreign investment. In order to do so, the Bank has 
taken part in a number of promotional initiatives. 40 
 
- International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Arguably the most important of the foreign investment promoting initiatives 
undertaken by the World Bank is the International Convention for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, concluded in 1965. The aim of the Convention is to 
provide a credible mechanism for the settlement of international investment 
disputes. It is thought that foreign investors will be more likely to invest if they 
are certain that a fair, independent and reliable dispute settlement mechanism 
will be available to them should any problems occur during the course of the 
investment.41 The Convention and the dispute settlement mechanism which it 
created (the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes) will 
be discussed in more depth later. 
 
- Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Aside from ICSID, the World Bank has associated itself with a number of 
other foreign investment promoting activities. One such initiative is the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Potential foreign investors 
are keen to ensure that their investment attracts additional guarantees in terms 
of non-commercial risks, especially when they are investing in poorer, lesser 
developed nations. Although protection may already be in place through 
existing national, regional and private insurance investment guarantee initiatives, 
an additional guarantee was thought to be desirable. Hence, the Convention 
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency was created in 
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198542. The main objective of MIGA is to encourage the flow of international 
investments throughout member states, with a particular emphasis on 
encouraging investment in less economically developed nations. The 
Convention highlights which risks are covered by the guarantee; examples 
include problems with currency, expropriation, and war/civil unrest.43 
 
- Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 
Another initiative to which the World Bank was party, was the Guidelines on 
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Jointly, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) requested that MIGA prepare a legal 
framework to promote foreign direct investment. Thus in 1992, the Guidelines 
on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment were created. The Guidelines do 
not form a binding international instrument; however their value should not be 
underestimated. Emanating from some of the major international financial 
institutions, the guidelines do have significant influence. The text was 
supposedly created with a view to promoting foreign direct investment. However, 
a closer inspection of the Guidelines seems to suggest that the real aim was to 
protect foreign investment rather than merely promote it. It has been suggested 
that, ‘the Guidelines address the conduct of states vis-à-vis foreign investors, 
but not the conduct of foreign investors.’44 Many of the Guideline’s provisions 
appear to go beyond the accepted principles of international investment law, 
extending protections to foreign investors in many respects, and in others 
seemingly creating new ones.45 
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- WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
 Efforts to regulate foreign investment have also been made under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Foreign investment was 
introduced to the WTO agenda during the Uruguay round of negotiations on 
multilateral trade. The end of that particular round of negotiations saw the 
creation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
which focuses on the regulation of trade-related aspects of foreign investment. 
The Agreement was created in order to improve economic efficiency; it prohibits 
WTO member states from applying any trade-related investment measure that 
is inconsistent with the principle of national treatment and from making 
quantitative restrictions. It is thought that the Agreement promotes trade by 
removing trade-related barriers to investment. However, it is important to note 
that the TRIMS Agreement may only be applied in certain, rather limited 
situations. Not all WTO member states supported the establishment of the 
TRIMS Agreement. The United States for example were very much against its 
creation, arguing that it was too restrictive and actually serves to operate as a 
barrier to trade. Developing nations too were sceptical about the Agreement, 
asserting that the WTO was not an appropriate forum to discuss investment 
matters.46 
 
- Other WTO documents 
 A number of other WTO documents also contain provisions relating to 
foreign investment. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) contain provisions on foreign investment. Though, obviously such 
provisions are of extremely limited scope, being applied only in relation to their 
specific fields.47  
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- OECD’s Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, the 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has also involved itself in the regulation of international investment. The OECD 
has spearheaded negotiations for several investment agreements and 
investment related guidelines. One of the first initiatives it became involved with 
in the 1950s, was what became known as the Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property48. The Draft remained just that after it failed to 
gain the approval of many states and was not ratified. The states that were 
against the text had concerns about a number of provisions, including those 
relating to the level of compensation that should be awarded to foreign investors 
in the event that their property was expropriated by the investment host state. 
Some years later, the OECD attempted to revive the idea, however this too 
failed. The OECD undeterred by its failure, made another attempt in 1976 to 
involve itself in the regulation of international investment. This time, discussions 
resulted in the establishment of the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; both 
texts are voluntary codes of conduct.49 
 
- Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
The OECD, wishing to move into the realm of mandatory investment rules, 
and encouraged by the 1992 World Bank Guidelines, endeavoured to conclude 
a multilateral investment agreement. Between 1995 and 1998, the draft 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was negotiated. The OECD 
believed that a multilateral agreement was necessary in order to ‘respond to the 
dramatic growth and transformation of FDI which has been spurred by 
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widespread liberalization and increasing competition for investment capital.’50 
The provisions contained in the MAI were heavily weighted in favour of the 
foreign investor, offering a higher standard of protection than was contained in 
the World Bank Guidelines. Moreover, the MAI contained very few provisions 
regulating the conduct of foreign investors, and consequently the text was met 
with fervent criticism. Experts asserted that the document gave too many rights 
to foreign investors, which in turn placed many obligations on the foreign 
investment host government. Accordingly, the draft MAI was abandoned, and 
the OECD was forced to produce a much diluted set of Guidelines on 
multinational enterprises, which formed a soft law instrument. The newer 
Guidelines were more balanced than the MAI, and included provisions which 
promoted sustainable development as well as greater human rights and 
environmental protection.51  
 
- Other voluntary schemes 
A number of other voluntary schemes containing provisions on foreign 
investment have also been established. Many of these schemes are primarily 
concerned with human rights, labour standards and protection of the 
environment. However, certain of their provisions also concern foreign 
investment.52  
 
- Multilateral investment agreement back on the WTO agenda 
With the turn of the century, efforts to regulate foreign investment were 
somewhat renewed, and the issue made its way onto the WTO agenda at the 
Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001. At the Conference, it was decided that 
completely fresh negotiations should be entered into regarding the 
establishment of a multilateral investment treaty. However, there were a number 
of existing problems which inevitably reappeared in the supposedly ‘fresh’ 
negotiations. The differences between the views of developing and developed 
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nations were particularly problematic; the two groups unable to agree on even 
the most basic concepts. Unsurprisingly, the negotiations were abandoned 
when the WTO member states met in July 2004 and the negotiation of a 
multilateral investment treaty was removed from the WTO agenda altogether.53  
 
- UN Commission and Council on Human Rights 
The UN Commission and Council on Human Rights have also been working 
in the area of multinational corporations (which has foreign investment related 
aspects). Similarly, a number of anti-corruption conventions have been 
established which contain investment related provisions.54  
 
2.2.4 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
BITs are agreements between two states which regulate the investment 
relationship between the states who are party to the agreement. The first BIT 
was concluded in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan. 55  Since 1959, 
thousands of BITs have been negotiated between hundreds of different state 
parties. In fact, today there are around 2,800 BITs in force.56 As has been 
discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the earliest regulation of 
international foreign investment came from customary international law 
principles. In more recent times, attempts to formalise that regulation have been 
witnessed, particularly since the end of the Second World War, and it is fair to 
say that progress in this regard was not particularly rapid or revolutionary. BITs 
therefore developed in order to provide a more structured and certain 
framework under which states could operate foreign investment relationships 
with each other. Due to the fact that foreign investors usually come from 
developed states, and the states in which they invest are usually of a 
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developing status, BITs are typically concluded between developing and 
developed nations (though this is by no means always the case).57 
The main purpose of BITs is to regulate international investment 
relationships between states. However, it is generally accepted that BITs do 
have secondary aims. For example, BITs are thought to promote and attract 
foreign investment, at least in part, by providing a stable environment for 
investment, where investors feel confident that their investment will be safe. 
Furthermore, the provision of direct access to international arbitration, which is 
thought to be a reliable, impartial means of settling any dispute that may arise 
during the course of the investment, is also thought to promote and attract 
foreign investment. Although, it is interesting to note that the assertion that BITs 
do actually increase the amount of foreign investment that a state attracts is 
increasingly being criticised.58 
BITs are very much individual agreements between the parties that conclude 
them, and as such provide a high degree of flexibility which allows them to be 
specifically tailored to regulate the parties’ particular investment relationship. 
Nevertheless, BITs usually contain similar provisions and possess similar basic 
characteristics. Generally, BITs are concerned with five main aspects of 
investment. First and foremost, they usually provide definitions of basic terms 
including ‘investment’ and ‘investor’, so that these are very clear from the outset. 
BITs also usually deal with issues surrounding the admission of foreign 
investors. Issues such as the fair and equitable treatment of investors are also 
dealt with and clarified. Importantly, they also discuss exactly what 
compensation should be payable to the investor, should the investment host 
government attempt to expropriate the assets of the foreign investor. Finally, 
BITs clarify how any disputes arising during the course of foreign investment will 
be dealt with. Habitually, BITs provide for recourse to international arbitration in 
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the event that a dispute should arise. This means that the private foreign 
investor can bypass the national courts of the host state and any domestic 
remedies that may be available, thus giving foreign investors direct access to 
international arbitration.59 
 
2.3 Dispute Settlement 
2.3.1 Methods of settling general international disputes 
According to Merrills,  
a dispute may be defined as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, 
law or policy in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-
claim or denial by another. In the broadest sense, an international dispute involves 
governments, institutions, juristic persons (corporations) or private individuals in 
different parts of the world.60 
Disputes are accepted as an inevitable part of international relations.61 This 
subsection will consider a number of different means of settling general 
international disputes, including consensual and adjudicative means. 
 
- Consultation 
Not strictly a form of dispute settlement, consultation affords the opportunity 
to avoid a dispute altogether. If the government of one state anticipates that a 
decision of proposed action might harm another state, consultations through 
discussion may enable a dispute to be avoided in the first place. Through 
discussions, the government planning the action may make modifications to its 
original plans, thereby altogether avoiding a problem.62 
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- Negotiation 
 Negotiation is one of the most basic methods of dispute settlement. Inter-
state negotiations, ‘are usually conducted through normal diplomatic 
channels…[such as] respective foreign offices, or by diplomatic 
representatives…[or] competent authorities.’ 63  Occasionally, in case of an 
ongoing problem, states often institutionalise negotiations through the creation 
of a commission which will monitor the situation. If negotiation through these 
conventional means fails, summits may be held between heads of state or 
foreign ministers in the hope of moving forward.64  
In order to have the highest chances of success, each party must enter the 
negotiations with the belief that the advantages of reaching an agreement 
outweigh the disadvantages. Several substantive negotiating techniques may 
be employed by the negotiating parties including agreeing on a procedural 
solution and splitting the issue at the heart of the dispute to satisfy all involved 
parties. Negotiations may either take place within the public sphere or, in the 
case of sensitive disputes, in private.65  
Negotiation is often used as a precursor to other means of dispute 
settlement (particularly adjudicative processes). Negotiation as a procedure 
enables the parties to retain the highest degree of control over the dispute, 
whereas adjudication erodes much of the control (particularly as regards the 
court/tribunal’s final decision). Thus, the point of transition from negotiation to 
adjudication, and establishing the relationship between the two methods of 
dispute settlement are matters which have attracted the attention of states and 
international institutions. This issue is particularly important where the 
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a dispute hinges on the exhaustion of 
attempts to settle a dispute by negotiation. Often, showing that negotiations 
have been exhausted involves evidencing the fact that negotiations have taken 
place. Where one party refuses to negotiate, the absence of negotiation 
proceedings will not provide an obstacle to the jurisdiction of an international 
court or tribunal.66 
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The main benefit of negotiation is that it enables the parties to retain the 
highest degree of control over their dispute. Nonetheless, there are a number of 
important limitations of negotiation. Negotiation is obviously impossible where 
the parties flatly refuse to engage with each other. In cases where this has 
occurred in the past, serious disputes have led to a severance of diplomatic 
relations and have even escalated to physical violence, as with the Falklands 
war. Negotiations will also be limited if the parties’ positions are too far apart 
and they have no common goal or interest. Power struggles also come into play 
in negotiations; the more powerful party may try to pressure the weaker party 
into accepting their preferred solution.67  
 
- Mediation 
Where negotiations between states have proven unsuccessful, the 
intervention of a neutral third party may provide a breakthrough.  Such 
intervention can take many forms, from simply encouraging the parties to 
resume negotiations, to providing them with an additional means of 
communication. Mediation is one form of intervention; it involves the mediator 
being an active participant in the resolution of the dispute. The mediator is 
expected to ‘advance fresh proposals and to interpret, as well as to transmit, 
each party’s proposals to the other.’ 68  The mediator generally offers 
suggestions informally and based on information supplied by the parties rather 
than through independent investigation.  
Mediation may be requested by the parties, or offered by independent third 
parties. It provides the possibility of a solution without a commitment to adopt 
the mediator’s proposal from the outset. A great advantage of mediation is that 
it does enable the parties to retain a high degree of control over their dispute. 
Furthermore, parties may feel more ready to make concessions through 
mediation than direct negotiation, avoiding embarrassment due to the 
perception of having backed down.69 
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For mediation to be carried out, an acceptable mediator must be appointed. 
International organisations, states or even independent individuals may be 
appointed as mediators. Additionally, parties must give their consent to 
mediation; no party can be forced into mediation. Parties must also give their 
blessing as regards to the choice of mediator.70  In a significant number of 
disputes, mediation will not be a credible option because no mediator is able or 
willing to act. Acting as a mediator is a difficult task at best. In some situations, 
shuttling between the parties to an international dispute is not easy, often 
requiring long distances to be travelled. For example, mediation was used 
between the UK and Argentina during the Falklands crisis in the 1980s: the 
mediator was required to travel back and forth between the two countries. 
Moreover, the mediator must sacrifice his or her freedom of action with no 
guarantee of a successful outcome.71 
Additionally, mediation does suffer some serious limitations; like negotiation, 
mediation will probably only be as effective as the parties want it to be. Issues 
such as consent to mediation and selection of an acceptable mediator may be 
difficult to resolve. Moreover, it does not offer a binding solution; after 
settlement through mediation, neither party can be assured that the other will 
perform as agreed through mediation.72 
 
- Inquiry / International Claims Commissions 
Where attempts to resolve a dispute by other means such as negotiation 
and mediation have resulted in stalemate, bringing a neutral third party into the 
dispute so that they can provide an objective assessment can revive progress in 
terms of the settlement of said dispute. Inquiry can be a specific institutional 
arrangement, and the parties may select it in preference to adjudicative forms of 
dispute settlement. 
The commission of inquiry as a form of dispute settlement was introduced by 
the 1794 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and 
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the US73. However, it was the Hague Convention of 189974  that cemented 
inquiry commissions as a credible form of dispute settlement after the US 
battleship ‘Maine’ (anchored in Havana harbour) was destroyed by an explosion 
which killed 259 on board. The US-Spanish relationship was already strained, 
and the Americans assumed that the Spanish were responsible for the 
explosion. The Spanish denied responsibility for the incident, and a commission 
of inquiry found the explosion resulted from internal causes. However, a rival 
commission held that the vessel was destroyed by a Spanish submarine mine. 
The delegates of the Hague Peace Conference were so impressed by the work 
of the commission of inquiry that they decided to discuss the possibility of 
including a fact finding process within the Convention itself. The basis of the 
proposal was that national commissions (such as the one which refuted 
Spanish responsibility for the ‘Maine’ incident) were unsatisfactory, and that the 
need for independent effective commissions was greater than ever. Some 
smaller states feared that the new international claims commissions would be 
‘used as a cloak for foreign intervention’75. In light of this, the delegates of the 
Hague Convention decided that claims commissions were desirable, subject to 
a number of conditions. Therefore, it was agreed that the commission should 
only be used for disputes ‘involving neither honour nor essential interests’76, 
questions of fact and not law, and finally that the request for a commission 
inquiry and its findings should not be mandatory.77  With these conditions in 
mind, Article 6 of the Convention outlined the provisions for the creation and 
operation of commissions of inquiry. The Hague Convention was revised in 
1907, though the inquiry commission provisions remained largely unaffected. 
The commission was utilised in a number of inquiries and provided a flexible 
means of settling disputes. The UN’s specialist agencies and regional 
organisations also conduct similar inquiries in certain situations. 
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Conducting inquiries is useful for fact finding in particular disputes, and 
again enables the parties to retain a relatively high degree of control over the 
dispute. However, the findings of the inquiries are not mandatorily enforced, 
thus they are of limited utility, especially if states are unwilling to adhere to the 
outcomes.  
International commissions of inquiry have proved invaluable since their 
establishment in 1794. Between 1840 and 1940 states established a total 
number of over sixty commissions in order to deal with disputes arising from the 
injury of foreign nationals. 78  Additionally, various ad hoc commissions were 
created during this time to deal with specific one-off claims. These claims 
commissions, hearing claims for individual loss and thus designed to protect 
individual rights relied heavily on a form of diplomatic protection (as it was the 
states who were party to the proceedings). After the First World War it became 
common practice for agreements to provide that individual claimants could 
make direct claims, rather than go through their state government.79 It is the 
decisions of these commissions, as well as state practice that formed the basis 
of the jurisprudence on state responsibility for injury to foreign nationals.80 
 
- Conciliation 
The term ‘conciliation’ has been defined as,  
A method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to 
which a Commission set up by the Parties, either on a permanent basis or an ad 
hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of the 
dispute and attempts to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of being 
accepted by them or of affording the Parties, with a view to its settlement, such aid 
as they may have requested.81 
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In effect, conciliation goes one step beyond the services offered by mediation, 
involving third party intervention, but in a more formalised and institutionalised 
manner.82 
 The first treaty to provide for conciliation was concluded between 
Sweden and Chile in 1920. The treaty actually emphasised inquiry, however 
one article provided for conciliation procedure. Many other treaties at that time 
dealt with conciliation in a similar manner, though some placed more emphasis 
on the procedure. The situation changed in 1925 for two reasons; a treaty 
between France and Switzerland defined in more precise terms the functions of 
conciliation commissions for the first time, and four of the seven Locarno 
treaties were concluded in which Germany bilaterally agreed with Belgium, 
France, Czechoslovakia and Poland that all disputes should be settled through 
conciliation unless there had been a specific prior agreement that the particular 
dispute should be settled judicially.83 
The mandate of conciliation commissions is to investigate the dispute at 
hand, and to put forward suggestions as to how it should be settled. To this end, 
conciliation commissions may perform various tasks including hearing the 
parties’ accounts, hearing witnesses and so forth. Conciliation is sometimes 
viewed as institutionalised negotiation; the commission’s task is to encourage 
and structure the parties’ exchanges, whilst providing the assistance they 
require in order that the dispute is concluded in an acceptable manner.84 
Around 20 cases of conciliation have been recorded in the ninety years in 
which it has been in existence85. This number is not particularly high, but it is 
worth noting that conciliation enjoys a relatively high rate of success; this is 
probably due to the degree of control which the parties have over the dispute. 
The nature of conciliation means that the outcome of the dispute is dictated by 
the parties’ dialogue. As such, the end result is never a surprise. Furthermore, 
the conciliation commission’s suggestions can be rejected by the parties as they 
are not binding.86 
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Since the end of the Second World War, the place of conciliation in dispute 
settlement has changed somewhat. Conciliation appears to have fallen out of 
favour in bilateral treaty practice, but its role has increased within multilateral 
treaty practice.87 
 
- Arbitration 
The other means of settling general international disputes that have been 
considered thus far in this subsection have been consensual or diplomatic 
means of dispute settlement; arbitration is more of an adjudicative process. 
Arbitration is utilised when what is desired is a decision based on international 
law and is binding on the parties.88 
 Public international and private international arbitration may take place, 
depending on the identities of the parties and what issues are at stake within 
the dispute. Public international arbitration takes place in inter-state disputes, 
whereas private international arbitration allows individuals and corporations to 
be involved as parties. Arbitration can be arranged on an ad hoc basis or 
through a permanent arbitral institution. The earliest forms of arbitration were ad 
hoc in nature and involved setting up a panel of an equal number of arbitrators 
selected by the parties and a neutral arbitrator to whom the case is referred if 
the national members continually disagree. Alternatively, a dispute could be 
referred to a foreign head of state or government to make a decision. Later, a 
third possibility was introduced; referring the dispute to a permanent specially 
qualified individual. In modern arbitration, the most commonly constituted 
tribunal consists of three or five arbitrators whose decision is based on majority 
vote.89 
The selection of arbitrators is often a decision for the parties to make. In a 
typical three person arbitration panel, each party will customarily appoint one 
arbitrator and the third will be selected by mutual agreement. Merrills notes that, 
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for obvious reasons, the result of a collegiate arbitration often turns on the 
decision of the neutral member or members. Deciding who they shall be is 
therefore extremely important to the governments concerned, which may 
sometimes find it difficult to agree on suitable candidates.
90
 
Equally as important as arbitrator selection, are the terms of reference; 
that is, the determination of how the proceedings are to be conducted and the 
question that will need to be answered by the tribunal. It is ultimately for the 
parties to decide on the procedural arrangements. Many permanent tribunals 
have their own procedural rules which may be engaged, though the parties are 
free to create their own rules. The definition of the issue at stake is important 
because it defines the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction; arbitrators only have 
the authority to answer the questions they have been set. This is often a difficult 
issue to agree on because of its overall importance in the dispute.91 
 The basis of the tribunal’s decision is another important issue. Frequently, 
in international disputes, the tribunal is requested to base the decision on the 
relevant aspects of international law. The parties may request that the decision 
be based on other principles, if appropriate, for example domestic law. 
Alternatively, the arbitrators may be given more freedom and be instructed to 
settle the dispute taking into account what is fair and reasonable.92 
 Another issue which needs to be addressed in any discussion of 
arbitration is the effect of the award that has been rendered. An arbitral award is 
said to be binding on the parties, however it may not be final. This means that 
the decision may be appealed or reviewed subject to express grant of this right 
by the parties. Without such express grant, there is no general power to review 
or revise an award. The parties may choose to expressly provide such power if 
they think it could be of use. However, it is important to note that where there 
has been some error or abuse of process, there may be a right to correct this 
without express grant.93 
 Arbitration has many advantages; it enables the parties to retain a high 
degree of control over the dispute right down to the selection of those persons 
who will settle the dispute, as well as the terms of reference and whether the 
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decision will ultimately be subject to review. This high degree of control will 
allow the parties to have confidence in the dispute settlement process. Another 
advantage is that it can be used to produce a solution to a specific problem on 
an agreed basis. Furthermore, arbitration produces a binding decision. For 
these reasons, arbitration has become extremely popular in the last 200 
years.94  
 Despite its advantages, arbitration does suffer a number of limitations. 
With the possibility of an unpredictable outcome, parties may be reluctant to 
submit their dispute to tribunals. Enforcement of decisions can also be 
problematic in arbitration. Although the tribunal produces a binding decision, 
there is no guarantee that the parties will recognise and carry out the award.95 
Arbitration in relation to international investment disputes will be examined in 
more depth later in this chapter. 
 
- International Court 
The international court provides a form of judicial settlement which involves 
referring matters to a permanent tribunal which formulates a legally binding 
decision. This form of dispute settlement developed from the practice of 
arbitration, which explains why the two can be so similar. The term ‘international 
court’ is used to refer to two institutions; the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) which was originally created in 1919 as part of the peace process 
after the First World War, and its successor, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) which was founded in 1945 after the Second World War.96  
The international court has jurisdiction over contentious proceedings and is 
dependent upon obtaining the consent of the requisite parties to the dispute. 
Many international treaties provide advance consent for the court’s jurisdiction, 
so that consent need not be obtained from the parties in each individual dispute 
that may arise. The court may be called upon to deliver binding judgments as 
well as advisory opinions. The court is composed of fifteen judges who are each 
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elected for a renewable term of nine years by the Security Council and General 
Assembly of the UN. Judges are selected for their in-depth knowledge of 
international law as well as their outstanding moral character. Cases may be 
heard by the full court or smaller chambers of fewer judges. The court is 
responsible for establishing the facts of the dispute, identifying the relevant law 
to be applied and producing binding judgements or advisory opinions as 
required.97 
The practice of the ICJ will be examined in greater depth later in the thesis, 
with special reference to the ICJ’s role in the settlement of international 
investment disputes. 
 
- Specialised bodies: trade disputes (From GATT to WTO) 
A number of international specialised bodies have been created in order to 
settle disputes specific to their field. In relation to trade, the GATT98 (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was created (it would later be succeeded by 
the WTO). After the Second World War, a number of institutions were created in 
order to provide the framework which would be necessitated by greater 
economic interdependence. The GATT was created in order to regulate trade 
and trade liberalisation. It was envisaged that the GATT would establish the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO), however this never materialised. In 
order to fill the void left by the failure to create the ITO, in 1994 the World Trade 
Organisation was established.99 The WTO is responsible for overseeing most, if 
not all aspects of world trade. 100  For the WTO rules based system to be 
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effective, it was thought that a mechanism had to be put into place which would 
deal with any trade related disputes that arose. This led to the creation of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)101 which contained provisions for the 
settlement of such disputes. The DSU encourages states to resolve disputes 
amicably, perhaps through consultation, conciliation and mediation where 
possible. Where this is not possible, the DSU provides for panel proceedings 
during which the panel makes an objective assessment of the law and facts 
relevant to the dispute which will assist the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in 
its function. The DSB will hear the case and provide a report to the parties. If 
one party believes there is a problem with a panel report, it may be appealed 
(though appeal is restricted to points of law). The work of the WTO, DSB and 
appellate body will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.102  
 
- United Nations 
Three of the United Nation’s organs play principal roles in the settlement of 
disputes; the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat. The 
Security Council is able to make recommendations with a view to the pacific 
settlement of any dispute at the request of the parties’ themselves. The 
competence of the Security Council is limited to matters concerning 
international peace and security. The General Assembly has powers of 
discussion and recommendation on most issues, except those that fall within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the member state. The Secretariat is able to 
participate in dispute settlement through delegated powers from the Security 
Council and General Assembly, under requests from interested parties and 
lastly under the Secretariat’s own initiative. The involvement of the Security 
Council, General Assembly and the Secretariat represent attempts to settle 
disputes politically rather than legally. The primary legal organ of the United 
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Nations that is responsible for the settlement of disputes is the ICJ (as 
discussed earlier).103 
 
- Regional organisations 
The precise role which a particular regional organisation plays in the 
settlement of disputes obviously depends on the characteristics of the particular 
organisation concerned. Europe provides an interesting example of a regional 
organisation which contributes to dispute settlement. The Council of Europe 
was founded in 1949 in order to facilitate the discussion of issues of common 
interest and to protect human rights. The Council’s biggest achievement to date 
has been the creation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
which is designed to protect human rights in Europe. If a human rights dispute 
was to arise, the Convention requires that the case be heard by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).   
Additionally the European Community (EC) was established through a series 
of treaties which led to the creation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
primary dispute settlement organ of what is now known as the European Union 
(EU). Outside Europe, the Organisation of American States (OAS) was founded 
in 1948 in order to formalise plans for inter-American co-operation. Within the 
OAS, the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Secretariat all have roles to play in the settlement of arising 
disputes.104 
 
2.3.2 Methods of dispute resolution in international investment law 
- Traditional methods 
Historically, international dispute resolution was only available in inter-state 
disputes. This meant that in cases where foreign investors had a problem with 
the investment host state government, they were unable to initiate dispute 
resolution proceedings directly. This is because ‘under public international law, 
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private parties had virtually no rights to bring a claim against a state through a 
dispute settlement mechanism administered by a third party.’105 If a dispute 
arose, investors typically had two courses of action; making use of the national 
courts of the investment host state and diplomatic protection. It is fair to say that 
neither of these two courses of action was particularly effective. 
 
i) National courts 
One of the traditional means of settling international investment disputes 
was referring the case to be heard by the national courts of the host state. From 
the host state’s viewpoint, this method of dispute settlement could be very 
positive. First and foremost, it is relatively inexpensive and, in terms of outcome, 
could be advantageous for reasons that will be discussed below. From the 
investor’s perspective, the involvement of the national courts of the investment 
host state is not a particularly attractive proposition. Investors worry that host 
state judges will not be impartial in disputes where their own countries’ 
government is being pursued. This is often a legitimate concern, as an unbiased 
judiciary cannot be taken for granted, especially in the lesser economically 
developed investment host states. Traditionally, foreign investors hail from 
developed, wealthier countries, and the states that they invest in are less 
developed, poorer nations. Therefore, it is the courts of the less developed 
states that are more likely to be settling the disputes in which their government 
is facing the claim. The judges may feel obliged to show loyalty and therefore 
bias towards their own state. This is especially likely to influence the outcome of 
the dispute where large sums of money are at stake, with the host state 
government being unlikely to be able to afford such a loss. Moreover, in some 
states, the law may obligate the judges to apply local rules rather than 
international law or treaty provisions, where sometimes these do not form part 
of the domestic legal order. Finally, the judges of the ordinary courts of the land 
are unlikely to possess the expertise required to deal with what will usually be 
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complex technical aspects of the highly specialised field of international 
investment law.106 
 
ii)  Diplomatic protection 
Once it had been accepted that foreign investors had the right to expect a 
minimum standard of protection under international law, the foreign investor’s 
home state was able to invoke said law against the offending host state, thus 
protecting their citizen and his/her rights and seek a remedy on their behalf. 
This is known as diplomatic protection.107 The protecting state intervenes on 
behalf of their citizen in order to demand protection and compensation for the 
citizen whose rights had been violated under the international minimum 
standard of protection. The concept of diplomatic protection can be traced back 
as far as the eighteenth century, with jurists such as Vattel asserting that,  
anyone who mistreats a citizen directly offends the state. The sovereign of that 
State must avenge its injury, and if it can, force the aggressor to make full 
repatriation or punish him, since otherwise the citizen would simply not attain the 
goal of civil association, namely security.108 
Other scholars have expressed similar ideas.109 Indeed, the PCIJ explained the 
concept in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions110 case: 
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its 
subject, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another 
State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary 
channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic 
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality 
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asserting its own rights- its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for 
the rules of international law.111 
This ruling has been reiterated in numerous other cases that have come before 
the PICJ and its successor, the ICJ.112 
 In practice, diplomatic protection requires investors attempting to 
pressurise their own home state government into taking the case to an 
international court on their behalf, thus generating a more traditional inter-state 
case. The availability of diplomatic protection depends on a number of factors. 
Firstly, the investor (individual or company) must be a national of the state that 
will be offering its protection. Although this seems simple enough, it is a 
surprisingly contentious issue, because some believe that the investor must 
have been a national at the time of the injury up until the time when the claim is 
presented. Others believe that the investor must continue to be a national of 
that state until the claim is settled. An additional requirement that the investor 
must have exhausted the local remedies in the host state must also be met.113 
 Diplomatic protection is of limited utility to investors for a number of 
reasons. At the outset, the investor has to persuade his government to espouse 
the case on his behalf, which can actually be very difficult to achieve. The 
investor’s lack of an absolute right to diplomatic protection means that whether 
or not the government chooses to undertake the case is completely at its own 
discretion. Even if the government is persuaded by the investor to take up the 
claim, the government may choose to end the protection at any time, or accept 
a reduced settlement. In other words, the investor retains very little control over 
the case once the government becomes involved.114  
 Diplomatic protection can also be disadvantageous for the protecting 
state. For example, undertaking the dispute may have serious repercussions for 
the international relations of the state concerned. Developing states do not 
enjoy being pressurised by developed nations, and the relationship between the 
two can be irreparably damaged when diplomatic protection is employed. 
Additionally, diplomatic protection will invariably involve financial detriment to 
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the states involved. The primary means of resolving a dispute under diplomatic 
protection is negotiation. However, if negotiations fail, disputes can be resolved 
through adjudicative procedures, such as those provided under the auspices of 
the ICJ.115 
 In practice, diplomatic protection is almost insignificant nowadays; all well 
drafted BITs provide for the settlement of arising disputes through judicial 
means instead (usually through international arbitration). Nonetheless, 
diplomatic protection is always available to aggrieved investors, even if the 
protection it provides is only the equivalent of the international minimum 
standard that is available to investors. The international minimum standard 
should be viewed as the foundation of the law of foreign investment that has its 
roots in the principles of customary international law. Though more often than 
not, investors will benefit from a wider scope of protection through BITs and 
international arbitration.116 
 
- Modern investment dispute settlement: arbitration 
The traditional dispute settlement methods discussed in the preceding 
section remained the only two means of resolving investment disputes until the 
1980’s. The 1980’s saw what can only be described as a boom in foreign 
investment. In 1980 around $50 billion of foreign investment was recorded 
worldwide.117 By the end of the decade, in 1989, this figure had skyrocketed to 
$197 billion. 118  This rapid increase in the amount of worldwide foreign 
investment in turn prompted a re-evaluation of the available dispute settlement 
mechanisms and provided an incentive to improve and expand the possibilities 
in this regard.119 The desire to avoid the problems associated with the traditional 
means of settling investment disputes, and the need to meet the demands of 
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the ever-expanding markets for foreign investment, a new dispute settlement 
mechanism was desperately required.120 Writing in 1996, foreign investment 
expert Salacuse states, ‘for foreign investors and their governments, one of the 
great deficiencies of customary international law has been its lack of effective 
and binding mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.’121  
The importance of having an effective dispute settlement mechanism should 
not be underestimated. Foreign investors value a reliable, unbiased mechanism 
in order to protect their investment, and there is evidence to suggest that an 
effective dispute resolution process will encourage foreign investment.122 States 
typically try to entice foreign investment because it is often linked to the 
enhancement of economic development; states therefore also have an obvious 
interest in a strong dispute settlement process.123 
International arbitration represents an ideal manner in which international 
investment disputes may be resolved because it allows the interests of both 
investors and host state governments to be harmonised. Arbitration can be 
defined as, ‘a private court based on party autonomy comprising one or more 
arbitrators, to whom, by means of private agreement, the resolution of legal 
disputes is transferred instead of the domestic courts.’124 
Traditionally, arbitration was understood to take place between states. 
Indeed the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 declared that ‘international 
arbitration has as its object the settlement of disputes between states.’ 125 
Arbitration is the oldest means of peacefully settling disputes between states 
through intervention by a third party. Arbitration has been used in the past by 
many regions of the world for many years. However, the different regions made 
use of different forms of this method of dispute settlement. As a consequence, 
arbitration procedures can vary greatly. 
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Modern arbitration is thought to have begun with the Jay Treaty 126 , 
concluded in 1794 between the USA and Great Britain. The Jay Treaty is 
credited with marking the transition of international arbitration from a diplomatic 
procedure to a juridical process. The Treaty itself provides for the settlement of 
arising disputes by impartial international arbitration and indicates the standards 
that the arbitrators should apply when settling the dispute. Other states began 
to follow suit; the practice of including provisions providing recourse to 
international arbitration in new treaties became commonplace. In fact, ‘by the 
end of the nineteenth century, over a hundred treaties contained reference to 
settlement of disputes by arbitration.’127 The trend towards dispute settlement 
through arbitration was encouraged by the Conventions for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907 which enabled the 
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).128 As the popularity 
of international arbitration increased, other arbitral institutions were founded in 
order to meet rising demand for such services. 
It was thought that the survival of international arbitration might be 
threatened by the advent of the PCIJ. Experts worried that the PCA and the 
PCIJ were too similar and were performing broadly the same function. Many 
believed that arbitration would no longer be required ‘after the commencement 
of institutionalised judicial settlement through the World Court [PCIJ].’129 This 
concern did not materialise, and international arbitration continued to flourish; 
arbitration was distinct enough from the World Court to survive. Important 
differences exist between arbitration and the World Court enabling them to 
coexist. Perhaps one of the most important of these differences is that of 
process. The PCIJ (and now the ICJ) has a fixed procedure for settling disputes, 
whereas arbitration is relatively flexible in nature and can be tailored to the 
parties’ exact needs and wishes. For example, in arbitration, the parties are 
often free to choose the forum, the arbitrators, where the procedure will take 
place and the overall time in which the process should be completed. Another 
important difference is access to the forum: the PCIJ (and now the ICJ) only 
grant access to states, whereas modern arbitration is available to states as well 
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as multinational corporations and individuals. This is particularly relevant in the 
field of international investment where disputes usually arise between individual 
investors/investing multinational corporations and the government of the 
investment host state.130 
As briefly discussed above, traditionally it was thought that arbitration was 
only available in inter-state disputes. Disputes arising between states and aliens 
(like international investment disputes), were not thought to involve an 
international dispute which should be settled through an international process. 
This view resulted from the long established understanding that international 
law is law between sovereign states, and that private individuals and 
multinational corporations lack the necessary status to have recourse to 
international remedies such as international tribunals. What is more, states 
lacked the incentive to develop the notion that international law could apply to 
private parties. In the event that a significant number of disputes involving 
private parties did arise, specially constituted claims tribunals were established 
to remedy the disputes, as recourse to international arbitration was not 
recognised.131 
The tide began to turn after the Second World War. Arbitration, which had 
been synonymous with the settlement of inter-state disputes, developed to 
regulate new situations. This period saw the emergence of international 
commercial arbitration, that is, arbitration between private individuals. Gradually, 
there were calls for a hybrid form of arbitration which could settle disputes not 
only between state parties or private individuals, but in situations where the 
parties were mixed; in other words, disputes involving both private and state 
parties.132  
International investment arbitration is an example of this new, hybrid form of 
arbitration; one party to the dispute is usually a state (often the investment host 
state), whilst the other is a private individual or company (the investor). In the 
1980’s, the settlement of international investment disputes through arbitration 
became very popular. The popularity of arbitration is largely due to the 
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proliferation of BITs which often include provisions designating recourse to 
international arbitration in case of a dispute arising. 
International investment arbitration is not executed by a single body or 
tribunal; it is carried out by various institutions. There are two types of arbitral 
institution; ad hoc tribunals and permanent bodies.  
 
2.4 Ad hoc arbitration 
Ad hoc arbitration is not administered by an institution. Rather, individual 
tribunals are assembled on a case by case basis, resolving the one dispute 
which it was created to hear, and no other. Ad hoc arbitration provides a great 
deal of procedural flexibility and the parties to the dispute retain a great amount 
of control over the dispute itself. For example, the parties may choose to 
conduct their arbitration under existing rules such as UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (which are widely used in ad hoc investment arbitration), under rules 
agreed by the parties, or under rules established by the tribunal in consultation 
with the parties.133  The parties themselves are often highly involved in the 
selection of arbitrators; it is common practice in a panel of three arbitrators for 
each party to choose one person and jointly select the third.134 
A number of important advantages are associated with ad hoc arbitration. 
Obviously, the degree of control which the parties retain is the most obvious 
advantage. Also, ad hoc arbitration is particularly useful where states are 
reluctant to submit themselves to foreign institutions in order that a dispute may 
be settled. Furthermore, ad hoc arbitration can be significantly cheaper than 
institutionalised arbitration; the parties do not have to pay a substantial fee to 
any institution, and are able to stipulate that the arbitration take place in a 
convenient location, saving what could amount to considerable travel costs 
(depending on the length of the proceedings).135  
However, ad hoc arbitration is not without its disadvantages. The major 
drawback, ‘lies in situations in which the parties lack the wide professional and 
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legal knowledge necessary for the formulation of a detail system of rules that 
can regulate all the various aspects of the arbitration proceedings.’136 Linked to 
this, where the parties are responsible for the selection of the arbitrators, the 
parties’ choices may be biased. Arbitrators may be chosen on the basis that 
they will be most likely to settle the case in favour of the party that appoints 
them. In reality this means that a three person arbitrator panel is reduced to the 
decision of the arbitrator that has been jointly selected, as he or she is the most 
likely to be impartial and unbiased. Moreover, this means that arbitrators are not 
being chosen for their merit and expertise in the field. This is despite the fact 
that they are expected to decide complex legal disputes of which their 
knowledge may not be adequate. This is particularly disturbing where large 
sums of money are at stake, as is often the case in international investment 
disputes. 
 
2.5  Institutionalised arbitration 
A number of permanent institutions are also routinely called upon to hear 
international investment disputes. Several of these permanent institutions merit 
discussion in the next chapter. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
International investment law has a long and complex history. The earliest 
forms of regulation of international investment activities were firmly rooted in 
customary principles which were developed according to state practice. It was 
only after the end of the Second World War that attempts were made to 
formalise the rules of international investment law. The new international 
institutions such as the UN became very interested in the realm of foreign 
investment. Numerous treaties, conventions, declarations, codes of conduct 
and guidelines were negotiated during this period, many of which were directly 
related to the regulation of foreign investment. However, many of these 
agreements never went beyond drafting stages, with negotiations failing 
frequently. Even the agreements that were finally concluded often fell short of 
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what had originally been planned for them. This resulted in the establishment of 
nothing more than voluntary schemes and soft law instruments rather than the 
binding hard law instruments that many hoped they would turn out to be. Efforts 
to establish a multilateral investment treaty were particularly ineffective, with 
negotiations in this regard failing on a number of occasions. 
The real phenomenon in the history of international investment law must 
surely be BITs. With thousands of BITs having been concluded between so 
many different states, their impact upon the regulation of foreign investment has 
been profound. What is particularly interesting in terms of this work is the way in 
which BITs have transformed the settlement of international investment 
disputes. Traditionally, disputes that arose between foreign investors and the 
states in which they invest were settled either by the national courts of the state 
receiving the investment or through diplomatic protection. For reasons 
discussed earlier in this chapter, both of these means of settling investment 
disputes were largely ineffective. BITs revolutionised the settlement of 
international investment disputes by providing clauses allowing investors to 
bypass national courts/local remedies and making direct recourse to 
international arbitration available. 
International arbitration as we know it today is very different from its earliest 
form. It was traditionally accepted that international arbitration should only take 
place between state parties. This view was based on the positivist approach to 
international law which sees international law as law between sovereign states. 
Following this approach logically, international arbitration, a distinctly 
international remedy should only be available between state parties. The 
introduction of international commercial arbitration brought about a re-
evaluation of the notion that international arbitration should only take place 
between state parties. International commercial arbitration involves the 
settlement of international disputes between two private parties. What evolved 
was a new, hybrid form of international arbitration between a state party and a 
private party. This new hybrid form of international arbitration was perfect for 
use in the settlement of international investment disputes which typically include 
a state party (the investment host government) and a private party (the investor).  
The precise mechanics of international investment arbitration are a little 
more complicated than one might expect. The system of international 
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investment arbitration does not operate in the same manner as a domestic or 
national judicial process. Domestic disputes are usually submitted to a single, 
authoritative body whose eventual decision may be appealed through a 
designated appellate mechanism. International investment arbitration does not 
function in this way. Rather, international investment disputes are submitted to 
the parties’ tribunal of choice (which is usually specified in the BIT between the 
disputing state party and the state of which the disputing investor is a national). 
There are a multitude of fora which may be referred to in BITs. The forum of 
choice may be a specially constituted ad hoc tribunal that is established to hear 
the one, single case at hand, or one of the many established permanent arbitral 
bodies that habitually settle international investment disputes. Many of the most 
prominent permanent arbitral institutions will be discussed in the next chapter, 
including ICSID and the PCA. Interestingly, whatever forum is used to settle the 
investment dispute, whether ad hoc or permanent, the tribunal to which the 
dispute is submitted is usually of first and last instance; there is no possibility of 
appeal in international investment arbitration.  
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CHAPTER III: ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM OF SETTLING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to evaluate whether the system of 
international investment arbitration (as the primary means of settling 
international investment disputes and as described in the previous chapter) 
provides an adequate and effective means of settling international investment 
disputes. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter is divided into several 
sections. The first part of the chapter will consider the requisite strengths and 
weaknesses associated with both ad hoc tribunals and permanent arbitral 
bodies. The next part of the chapter will consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of several specific arbitral institutions. The third and final part of 
the chapter will examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system of 
international investment arbitration as a whole.  
The chapter will show that there are a number of important strengths 
associated with both ad hoc and permanent tribunals, and indeed that individual 
permanent arbitral bodies have significant advantages. In fact, the system of 
international investment arbitration as a whole has many strengths. However, 
ad hoc, permanent tribunals, individual institutions and indeed the system as a 
whole do also have critical weaknesses.1  
Any discussion of the system of international investment arbitration must 
examine both ad hoc and institutional forms because they are both commonly 
used in international investment arbitration. Furthermore, the chapter analyses 
the most prominent permanent arbitral institutions because they are the 
tribunals that are regularly settling international investment disputes. Of the 
institutions that will be discussed in this chapter, ICSID will be examined in the 
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greatest depth due to the fact that it is the most popular of all institutions in the 
settlement of international investment disputes.2 
 
3.2 Ad hoc arbitration 
 Ad hoc arbitration is not administered by a permanent institution 
according to any particular set of formalised rules or procedures. Rather, 
individual tribunals are created in order to resolve the single dispute at hand. 
There are two different forms of ad hoc arbitration; it may be carried out in 
accordance with specially formulated procedural rules, such as the UNCITRAL 
rules of arbitration3, or it may be completely ad hoc, not being carried out in 
accordance with such procedural rules. Both forms will be considered under the 
general term ‘ad hoc arbitration’ in this section.  
 
3.2.1 Advantages of ad hoc arbitration 
Ad hoc arbitration has many advantages, although many commentators 
would probably agree that the most important of them is the flexibility which it 
can offer the parties involved in the dispute. The ad hoc arbitration process can 
be shaped to meet the requirements of both the parties, as well as the 
particularities of the individual case. It is for the parties themselves to agree on 
every aspect of the arbitration, from choosing the seat of arbitration to the 
procedural rules which will be followed. Moreover, by mutual agreement, the 
parties are able to select which arbitrators will hear the case. Research has 
shown that in cases where the parties have been actively involved in the 
resolution of the dispute (for example where the parties have exercised a high 
degree of control over the proceedings), the parties are much more likely to 
uphold and implement the decision of the tribunal.4  
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Non-institutionalised arbitration is also useful in disputes where the 
parties are unable to come to an agreement regarding the use of an arbitral 
institution, and in situations where parties do not wish to submit themselves to 
foreign institutions (for a multitude of different reasons state parties in particular 
are often unwilling to do so). Such states are usually much more comfortable 
settling their disputes using ad hoc arbitration where they are able to retain a 
high degree of control over the process.5  
 Ad hoc arbitration also allows disputes to be settled very quickly and 
economically. It provides one of the fastest forms of arbitration; disputes may be 
settled extremely quickly in this manner. Ad hoc arbitration may be carried out 
as quickly as the parties wish; it is not delayed by institutionally imposed 
deadlines and institutional bureaucracy. Such arbitration also provides one of 
the least expensive options for arbitration. Most permanent arbitral institutions 
charge relatively high administration fees, which parties can and often do 
choose to avoid through the use of ad hoc arbitration. Additionally, parties will 
have to pay to travel to the institution when using institutional arbitration. 
Obviously the associated travel costs will vary depending on how far away the 
seat is. Parties might avoid over inflated travel costs in ad hoc arbitration by 
selecting a mutually convenient venue for the arbitration to take place.6  
 
3.2.2 Disadvantages of ad hoc arbitration 
In some ways, the greatest strength of ad hoc arbitration (flexibility) is 
also its greatest downfall. It is generally accepted that ad hoc arbitration is 
procedurally much more hazardous that institutional arbitration, owing to its 
flexible nature.7  
Another problematic aspect of ad hoc arbitration is the degree of control 
which the parties can exert over the dispute on many matters. In this form of 
arbitration, the parties may have control over where the dispute should be 
settled, which law should be applied, and even which arbitrators should hear the 
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case. The difficulty with the parties having such a high degree of choice and 
control is that they may not be the best people to make such important 
decisions. For example, the parties may be too close to the dispute to exercise 
impartiality, or may simply lack the relevant expertise and knowledge to know 
what would be best for the dispute.8  
One particular aspect of ad hoc arbitration where the parties’ control, and 
extensive involvement in the procedure is particularly troublesome, is the 
parties’ right to select the panel of arbitrators who will settle the dispute. It is 
common for three arbitrators to be chosen to form the arbitration panel; each 
party chooses one person, and the third arbitrator is chosen by way of mutual 
agreement. It would be too optimistic, and indeed unrealistic to believe that the 
parties will make impartial choices in this regard. Simply put, the parties will 
each choose an arbitrator whom they believe is likely to be most sympathetic to 
their own point of view. As for the third arbitrator, chosen in agreement, again, 
the parties will put forward persons who they believe will favour them, in the 
hope that the other party might by chance agree to the selection. Of the three 
arbitrators then, only one is likely to be at all unbiased and impartial.9 Even if 
this is perhaps too harsh an opinion, and the parties do attempt to select 
arbitrators in an unbiased manner, there is also an issue of competency. The 
parties may not be experts in the particular field of the dispute, and may 
therefore lack the expertise to be able to select appropriate arbitrators.10 If the 
parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the decision may be 
deferred to a disinterested third party.11 
A final weakness of the ad hoc form of arbitration is related to the speed 
with which the dispute may be resolved. One of the purported benefits of ad hoc 
arbitration (namely the speed at which disputes are able to be resolved) is only 
advantageous where the parties dedicate themselves to adhering to the strict 
deadlines that they have set. Thus, the dispute will only be resolved as fast as 
the parties themselves permit.12  
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3.3 Institutionalised arbitration 
 The general strengths and weaknesses of institutional arbitration will be 
considered, before moving on to briefly highlight the requisite strengths and 
weaknesses of several individual institutions themselves.  
 
3.3.1 Advantages of institutionalised arbitration 
 The most obvious advantage of institutionalised arbitration is that the 
institution provides a rigid procedural framework and process for the arbitral 
proceedings which has already been put to the test in prior disputes. The 
institution is able to provide extensive supervision of the proceedings and 
ensure that the administration is straight forward and efficient.13   
A great advantage of institutionalised arbitration is that the institution is 
able to impose tight deadlines and time limits. Often, at each stage of the 
proceedings, parties will be given deadlines; for example for the submission of 
documents and required responses. Often, if either of the parties defaults in this 
regard, sanctions are applied.14  
Arbitral institutions also usually continuously compile vast databases of 
experts who may be appointed to settle disputes. The advantage of this is that 
the parties will have a large pool of potential experts at their disposal. The 
parties usually either select the arbitrators themselves or they can ask the 
institution to appoint arbitrators to resolve the dispute on their behalves. The 
latter may be advantageous, as the institution will have greater experience and 
be more knowledgeable in this regard.15   
Another important advantage of institutional arbitration is that it does 
provide the physical facilities which are required for arbitration. This means that 
an appropriate venue and associated facilities are readily available for the 
arbitration. The convenience of these facilities may sometimes be 
underestimated.16   
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A final advantage of institutionalised arbitration is neutrality. There is a 
perception that arbitral institutions provide more of a neutral dispute settlement 
mechanism than other means of dispute settlement might. For example, use of 
a state’s national courts might lead to bias towards the interests of the state; 
whereas an arbitral institution has no interest in the dispute and is thus able to 
provide a completely neutral forum. 
 
3.3.2 Disadvantages of institutionalised arbitration  
One of the major disadvantages of institutionalised arbitration is cost. 
Institutions often charge relatively high administrative fees. Often fees are 
calculated using a base fee plus a proportion of the amount in dispute. This 
means that if a large amount of money is in dispute, the fees may be very high 
indeed. However, even if there is only a relatively small amount in dispute, the 
base fee could be proportionally higher than that amount. Both situations could 
lead to high costs.17  
Another important disadvantage of institutionalised arbitration is the fixed 
process which must be adhered to. Frequently, the institution’s bureaucracy can 
lead to excessive delay. Such delay may in turn also contribute to higher costs, 
since the dispute is ongoing for a longer period of time.18  
Additionally, a feature of institutionalised arbitration that in some 
instances may be advantageous, can in other instances be disadvantageous; 
the strict deadlines imposed by the institution. Such strict deadlines are 
desirable in one respect, as they contribute to the settlement of disputes in a 
timely fashion. Deadlines are imposed at almost all stages of the dispute, giving 
the parties a strict timeframe in which to submit any documents or responses. 
However, the drawback of having to adhere to such rigid deadlines is that the 
parties may not have enough time to fully prepare their submissions.19 
  
3.3.3 Specific arbitral bodies 
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-International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States 20  was adopted on 18 March 1965 in 
Washington. It entered into force the following year on 14 October 1966. At 
present, there are 158 signatory states to the Convention.21 The Convention 
was supported by the World Bank, which has an obvious interest in 
encouraging economic development 22  (which the Convention is thought to 
advance). As detailed in its preamble, the objective of the Convention ‘is to 
promote economic development through the creation of a favourable investment 
climate.’23  
The main manner in which the Convention is thought to encourage 
investment is through the provision of a ‘credible mechanism for settling 
disputes’.24 The Convention established the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (more commonly referred to as ICSID). Completely 
unique, the Centre is the only forum dedicated exclusively to the settlement of 
international investment disputes. It is thought that investors will feel secure in 
the knowledge that should a dispute arise, there will be a fair, reliable and 
expeditious mechanism for resolving that dispute. It is thought that investors will 
therefore be more confident in their investments, thus they will invest increased 
sums more frequently. 
Despite its grand designs, it is fair to say that ICSID had modest 
beginnings: 
The convention entered into force in 1966 but the first case was not registered 
before 1972. The 1970s and 1980s saw steady but only intermittent action. One 
or two cases per year were typical for that period. Since the mid-1990s, there 
has been a dramatic increase in activity. In 1995 there were four ICSID 
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arbitrations pending. In early 2007 more than 100 were pending. On average 
about two new cases are registered every month.25 
Despite its fairly understated start, ICSID has become one of, if not the 
most important, forum for international investment dispute settlement; 
As evidenced by its large membership, considerable caseload, and by the 
numerous references to its arbitration facilities in investment treaties and laws, 
ICSID plays an important role in the field of international investment and 
economic development. Today, ICSID is considered to be the leading 
international arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute 
settlement.26  
 ICSID has a relatively simple organisational structure, consisting of an 
Administrative Council and its Secretariat. The Administrative council forms 
ICSID’s governing body. It is comprised of one representative from each ICSID 
Convention member state; each representative has equal voting powers. The 
President of the World Bank is also the Chairman of the Administrative Council 
(though he/she has no right to vote). The Council convenes annually at the 
same time as the annual World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings 
take place. The Secretariat is comprised of the Secretary General, Deputy 
Secretary General and Staff. The Secretary General is the head of the 
Secretariat, its legal representative and acts as the registrar. The Deputy 
Secretary General is responsible for the general day-to-day running of the 
Secretariat which itself performs a number of important functions, including, 
providing institutional support for the initiation and conduct of ICSID 
proceedings; assistance in the constitution of conciliation commissions, arbitral 
tribunals and ad hoc committees and supporting their operations; and 
administering the proceedings and finances of each case. The Secretariat also 
provides support to the Administrative Council and ensures the functioning of 
ICSID as an international institution and a centre for publication of information 
and scholarship.27 
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The Secretariat also maintains the ICSID panels of conciliators and 
arbitrators. Each member state may allocate four persons and the Chairman of 
the Administrative Council may allocate ten people to the panels. The panels 
provide a pool of arbitrators from which the parties to ICSID proceedings may 
select the conciliators and arbitrators to act in an individual case. In the event 
that the Chairman of the Administrative Council is asked to appoint conciliators 
or arbitrators in ICSID proceedings, the appointees must be drawn from the 
panels.28  
The costs of administrating ICSID are borne by the World Bank, and the 
costs of individual proceedings are incurred by the parties to the dispute. ICSID 
itself does not conciliate or arbitrate disputes; rather it provides the institutional 
and procedural framework for tribunals which are constituted on a case by case 
basis. ICSID actually provides two sets of procedural rules: the ICSID 
Convention, Regulation and Rules and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. The 
former were the original Rules established to deal with international investment 
disputes. The Rules provide a system of dispute settlement that uniquely 
specialises in the settlement of international investment disputes. It offers 
standard clauses which the parties may use, specific rules of procedure and 
institutional support. Institutional support includes assistance with the selection 
of arbitrators and the conduct of the proceedings, which may involve providing a 
venue for arbitration to take place and assisting with the financial arrangements 
surrounding the arbitration.29 
Today, the 158 30  member states and the many hundreds, if not 
thousands of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties grant ICSID 
jurisdiction in case disputes arise during the course of investment. By becoming 
a signatory to the ICSID Convention, states give consent for aggrieved foreign 
investors to take their dispute to the Centre for settlement. In this way, foreign 
investors feel safe in the knowledge that should a dispute arise, there is a 
credible dispute settlement mechanism available to them. Ratification of the 
ICSID Convention is seen as a sort of guarantee or insurance against host 
states acting in a negative manner towards foreign investors and their 
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investments (for example in case the host state attempts to expropriate their 
assets). This ‘insurance’ enables foreign investors to feel more confident in their 
investment in the host state, which in turn the host state hopes will attract more 
foreign investment.31 Foreign investment is seen as desirable as it is thought to 
increase the state’s wealth, infrastructure and enhance development.32  
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention defines the Centre’s jurisdiction, 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that 
State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given 
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.33  
Article 26 Provides, 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless 
otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any 
other remedy. A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local 
administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration 
under this Convention.34 
This means that once the parties consent to arbitration under ICSID, no other 
remedy can be sought, and thus other remedies should be exhausted before 
commencing ICSID arbitration. 
If one party refuses to co-operate, proceedings are not thwarted. For 
example, if a party refuses to choose an arbitrator, ICSID will appoint one on 
their behalf. Furthermore, the tribunal will decide on matters of jurisdiction, and 
non-submission of materials and non-appearance will not halt proceedings.35 
 Article 42(1) stipulates the law that is applicable to a dispute that is 
submitted to ICSID arbitration, 
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The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall 
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rule on 
the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.
36 
Interestingly, at the time it was created, Article 42(1) went against the prevailing 
view of developing nations that disputes which arose due to expropriation or 
nationalisation should be settled by the application of the national laws and 
remedies of the investment host states.37 Over time developing nations have 
probably come to accept ICSID and its arbitration because they view it as 
necessary to attract foreign investment; investors favour states that are party to 
the ICSID Convention because they feel assured having a credible dispute 
settlement mechanism available to them should a dispute arise in the course of 
their investment.38 
All awards made by tribunals under the ICSID Convention are fully 
binding, final and not subject to review (except in the limited conditions set out 
by Articles 49-52 of the Convention itself). Parties may seek review of a final 
award in a number of circumstances. The limited situations in which an award 
may be reviewed centre around procedural issues such as: the tribunal being 
improperly constituted; the tribunal manifestly exceeding its powers; one or 
more members of the tribunal was corrupt; there was a serious departure from 
one or more fundamental rules of procedure; the award failed to state the 
reasons on which it is based.39 If an award is reviewed, there are three possible 
outcomes; interpretation, revision and annulment. Annulment falls short of 
appeal in a significant manner. If an award is annulled, it simply nullifies the 
decision, without replacing or substituting it for a new one. Annulment will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter six of the thesis. 
If a party refuses to comply with the award that has been rendered, it will 
be treated as a breach of the Convention and lead to the revival of the right of 
diplomatic protection by the investor’s home state government. Generally, the 
Convention provides an effective system of enforcement of awards, which are 
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binding in every state which is party to the convention. 40  ICSID arbitration 
proceedings are fully self-contained, independent of any outside bodies. This 
means that domestic courts do not have the power to intervene in proceedings, 
review or set aside any awards rendered.41 
 The Additional Facility Rules were created in 1978 by the Administrative 
Council. The Additional Facility was created in order to open up ICSID 
arbitration to include cases that would normally fall outside of its jurisdiction. 
This means that ICSID may now be used to settle disputes where only one 
disputing party is a member of the ICSID Convention, or a national of a state 
party to the ICSID convention. The Additional Facility also enables ICSID to 
hear cases that do not arise directly from an investment, and also fact-finding 
cases.42 
 The Additional Facility has been very important in disputes arising from 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) where only the United 
States has ratified the ICSID Convention, whilst its contracting partners Mexico 
and Canada have not. Article 1120 of NAFTA permits arbitration under the 
ICSID Additional Facility, as well as under the UNCITRAL Rules. Practically, 
many of the disputes that do arise through NAFTA are settled under ICSID’s 
Additional Facility (this is largely due to the availability of institutional support 
through ICSID).43  
Arbitration under the Additional Facility is not regulated by the ICSID 
Convention, but rather by the Additional Facility Rules. The consequence of this 
is that the ICSID Convention’s provisions on the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards do not apply; instead the New York Convention44 governs these 
issues. Furthermore, unlike under the traditional ICSID Convention, under the 
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Additional Facility, awards rendered are not exempt from the scrutiny and 
setting aside by national courts possessing the relevant authority.45  
With the explosion in ICSID Convention membership numbers, the 
caseload of the centre has also increased rapidly. To date, 24946 cases have 
been concluded altogether, and 15047 cases are currently pending. On average, 
the centre now sees at least one new case each month.48 In 2008, of the 318 
investment cases commenced, 202 were filed with ICSID, 83 under the 
UNCITRAL Rules and a further 27 with other institutions and/or under other 
rules.49 If ICSID’s caseload is considered to be a measure of its achievement, 
the centre would undoubtedly be deemed a roaring success. Indeed, ICSID 
considers itself to be ‘the leading international arbitration institution devoted to 
investor-state dispute settlement.’50 Whilst a large caseload is testament to the 
success of an arbitration institution, it should not be the only indicator. The 
opinions of experts on the subject and users of the institution should be taken 
into account. 
 
i) Advantages 
 A huge benefit of ICSID as an arbitration institution is that it provides a 
neutral and completely self-contained mechanism for resolving disputes. Often, 
in international arbitration, the parties may select the place of arbitration, or it 
may be specified in the arbitration rules which are to be applied to the dispute. 
The place chosen will determine the procedural law which is to govern the case, 
and the local courts may be able to intervene, for example to designate the 
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tribunal or grant interim measures. 51  However, in ICSID arbitration, the 
convention explicitly states that the place of the arbitration shall have no impact 
upon the proceedings. ICSID provides an entirely self-contained dispute 
resolution process that is completely de-localised. ICSID also oversees the 
appointment of the arbitrators, who in turn oversee all aspects of the 
proceedings. Any awards that are issued are final and binding on the parties 
involved, and are not subject to review (except in the extremely limited 
circumstances where annulment may be permitted).52 
 ICSID is also praised for its clear and reasonable approach to the costs 
involved in arbitration. Like all major arbitral institutions, ICSID provides a 
clearly defined, transparent structure for calculating the likely costs of arbitration. 
Uniquely though, the cost structure provides a fixed rate fee to arbitrators. The 
fee is around $2000 per day, a figure which is quite low, particularly when 
compared with the fees which other arbitrators typically charge. Furthermore, 
when compared with other arbitration institutions, ICSID’s administrative fees 
are also comparatively low.53 
 Another advantage of ICSID is that it provides privacy and transparency 
at the same time; the two concepts are traditionally thought to be mutually 
exclusive. In most international arbitration, at least some degree of privacy and 
confidentiality is observed. In ICSID arbitration, any submissions are 
confidential, and oral hearings take place in private. However, unlike in other 
international arbitration, ICSID maintains public registers of dispute resolution 
proceedings and frequently publishes awards with parties’ consent. Additionally, 
many parties choose to publish awards unilaterally. This means that in practice, 
almost all ICSID awards are published and easily accessible to the public. This 
relatively high level of transparency has positive side effects; 
because many states want to be considered investment-friendly, the prospect of 
being named- publicly- in an ICSID arbitration may intimidate host states more 
than the threat of other international arbitration proceedings and provide 
investors with more leverage in early negotiations.54 
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ICSID’s settlement and enforcement rates may indicate a great 
advantage over other forms of international arbitration. What has been termed 
by some experts as ‘the world bank factor’ may have contributed to this. There 
is a perception that failure to settle, or respect the ICSID award may have 
indirectly negative political consequences, such as lack of credibility with the 
World Bank. In reality, this may or may not be the case, however it is thought 
that the perception itself, even if unfounded, may be enough to actively 
encourage respect for the award.55 
 
ii) Disadvantages 
Although ICSID has a number of important advantages, and has become 
extremely popular, it has certainly not escaped criticism. Many experts argue 
that ‘as ICSID booms, cracks have surfaced.’56  
One of the most serious criticisms that ICSID has faced is that it lacks 
legitimacy. One author has suggested that ICSID’s lack of legitimacy is 
manifested in three ways; ‘a lack of legal security due to inconsistencies in 
jurisprudence, opacity of the process, and lack of a mechanism to mediate 
conflicts of interests between arbitrators.’57 
  In terms of inconsistent decisions, Lauder 58  and SGS 59  illustrate the 
capacity of different tribunals to reach inconsistent, and sometimes manifestly 
conflicting decisions. The author goes on to suggest that those decisions, ‘may 
have jeopardised the elements of legal security and predictability so essential to 
the international investment regime.’60 These cases will be discussed in more 
depth later in the thesis. 
                                            
55 Ibid. 
56 I Penusliski, ‘A dispute systems design diagnosis of ICSID’ in M Waibel et al (eds), 
The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 2010) 
520. 
57 Ibid 522. 
58 CME Czech Republic B.V. v Czech Republic, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
Partial Award of 13 September 2001 and IIC 62 (2003), Final Award of 14 March 2003 
and Lauder v Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2001 (Ad hoc- UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules). 
59 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) 42 ILM 1290 and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004).  
60 I Penusliski, ‘A dispute systems design diagnosis of ICSID’ (n 56) 522. 
68 
 
Other authors have reached the same conclusion.61 The accusation that 
ICSID proceedings are too opaque, especially when public matters are at stake 
also contributes to the alleged lack of legitimacy. Meetings are often held in 
secret, with members being unknown, and awards are not necessarily always 
fully disclosed. The thorny issue with transparency though, is how it may be 
reconciled with the concept of confidentiality, which is traditionally thought to be 
one of the major advantages of the current system of international arbitration.62 
Furthermore, ICSID’s legitimacy may be impaired by the lack of mechanisms 
that are available ‘to tackle conflicts of interests amongst arbitrators.’63 The 
ability of the parties to select the arbitrators may allow for the selection of 
biased arbitrators.64  
Some experts have also criticised ICSID’s cost structure, and the length 
of proceedings. Although the costs are clearly defined before the arbitration 
even begins, some commentators believe that the costs are too high. This is a 
particularly problematic issue for developing nations who do not have unlimited 
resources at their disposal to fund legal defence if an investor wishes to take a 
dispute to arbitration. This is particularly worrying, given that statistically most 
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investment arbitration cases are brought against developing states.65 Moreover, 
the average length of time it takes for a dispute to be completely resolved from 
start to finish with ICSID is several years. The process is not as quick and easy 
as we may have been led to believe.66 
The significance of the disadvantages and indeed their effects should not 
be underestimated. A survey completed in 2004 found that over a third of ICSID 
clients are dissatisfied with the quality of ICSID’s arbitral awards. 67  In fact, 
recently, a number of states have completely withdrawn or seriously limited their 
ICSID Convention membership. Bolivia fully withdrew its membership in 200768, 
asserting that ICSID had become a mechanism for foreign investors to threaten 
arbitration when faced with policy decisions and legislation from host state 
governments that adversely affected them. Bolivia also suggested that within 
ICSID there is a bias towards investors and their corporations and against 
states. Bolivia also cited the lack of an appeal mechanism and confidentiality of 
ICSID proceedings as further justification for its denunciation. 69  Ecuador 
followed in Bolivia’s footsteps and denounced from the ICSID Convention in 
2009 citing similar reasons for the departure as Bolivia did in 2007, namely an 
alleged bias within ICSID towards the protection of investors at the expense of 
the host state.70 
 
-United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
 Resolution 2205(XXI) of the United Nations’ General Assembly 
established the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
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(UNCITRAL) on 17th December 1966. The General Assembly recognised that 
often member states have different trade laws, and that legal disparities 
between different state trade laws may act as barriers to international trade. The 
Commission was created in order that it should attempt to reduce or entirely 
eradicate such barriers to trade by ‘further[ing] the progressive harmonization 
and unification of international trade’.71  
 The Commission itself is comprised of 60 member states who are 
elected by the UN General Assembly. Membership is carefully structured in 
order that it should ‘be representative of the world’s various geographic regions 
and its principal economic and legal systems.’72 Members are elected for six 
year terms, with half the membership expiring every three years.73 
 The Commission is not a judicial body and therefore does not hear cases. 
Rather, disputes are settled in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.74 The Rules were adopted by the Commission on 28th April 1976. They,  
provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree 
for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial 
relationship and are widely used in ad hoc arbitrations as well as administered 
arbitrations. The Rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a 
model arbitration clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment 
of arbitration and the conduct of arbitral proceedings and establishing rules in 
relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the award.
75 
 Around 20-30% of publicised investment arbitration cases are settled 
under UNCITRAL arbitration rules. 76  By 2007, of the 290 international 
investment disputes that had been settled, 80 had been resolved under the 
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration. 77  The other disputes were settled in 
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accordance with ICSID procedure. The choice of procedural rules seems to 
amount largely to a choice between the two.78 A number of famous cases have 
been settled under the UNCITRAL rules, for example the Iran claims tribunal. 
The UNCITRAL rules are often the rules of choice for arbitration under NAFTA 
and in ad hoc arbitration.79 
 
i) Advantages 
One of the advantages of settling disputes in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Rules is that the ‘Rules are characterized by...[a high] level of 
confidentiality.’ 80  This high degree of confidentiality is possible because 
UNCITRAL proceedings are governed by the local law of the seat of the 
arbitration. The local law may (and often does) impose a duty of confidentiality. 
It is thought that the high degree of confidentiality is one of the main reasons 
that parties choose to arbitrate their dispute under the UNCITRAL Rules. The 
main advantage of the arbitration taking place ‘in a completely closed 
environment...[is that] all sensitive information and documents remain private 
and confidential.’81 The Rules themselves make reference to the privacy and 
confidentiality of the hearings and the awards, but not the proceedings 
themselves.82 There is talk of revising the Rules in the future, in order that they 
should reflect a more transparent (and less confidential) approach to dispute 
settlement. The Rules have already been revised once, in 2006; those revisions 
became effective as of August 2010. However, the revised Rules did not touch 
on the issue of confidentiality and transparency, though it is expected that the 
Working Group will commence work on this area in the near future. Thus, the 
current advantage of a high degree of confidentiality under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules may soon cease to exist.83  
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ii) Disadvantages 
 One major disadvantage of the UNCITRAL Rules is the lack of a review 
mechanism for awards. As noted above, the ICSID Convention does provide 
some (albeit very limited) scope for the review of awards through its Article 52 
Annulment Procedure.84 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not provide for 
any form review, either by means of annulment or appeal of decisions. This is 
disadvantageous because neither party can seek redress if they feel that the 
award is unjust, or if there has been some abuse of process. It must be noted 
that the parties may have an indirect right to review of the award, but only if the 
local law of the seat of arbitration allows this. This is not an ideal situation 
though, as it may significantly lengthen the dispute. In turn, this may cause the 
parties to incur greater costs and suffer more general inconvenience. The 
review of decisions by domestic courts is also quite undesirable, at least in part, 
because it defeats the object of taking the dispute to international arbitration 
from the outset. The advantages of impartiality and neutrality of international 
arbitration are effectively destroyed if the dispute is to ultimately be reviewed by 
domestic courts. Parties will also be dubious about this review practice, 
particularly if the seat of arbitration is not thought to have a completely 
independent and capable judiciary. Thus, the lack of review mechanism in the 
UNCITRAL Rules is a  potentially enormous downfall; it may frequently lead to 
parties in need of dispute settlement facilities overlooking the UNCITRAL Rules, 
in favour of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention. ICSID might be 
preferable because it does provide some self-contained form of review, and 
does not involve deferral to domestic courts.85   
  
-Permanent Court of Arbitration 
The PCA was established by the Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes of 1899. The Convention was subsequently amended in 
1907. The PCA is rather curiously named; it is not a court or a judicial body, 
                                            
84
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States (n 20). 
85 S Jagusch (n 77) 102-104. 
73 
 
in the conventional understanding of that term, but an administrative 
organization with the object of having permanent and readily available means to 
serve as the registry for purposes of international arbitration and other related 
procedures, including commissions of enquiry and conciliation.86  
 Each member state has the right to nominate four persons to the list 
from which arbitrators are chosen. Additionally, the PCA offers registry services 
and support to ad hoc tribunals. The PCA often administers arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Rules.87 The Court typically deals with disputes on the matters 
of territory and human rights, as well as commercial and investment disputes 
which may arise under bilateral and multilateral treaties.88 
Originally, the PCA was intended to be an institution for the settlement of 
inter-state disputes; this is reflected in the wording of its founding conventions. 
However, today the court enjoys a wide jurisdiction. The PCA is capable of 
hearing disputes between ‘states and international organizations or private 
persons, between international organizations and between international 
organizations and private persons.’89 The Court’s mandate was broadened in 
1935, when it heard the case of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) v China90. 
This was the first case between a state party and an individual to be heard by 
the PCA. RCA v China set the precedent for the Court’s mandate and future 
activities. It is now particularly common for the PCA to facilitate the settlement 
of disputes between governments and private individuals where the latter has 
invested in the former’s territory and where problems have arisen during the 
course of the investment.91 
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The Court has interesting links with other international arbitral institutions. 
In 1968, the PCA entered into an agreement with ICSID which provided for the 
‘use of staff and facilities in connection with proceedings conducted at the 
headquarters of one institution but under the auspices of the other.’92 A similar 
agreement was concluded in 1990 with MIGA.93 Other comparable agreements 
have been entered into, for example those with the International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and the International Federation of Commercial 
Arbitration Institutions (IFCAI).94 
The PCA’s relationship with the ICJ is rather intriguing as both 
institutions sit at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Perhaps even more 
interestingly, ‘many members of the International Court of Justice, past and 
present, were or are members of the Permanent Court.’95 Furthermore, the 
flexibility of the PCA’s facilities enable it to assume a role which the ICJ cannot 
emulate (due to limitations of jurisdiction and due to the ICJ’s adjudicatory 
nature). For these reasons then, the two institutions have had and continue to 
have a close relationship, but do have important differences. 
From the early years of its establishment, around 1910 to the 1990’s, the 
PCA heard on average around 20 to 30 cases annually. Since the 1990’s that 
figure has increased dramatically to around 65 cases per year in the early 
2000’s. 96  Many of the above cases will have involved investment related 
matters, and the PCA’s contribution to settling international investment disputes 
and development of foreign investment law as a discipline cannot be overlooked.
  
i) Advantages 
One of the advantages of the PCA is the flexibility which it can provide. 
Although the Court itself is situated at the Peace Palace in The Hague, 
proceedings can either take place on site, or anywhere else that the parties 
agree that they should take place. This allows parties to the dispute to take 
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advantage of the physical facilities that the Court has to offer, or if it is more 
convenient, they can choose to find their own venue.97  
Another advantage of the PCA is that generally, proceedings take place 
in camera (unless the parties specify otherwise). This means that PCA 
arbitrations generally provide a high degree of confidentiality, which is often a 
top priority for the parties involved.98  
 
ii) Disadvantages 
One of the disadvantages of having the PCA resolve disputes is the lack 
of a rigid cost structure. The administrative costs are clearly defined from the 
outset. However, the fees payable to the arbitrators are variable, and therefore 
cannot be known before entering into the dispute resolution process. Arbitrator 
fees are determined by the mutual agreement of the parties and the arbitrator. 
The problem with the lack of a set arbitrator fee is that arbitrators can command 
varying amounts in remuneration for their services.99 
 
-International Court of Justice 
 According to Article 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
ICJ is the ‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations’100. The Court is charged 
with the task of settling the disputes submitted to it by UN member states in 
accordance with international law. Additionally, the Court is also often called 
upon to give advisory opinions. The ICJ is limited to hearing disputes between 
states, as it operates under the traditional view that international law is 
applicable to conduct between state parties.101 It is for this reason that the 
Court’s role in international investment dispute settlement has been modest; 
investment related disputes are usually between states and investors. However, 
if an investor can persuade their home state to take up the case on their behalf, 
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the Court may be called upon to hear the dispute. In this way, the ICJ has been 
called upon to hear international investment disputes on a small number of 
occasions.102 
Only three investment disputes have come before the ICJ in the post-war 
period: The Anglo-Iranian Case103 ; Barcelona Traction104  and ELSI105 . The 
Anglo-Iranian Case concerned a UK oil company, which had a concession in 
Iran dating from 1933. In 1951 the Iranian parliament nationalised the oil 
industry. The company invoked an arbitration clause which was rejected by Iran. 
The UK government then took up the case, and so it was referred to the ICJ. 
The Court held that the UK could not invoke the treaties with Iran on which it 
sought to rely, as they were concluded before the ratification of a 1930 
Declaration which accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Accordingly, the Court 
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.106  
The Barcelona Traction case involved a holding company in Canada which 
was to develop a system for producing and distributing electricity in Spain. 
Shares in the company were predominantly held by Belgian nationals. The 
company was declared bankrupt and lost any rights over its property. New 
shares were issued, and these were sold to a Spanish company. Belgium 
initiated proceedings, claiming reparation for the shares. Belgium claimed 
jurisdiction on the basis of a 1927 treaty with Spain. Spain refuted this, claiming 
that Belgium did not have the required standing to initiate proceedings. The 
Court held that Belgium did in fact lack standing. Lowenfeld commented that, 
special arrangements could provide substantive protections or avenues for dispute 
settlement. But customary law would not be built from these arrangements, or at 
least had not been built. Like the United States Supreme Court six years earlier, the 
International Court of Justice saw an ‘intense conflict of systems and interests’ and 
decided to get out of the way.107 
The third and final case to be heard by the ICJ on the subject of foreign 
investment is the ELSI case. The case concerned an Italian electronic 
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manufacturing company (ELSI), which was owned by a larger American 
company. ELSI relied heavily on patents, licences and assistance from its 
parent company. ELSI was not a success, and never became economically self-
sufficient. As a result of this, the American company decided not to invest any 
more capital in its Italian subsidiary. ELSI made plans to shut down production. 
The local authorities obtained a requisition order, and ELSI then declared itself 
bankrupt. The authorities publicly announced that they intended to take over 
ELSI’s assets through a subsidiary. Discussions about the takeover (which was 
to include settlement of ELSI’s debts) were held. Discussions did not come to 
fruition, and therefore auctions of ELSI’s assets were scheduled to be held. The 
authorities did not participate in the auctions to take over the company, as had 
been discussed. Other bidders did not bid, as the authorities’ takeover plan had 
been well publicised. The authorities’ subsidiary company did purchase some of 
ELSI’s assets eventually. The original requisition order was then annulled, due 
to lack of legality. This annulment caused financial injury to ELSI’s American 
parent company; its costs were significantly higher than they would have been 
had the company been allowed to go ahead with the original planned liquidation. 
The American government therefore took the case to the ICJ. The Court held 
that the case was admissible, but that the Italian government had not breached 
its treaty of friendship between the parties. In doing so, the ICJ rejected the 
USA’s claim for reparation. It has been noted that, ‘the Judgment of the 
Chamber does not include any substantial contribution to the clarification or 
even the evolution of customary international law.’108 
The diminutive number of cases that have been heard by the ICJ on foreign 
investment illustrate that the court’s impact on the field of international 
investment law and its development has been, and continues to be relatively 
minimal. In those cases that have been settled by the ICJ, the court has largely 
tended to avoid engaging in the contentious issues, instead either casting 
jurisdictional doubts or making general statements.109 
Having settled so few disputes involving investment, it is difficult to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the ICJ in this regard. Other 
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institutions, such as ICSID have eclipsed the ICJ, hearing many more 
economic/investment related disputes. Undoubtedly one of the reasons why the 
ICJ has been involved in so few investment disputes is because the ICJ is 
limited to hearing inter-state disputes; the majority of international investment 
disputes involving state and non-state parties. Due to the limited participation in 
settling investment disputes which the ICJ has had in the past, some 
commentators are sceptical about whether the court could assume a more 
active role in the future.110 Although, according to one study by Wellens, this 
pessimism may not be warranted. Wellens found that the common assumption 
that the court is incapable and/or unwilling to deal with disputes of an economic 
nature is completely unfounded. Wellens’ study also dismisses the accusation 
that the court does not provide suitable judicial remedies for economic 
disputes.111 
  At first glance, the aforementioned pessimism regarding the future role 
of the ICJ in settling economic disputes does seem to be inconsistent with 
Wellens’ research. However, this is simply not the case. The pessimism 
expressed by some commentators does not suggest that the ICJ is indeed 
incapable of settling such disputes; rather, that the likelihood that the court will 
be called upon to settle economic disputes is low.112 
 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the future role of the ICJ in 
settling economic disputes will be greater than it has in the past (albeit in a 
slightly different manner). Qureshi 113  indicates that the court will have an 
important constitutional role to play in the future; the author believes that this 
constitutional role will gradually become more important in an increasingly 
fragmented legal framework. The constitutional role of which he talks, will 
involve safeguarding the fundamental pillars ‘upon which international economic 
relations rest...and which are founded...upon general international law.’ 114 
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Qureshi gives the example of the court guaranteeing the basic freedoms, 
without which international investment would be impossible, as well as clarifying 
the limits of state sovereignty which is also significant for international 
investment law. Another aspect of the constitutional role which Qureshi 
describes is the court’s status as one of the most important judicial organs of 
the international economic order, as well as of the UN itself. As such, ‘the court 
services many international economic treaties, which refer to it in the event of 
the need for conflict resolution; as well as IEOs for advisory opinion.’115 The 
court may also have an important future role in adjudicating disputes involving 
conflicts arising from the different sources of the various obligations.116  
 Qureshi illustrates that although the ICJ’s adjudicatory role in 
international economic disputes, including international investment disputes 
may be characterised as fairly minimal in the past, the court’s future role could 
be very different and indeed much more significant.117 
 
- Regional arbitration centres 
 Throughout the world there are a number of regional arbitration centres, 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (AISCC) and 
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) provide examples of 
such institutions. The AISCC does not decide disputes; rather, it administers 
disputes in accordance with the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
or any other procedural rules (e.g. UNCITRAL) and provides information on 
arbitration and mediation.118 The HKIAC works in a similar fashion119. Indeed 
there are hundreds of similar regional arbitration centres around the world. The 
great advantage of regional organisations such as these is that they may be 
much closer to the place where the dispute has arisen. This means that the time 
and costs involved in resolving the dispute may be much lower. For parties 
based in America or Asia, travelling to Europe for arbitration does not make 
sense. On the other hand, if parties live in different regions, regional arbitration 
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centres are less useful as one party may still have to travel a significant 
distance.120 
 
3.4 System of International investment arbitration as a whole 
3.4.1 Strengths 
-Organised dispute settlement 
  Perhaps the most important advantage of the system of international 
investment arbitration is that it provides a mechanism for resolving disputes in 
an organised and civilised manner.121 As the previous chapter outlined, prior to 
the settlement of investment disputes through arbitration, diplomatic protection 
and allowing the investment host state national courts to settle arising disputes 
was commonplace. If diplomatic protection was unsuccessful, disputes often 
arose to physical conflict and so called gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy 
involved individuals persuading their national governments to take up their case, 
with the government stationing a number of warships off the coast of the 
offending state (if possible) and threatening attack in the event that the 
investment dispute was not resolved. In this manner, many investment disputes 
escalated into physical conflicts.122 Similarly, using the national courts of the 
host state to settle disputes did not yield much success. 
International investment arbitration has provided a mechanism through 
which arising disputes are able to be dealt with in a timely, cost effective 
manner. The system of international investment arbitration has therefore 
undoubtedly contributed to the promotion of peaceful international relations. 
 Organised dispute settlement through arbitration has also enabled the 
de-politicisation of disputes, allowing them to be settled without recourse to 
violence or physical conflict. Furthermore, smaller and lesser economically 
developed states are able to bring a dispute involving an investor from a larger, 
more economically developed nation. This was much more difficult before 
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arbitration became popular. Additionally, arbitration allows investors to take a 
case to a neutral tribunal, this means that they can bypass their home state 
governments. Furthermore, international arbitration enables investors to bypass 
international adjudicative bodies such as the ICJ, thus 'avoiding the possibility 
of being caught up in other geopolitical dialogues.’123  
 
-International recognition and effective enforcement of arbitral awards 
 It is generally accepted that international law suffers from a lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms; this means that judgments and decisions of 
international courts and tribunals are often not complied with. 124  In stark 
contrast, international investment arbitration enjoys a relatively high level of 
enforceability.125 Decisions and awards of permanent arbitral bodies, as well as 
those of ad hoc tribunals are treated as foreign arbitral awards (as defined by 
the New York Convention) 126  and are therefore enforceable under the 
Convention itself. The Convention was adopted during a United Nations 
diplomatic conference on 10 June 1958, and came into force on 7 June 1959. 
Article III of the Convention provides that, 
Each contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award 
is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There 
shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or 
charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this 
Convention applied than are imposed on the recognition of domestic arbitral 
awards.
127   
 
-Privacy and confidentiality 
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The principle of confidentiality is one of the fundamental principles of 
arbitration; it is set out in many domestic laws concerning arbitration, as well as 
in countless other institutional and procedural rules.128 Confidentiality is thought 
to apply to ‘the proceedings themselves, the associated documents and the 
final arbitral award’129.  
Confidentiality is widely regarded as one of the primary advantages of 
arbitration. 130  As regards investment arbitration, confidentiality is often of 
particular importance due to the sensitive issues that often form the subject of 
investment disputes. Sensitive issues are often at stake due to the nature of 
investment arbitration; namely the fact that investment arbitration typically takes 
place between a state party and a private individual or company. Disputes often 
concern the manner in which the state is regulating foreign investment or 
indeed any other aspect of its regulatory authority, which may have an adverse 
effect on the foreign investment.  
 
-Neutrality of proceedings 
 Neutrality of proceedings is an often cited benefit of international 
investment arbitration. In fact, it is one of the main reasons why investment 
arbitration came to be so popular. One of the traditional means of resolving 
disputes that arise during the course of international investment is making use 
of the domestic court system of the investment host state, as advocated by 
Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo.131 Unsurprisingly, state parties generally support 
the idea of allowing their national courts to hear the dispute, in the hope that 
they be treated more favourably by their own judiciary. It would be too idealistic 
to believe that such bias would not occur on the basis that judges are thought to 
be well-respected individuals possessing the ability to distance themselves from 
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the case and achieve impartiality. This would be naive, especially when we take 
into account which states, and therefore which judges would become embroiled 
in international investment dispute settlement. In traditional international 
investment relationships, foreign investors originate from richer, developed 
nations, and the states that they invest in are poorer and less developed. Thus, 
if a dispute did arise, it would be courts of the less developed nation that would 
handle the settlement of said dispute. Corruption and bias (from which judges 
are not immune) is more likely to be a problem in less developed nations. Even 
if we concede that corruption may be too strong an accusation, lesser bias may 
still be significant; it would be particularly difficult for judges to rule against their 
state government where it simply cannot afford to lose. Investment disputes 
often involve huge sums of money, with the losing party having to pay 
substantial damages and costs. Poorer, lesser developed nations may literally 
not be able to afford to lose. Furthermore, even if the judiciary remains impartial, 
some states require judges to apply more favourable local law, as opposed to 
international legal norms which may not form part of the domestic legal order.132  
 For the reasons discussed above, the settlement of international 
investment disputes by the courts of the investment host state is thought to be 
hazardous. It was for these same reasons that arbitration was introduced and 
gained popularity; it is thought to be a much fairer, less biased means of settling 
international investment disputes. Neutral arbitrators, who may possess a 
different nationality to each of the parties, and who are experts in the field are 
able to be selected to preside over the case. Moreover, the arbitration can take 
place in a neutral location, in a state other than the home states of the parties 
involved.133 
 
-Finality, speed and economy 
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 Three of the most often cited advantages of the current system of 
international investment arbitration are finality, speed and economy.134 Finality 
is concerned with final and binding nature of the award; essentially it means that 
no further appeal should be possible. Traditionally, finality of investment awards 
has been valued because it leads to greater speed and economy. It is obvious 
that allowing further appeal will cause a dispute to go on longer, which will in 
turn cost the parties more.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that these purported advantages 
are being overstated. Finality has traditionally been an important principle in 
international investment arbitration, sought by investors and states alike. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the tide is now turning and that 
parties are valuing justice and correctness over finality.135 
In terms of the speed with which international investment arbitration is 
carried out, the average length of time taken to settle a dispute through ICSID is 
thought to be around two years. 136  If strict time limits are imposed on the 
process, the amount of time it would take to go through an extra layer of 
arbitration (i.e. appeal) would surely appear negligible, due to the fact that the 
parties are already waiting a relatively lengthy amount of time for the original 
award. 
Finally, as regards to the economy that is traditionally thought to have 
been achieved in international arbitration, there is evidence that this is no longer 
the case. More recently, the costs involved in investor-state arbitration have 
‘sky-rocketed’137. The increased costs being referred to not only include the 
damages that the losing party will be ordered to pay the winner, but also the 
costs involved in conducting arbitration procedures. Legal fees associated with 
the proceedings have increased dramatically in recent years, with these costs 
amounting to as much as 60% of the total costs of the case.138 
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3.4.2 Weaknesses  
-Parallel proceedings 
 Parallel proceedings are becoming increasingly problematic and 
common in international investment law dispute resolution. Parallel proceedings 
are, for the purposes of this work, defined as the situation occurring where the 
same parties initiate the same proceedings in more than one forum.139 The 
phenomenon of parallel proceedings in international investment arbitration is 
possible due to the ever expanding network of investment treaties, agreements 
and contracts which include dispute settlement provisions. Investors seeking to 
pursue claims often have a choice of fora available to them, and may choose to 
pursue multiple claims (as this is often not expressly forbidden). Parallel 
proceedings are problematic for a variety of reasons, but especially because 
they can lead to conflicting awards being rendered.140 
 In the investment sphere, parallel proceedings may result from three 
different situations:  
(i) where, because of the wide definition of investor to include direct and indirect 
shareholders, investors are able to claim breaches of different BITs and to seek 
relief through different arbitration proceedings under each of the invoked 
treaties in respect of a single investment and regarding the same facts; 
(ii) where an investor may have both treaty and contract claims based on the 
same facts against the same host government; and 
(iii) where there is a jurisdictional overlap, that is where the same international 
dispute might be subject to adjudication by more than one international judicial 
body.141  
 In instances where parallel proceedings occur, there are two 
jurisdictional regulating rules which may be applied; res judicata and lis 
pendens. It should be noted that the effects of both are limited in terms of time 
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and substance. The res judicata rule ‘serves as a bar against adjudication only 
after the first proceedings are concluded and a valid judgment issued’ 142 , 
whereas lis pendens ‘bars a second litigation only during the pendency of 
another set of proceedings.’143 Res judicata and lis pendens are commonly 
recognised principles in domestic legal systems, where they are frequently 
applied. Their application in international litigation is certainly less clear: they 
are not contained in arbitration institution rules or in international investment 
agreements, and they are not frequently referred to in investment disputes.144  
 Parallel proceedings may also be regulated through treaty-based 
methods, such as provisions requiring the exhaustion of local remedies, fork-in-
the-road provisions, waiver and umbrella clauses. Provisions requiring the 
exhaustion of local remedies essentially require disgruntled investors to bring 
the case to the investment host state tribunals or courts before the case can be 
taken to international arbitration (therefore limiting the risk of parallel 
proceedings occurring). The utility of these types of provisions is somewhat 
limited, due to the fact that they have, as yet, not been widely used. Fork-in-the-
road provisions also attempt to limit the possibility of parallel proceedings 
occurring by forcing the investor to make an irrevocable choice as to the forum 
in which the claim will be pursued, effectively banning parallel proceedings. 
Given the complexities of these clauses, they have never really been strictly 
implemented and enforced.145 Waiver provisions require investors, in certain 
circumstances to waive their right to initiate proceedings against the allegedly 
breaching party except for injunctive or declaratory proceedings. Umbrella 
clauses create international law obligations that a host state will observe any 
commitments it has entered into with respect to any investment. They are also 
more general in nature, supporting existing, more specific clauses, and giving 
investors additional protection. Such clauses can help to avoid parallel 
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proceedings by allowing investors to bring contract claims and proceedings for 
treaty violations to the same tribunal.146  
A final way in which parallel proceedings may be avoided is through the 
consolidation of claims. Consolidation of claims involves combining two or more 
claims to form a single procedure. This obviously helps to avoid multiplicity of 
claims and proceedings. In investment arbitration, consolidation may occur 
‘when there are multiple arbitration proceedings filed with common questions of 
law or fact which raise the possibility of inconsistent or even conflicting 
awards.’147 The concept of consolidation of claims is fairly new to investment 
arbitration. However, it has been widely used in the context of commercial 
arbitration. The UNCITRAL Rules and the ICSID Convention do not provide for 
the consolidation of claims at the present time. However, the concept was 
included in the draft MAI. The first multilateral agreement in force which 
provided for the consolidation of claims was NAFTA. Other BITs have also 
included a consolidation provision, such as the Mexico-Japan BIT, and indeed 
the new US Model BIT.148 However, consolidation of claims has not yet become 
standard practice.149 
 Parallel proceedings in international investment law significantly increase 
the risk of inconsistent and conflicting decisions. Although it may be argued that 
such divergent decisions do not occur frequently, one cannot ignore the 
possibility that they may occur. Furthermore, the possibility of them occurring is 
ever-increasing, due to the multitude of investment agreements that are now in 
force, and many more which are currently being negotiated. In international 
investment disputes, where important public interest issues are often at stake, 
the outcome of such inconsistent decisions may be very serious indeed. Whilst 
there are a number of devices in existence which may limit the possibility of 
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parallel proceedings, such devices are not mandatory, and as such multiple 
proceedings can and do sometimes occur.150  
 
-Inconsistent decisions, disjointed and a lack of binding precedent 
 As the previous chapter highlighted, the current system of international 
investment arbitration is extremely disjointed. Disputes are resolved by 
numerous permanent and ad hoc tribunals; there is currently no single, 
permanent, authoritative body that is solely responsible for settling investment 
disputes. As a result of this disjointed system, the decisions of different 
investment tribunals are often inconsistent. Such inconsistent decisions 
frequently arise due to tribunals’ overly creative interpretations of relevant treaty 
provisions and customary international law principles. 
There are also a number of cases in which different tribunals have 
reached ‘diametrically opposed or conflicting decisions’151. Perhaps the most 
spectacular example of conflicting decisions can be seen in the Lauder152 cases.  
 
- Lauder 
The cases concerned ‘the same set of facts, almost identical parties, and 
nearly identical legal norms’153, yet came to dramatically different conclusions. 
The cases concerned Mr. Lauder (an American investor) and his (Dutch) 
company’s creation of the first private television station in the Czech Republic. 
After the station had been in operation for three years, the regulatory authorities 
began to make life increasingly difficult for Mr Lauder and his company. As a 
result, Mr Lauder initiated two proceedings against the Czech Republic, alleging 
breach of its obligations under the Netherlands-Czech and the US-Czech 
bilateral investment treaties respectively. The Netherlands-Czech BIT was 
considered by a Stockholm tribunal, whilst the US-Czech Bit was considered by 
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a London tribunal. Although both treaties offered the opportunity to consolidate 
the two proceedings, the Czech Republic objected to the same tribunal hearing 
both disputes.154  
One of the only issues on which the two tribunals were in agreement was 
that Mr Lauder and his company had indeed been the victim of discrimination at 
the hands of the Czech government. Beyond this issue however, there was little 
consensus between the two tribunals.155 The Stockholm tribunal found that the 
Czech Republic had committed an illegal expropriation, as prohibited by Article 
5 of the Netherlands-Czech BIT, which provides that, 
neither country shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, 
investors of..their investments unless the following conditions are complied with: 
(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; 
(b) the measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied by 
just compensation.156 
As a result of this, the Czech Republic was ordered to pay Mr Lauder’s 
company $355 million.157 
However, rather interestingly, the London tribunal held that the Czech 
Republic’s actions did not amount to expropriation, as prohibited under Article III 
of the US-Czech BIT158. The tribunal’s decision was based on the fact that there 
had been no direct interference by Czech authorities, and Mr Lauder’s property 
rights had been fully maintained. Furthermore, the tribunal thought it relevant 
that the measure did not benefit the Czech government. Accordingly, Mr Lauder 
was not awarded any damages. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to determine which tribunal arrived at 
the correct result. However, what is certain, and widely accepted amongst 
experts, is that the effect of the contradictory awards is to undermine the system 
of investment arbitration. One widely-cited commentator pertinently states that 
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the incongruous results in the Lauder cases ‘brings the law into disrepute, it 
brings arbitration into disrepute- the whole thing is highly regrettable.’159 
 
- SGS 
As well as the Lauder cases, the SGS160 cases are often cited when 
discussing inconsistent decisions in international investment arbitration. The 
SGS cases concerned the conflicting interpretations by differently constituted 
ICSID tribunals, ‘of a similar legal rule enshrined in different treaties, and 
applicable in similar cases between different parties.’161 SGS, a Swiss company 
agreed to provide pre-shipment inspection services on behalf of the Pakistani 
government with respect to goods to be exported from certain countries to 
Pakistan. Both parties became increasingly unhappy with the other’s 
performance under the contract and Pakistan notified SGS that it wished to 
terminate the arrangement. SGS alleged that the Pakistani government had 
breached its obligations under their contract and the Swiss-Pakistan BIT. SGS 
asserted that breaching the contract amounted to breach of the BIT under the 
umbrella clause contained within the BIT itself. According to SGS, the umbrella 
clause had the effect of elevating the violation of the pre-shipment agreement 
contract into a treaty claim under the BIT. The ICSID tribunal interpreted the 
umbrella clause narrowly, holding that an umbrella clause ‘cannot transform a 
failure to pay fees under a concession contract into a treaty breach.’162 As such, 
SGS’s claim was unsuccessful.163 
 SGS also sued the Philippines before a different ICSID tribunal. SGS and 
the government of the Philippines concluded a comprehensive import 
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supervision agreement, under which SGS was to improve the customs 
clearance and control processes in the Philippines. At the end of the initial three 
year contract period, the contract was extended three times. The government of 
the Philippines then decided to discontinue the services, at which time SGS 
submitted a claim for unpaid sums under the contract of $140 million, plus 
interest. SGS alleged that the Philippines has violated several aspects of the 
Swiss-Philippine BIT, including a breach of the umbrella clause which required 
the host state to observe commitments made to specific investments. The facts 
of the case were very similar to the SGS v Pakistan case considered above. 
Whilst the ICSID tribunal in SGS v Pakistan took a restrictive view of the 
umbrella clause, the tribunal in SGS v Philippines took a much broader view of 
the clause. The tribunal effectively found that the umbrella clause had the effect 
of elevating a contractual claim to a treaty claim under the Swiss-Philippine BIT. 
These two SGS cases provide a striking example of ICSID tribunals taking 
divergent views in cases where the facts are the same or very similar and 
consequently creating inconsistent jurisprudence.164 
 
- NAFTA Cases 
A final set of inconsistent cases have arisen under NAFTA165. In S.D. 
Myers v Canada166, Metalclad v Mexico167 and Pope & Talbot v Canada168, 
three tribunals provided three radically different interpretations of the same 
NAFTA ‘fair and equitable treatment’ clause. 
 
i) S.D. Myers 
S.D. Myers, a US company which was engaged in the treatment of an 
environmentally hazardous chemical established an investment in Canadian 
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territory. The investment was a plant which was set to obtain hazardous 
chemicals in Canada for treatment by the company in its US treatment facility. 
In 1980, the US closed the border for the movement of the hazardous chemical. 
However, in 1995 S.D. Myers was given permission to import the chemical from 
Canada. Shortly after, the Canadian government passed regulations prohibiting 
the transportation of the chemical to the US; this obviously adversely affected 
the investment of S.D. Myers, precluding them from carrying out their business. 
The Canadian government prohibition was in effect for 16 months and S.D. 
Myers brought a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11, alleging that the Canadian 
government had breached several of its NAFTA obligations: Article 1102 
(national treatment); Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment); Article 1106 
(performance requirements); and Article 1110 (expropriation).169 
As regards Article 1102, the tribunal found that Canada’s issuance of the 
order prohibiting the transport of the chemical was not driven by environmental 
concerns (as the Canadian government alleged). Rather, it was issued in order 
to protect the Canadian chemical disposal industry, which amounted to 
favouring nationals over foreigners. Thus, the prohibitive order was found to 
breach Article 1102. The tribunal also found that the Canadian government had 
breached Article 1105 which provides for the minimum standard of treatment for 
foreign investors. NAFTA Article 1105(1) requires that foreign investments are 
treated ‘in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security’170. It was found that the prohibitive 
order breached the international minimum standard of treatment and the fair 
and equitable treatment standard which should be expected by foreign investors. 
In its award, the tribunal focused on the principle of discrimination, holding that 
where, ‘an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that 
the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international 
perspective’171 and, ‘as discrimination amounts to such treatment, it violates 
obligations to fair and equitable treatment.’172 The tribunal went on to say that 
the term ‘fair and equitable treatment’ should be read in conjunction with the 
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introductory phrase, ‘treatment in accordance with international law’173 . The 
tribunal recognised the need for governments to be able to regulate their 
internal affairs, but that whether the measures would violate the principle of fair 
and equitable treatment will ultimately be a matter for international law to decide. 
In the present case, the tribunal found that the Canadian government’s obvious 
protectionist approach and discriminatory intent did indeed violate the principle 
of fair and equitable treatment.174 
The tribunal dismissed S.D. Myer’s claims regarding Articles 1106 
(performance requirements) and 1110 (expropriation). Accordingly, the tribunal 
awarded damages of CAN$6 million. Canada attempted to set aside the award 
through its federal courts, however the application for judicial review was 
dismissed.175  
 
ii) Metalclad 
Metalclad was a US corporation operating under a Mexican subsidiary. 
Metalclad obtained permission from the Mexican federal government to 
construct a toxic waste disposal site in Guadalcazar, Mexico. Mexican federal 
government officials assured the company that no other permissions would be 
required. Five months after construction began, Metalclad received a notice 
from the municipality of Guadalcazar that it was operating unlawfully, without a 
municipal construction permit. The company applied for the construction permit 
and in the meantime completed the building works. The municipality refused the 
permit application, which effectively meant that Metalclad could not operate its 
newly built site. Additionally, the site of the toxic waste disposal was declared to 
be an ecological reserve, and consequently the site would have to be 
permanently closed. Metalclad commenced ICSID proceedings against the 
Mexican government, alleging breach of Articles 1105 (fair and equitable 
treatment) and 1110 (expropriation) of the NAFTA agreement.176 
The tribunal held that the Mexican government had breached the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, as provided by NAFTA Article 1105. The tribunal 
found that the municipal government had no authority to refuse permission on 
environmental grounds and that the absence of clear rules regarding the 
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construction permit contravened the NAFTA standard for ensuring transparency. 
Interestingly, NAFTA Article 1105(1) requires that foreign investments are 
treated ‘in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security’ 177 . It seems that the tribunal 
interpreted this provision in light of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation 
of International Treaties, moving away from the wording of the NAFTA text. The 
tribunal interpreted NAFTA Article 1105 as requiring the transparency of all the 
relevant legal requirements at all stages of the investment. The lack of a clear 
rule as to the requirement of a municipal government construction permit and 
no clear, established procedure for the procurement of such a permit, as well as 
the representations of federal government officials that no further permissions 
would be required, amounted to a failure to ensure transparency on the part of 
the Mexican government.178  
The tribunal also found that some of the local government’s actions in 
denying the permit and the lack of clear procedure for obtaining the permit as 
well as the representations of the federal government that no further 
permissions would be required amounted to indirect expropriation, as prohibited 
by NAFTA Article 1110. The tribunal went on to say that declaring the site to be 
an ecological reserve (which would effectively forever bar the operation of the 
completed site) was also tantamount to expropriation in its own right.179 
In consequence, it was deemed that Metalclad had completely lost its 
investment and compensation should be awarded according to the estimated 
market value of the investment. Accordingly, damages of $16.7 million were 
awarded to Metalclad. The tribunal’s award was subsequently reviewed by the 
British Colombia Supreme Court which set aside some of the tribunal’s findings 
on both Articles 1105 and 1110. However, the Supreme Court did hold that the 
declaration of the site to be an ecological reserve did amount to expropriation, 
and therefore the damages awarded to Metalclad were only slightly reduced.180 
 
iii) Pope & Talbot 
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Pope & Talbot concerned claims relating to the verification process under 
the US-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement. Pope & Talbot was a US 
company with a Canadian subsidiary that operated softwood lumber mills in 
British Columbia, Canada. The investor company claimed under the UNCITRAL 
Rules that Canada’s implementation of the US-Canadian Softwood Lumber 
Agreement violated several NAFTA provisions: Article 1102 (national treatment); 
Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment); Article 1106 (performance 
requirements); and Article 1110 (expropriation). Under the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement, Canada agreed to charge a fee on certain exports of softwood 
lumber. Pope & Talbot alleged that the fee schedule was unfair and inequitable 
and sued for damages. The tribunal dismissed the investor’s claims under 
Articles 1102, 1106 and 1110.  In its’ interpretation of Article 1105, the tribunal 
took a very broad approach, holding that the regulatory approach of the 
Canadian government did indeed violate its obligation to provide fair and 
equitable treatment,  
put simply, Pope & Talbot concluded that the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
standard in article 1105 was not a concept subsumed within a Sovereign's 
obligations to provide minimum standards of treatment under international law; 
rather, it was an ‘additive’ standard in addition to minimum guarantees under 
international law.181  
The tribunal found that Canada had breached Article 1105, and awarded 
damages to the investor company.182 
 
The Free Trade Commission (FTC) interpretation of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ 
 After a number of confusing cases involving Article 1105, the FTC issued 
an interpretative statement, which basically narrowed the scope of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ to what is provided by customary international law. 183 
Presumably the interpretative statement was released in order to avoid 
confusion in future cases about the standard of treatment which could be 
expected by investors and reduce the occurrence of conflicting decisions. 
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However, subsequent cases such as Methanex 184  and Loewen 185  have 
struggled with the same issues, so arguably the interpretative statement did not 
ameliorate the situation. The statement has been criticised for introducing ‘back 
door’ amendments to the NAFTA text without going through the usual member 
state constitutional approval.186  
 
- Maffezini 
The Maffezini187  case provides another example of inconsistency. Mr 
Maffezini, an Argentinean national, brought a claim to international arbitration 
under the Spain-Argentina BIT 188 . Mr Maffezini had invested in a Spanish 
chemical production and distribution company. The dispute resolution clause in 
the Spain-Argentina BIT required that the dispute must be referred in the first 
instance to the courts of the host state (in this case Spain) before international 
arbitration could be commenced. The Spanish government therefore contested 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, on the basis that Mr Maffezini had bypassed the 
Spanish courts, thereby contravening the BIT. Mr Maffezzini argued that he was 
entitled to bypass the Spanish courts due to the operation of the most favoured 
nation (MFN) clause in the BIT which enabled him to resort straight to 
international arbitration. The Spain-Argentina BIT provided a standard MFN 
clause, which meant that both contracting nations must not treat investors from 
the other state any less favourably than it treats an investor from a third party 
state. Based on this provision, Mr Maffezini argued that he should be able to 
rely on the more favourable provision in the Spain-Chile BIT, because it did not 
have contain a requirement that local remedies must be exhausted before 
resort to international arbitration. The tribunal recognised its own jurisdiction, 
accepting Mr Maffezini’s MFN argument. Effectively, the tribunal took a wide 
interpretation of the MFN clause, asserting that they could apply not only to 
                                            
184
 Methanex Corporation v USA, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005 
(Ad hoc-UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) (2005) 44 ILM 1345. 
185
 Loewen Group Inc. v USA (2003) 42 ILM 811.  
186
 L Zarsky (ed), International Investment for Sustainable Development: Balancing 
Rights and Rewards (n 183). 
187 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (2000). 
188 Spain-Argentina BIT (Spanish) full text available at 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_spain_sp.pdf> accessed 11 
August 2012, cf. Spain-Chile BIT (Spanish) 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chile_spain_sp.pdf> accessed 11 August 
2012. 
97 
 
substantive provisions (as had been generally accepted) but also to dispute 
resolution provisions as well. Accordingly, Spain was found liable for breach of 
the Spain-Argentina BIT. The tribunal’s decision was the first to address the 
scope of the operation of the MFN clause in BITs, and it triggered a debate 
about this type of clause. Other tribunals in subsequent similar cases (Siemens 
v Argentina189) have followed Maffezini in this regard and adopted similarly 
broad interpretations of the MFN clause, others have taken a narrower view, 
holding that MFN clauses do not cover procedural and dispute settlement 
issues.190 
Why such inconsistency in international investment arbitration? 
 Having identified that inconsistency is a feature of international 
investment arbitration, it is interesting to reflect upon the possible reasons for 
such inconsistencies arising. It is generally accepted that intrinsically linked with 
the issue of inconsistent decisions, is the lack of binding precedent in 
international investment arbitration. The common law notion of stare decisis191 
does not operate in international investment arbitration or arbitration generally. 
Awards are therefore binding between the two parties to the dispute, but have 
no effect on third parties.192 This is hardly surprising, given that arbitration was 
originally created in order to ‘fulfil the desire of two parties to have their dispute 
resolved privately through alternative means.’193 Such alternative means were 
intended to be used in isolated situations and in private; hence there would 
have been no need for the concept of binding precedent.194 
 Until recently, the lack of binding precedent in investment arbitration was 
considered a key advantage. The lack of precedent enabled arbitrators to 
maintain a high degree of flexibility and provide a tailored solution for the parties, 
taking into consideration all the peculiarities of the particular case at hand.195 
However, the lack of binding precedent in investment arbitration is increasingly 
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being criticised. Investment arbitration has witnessed rapid growth in recent 
years, and with many arbitrations arising from international conventions, a 
uniform approach to interpretation is desirable. Furthermore, in the context of 
international investment arbitration, in which cases often concern whether state 
regulatory measures amount to an expropriation of the investor’s assets, the 
outcome of the case can and often does affect third parties, and are thus no 
longer ‘case specific’.196  
 For various reasons then, the need to establish the principle of binding 
precedent in international investment arbitration is growing stronger. In order to 
establish greater coherence and consistency, the concept that arbitral awards 
should have no binding effect on third parties is in need of urgent 
reconsideration.197 
 
-Confidentiality 
In order to consider why adherence to the principle of confidentiality is 
considered a weakness of the system of international investment arbitration, it is 
first necessary to highlight the rationale behind the application of the concept. 
The main justification for the principle of confidentiality, particularly in 
investment arbitration is due to the type of dispute that arises: investment 
arbitration typically involves investor-state arbitration, where the tribunal is 
considering ‘the lawfulness of regulatory and administrative actions of a state 
that could potentially have wide-reaching economic and political 
consequences.’198 Sensitive issues are often at stake in such arbitration, which 
is why confidentiality is believed to be advantageous. 
Although the principle of confidentiality has long been regarded as a 
definite advantage199 of the system of international investment arbitration (and 
indeed one of the very reasons that many parties elect it as their preferred 
method of dispute resolution), its application ‘is the cause of continually 
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increasing problems and criticism in investor-state arbitration.’200 There is no 
absolute, unqualified right to confidentiality in international arbitration; rather, it 
is a discretionary right, and the extent to which it operates is for the parties 
themselves to decide.201 In terms of international investment arbitration, respect 
for the principle of confidentiality has led to the evolution of a dispute settlement 
mechanism that is not transparent.202 This lack of transparency has recently 
been the subject of much criticism.203  
The lack of transparency of the investment arbitration process leads to a 
lack of legal certainty and a lack of uniformity. Furthermore, confidentiality leads 
to a decline in confidence in the arbitration process on the whole.204 
In investment arbitration, the principles of confidentiality and 
transparency are particularly disturbing because of the nature of the dispute; 
typically, investment disputes involve a state party. For this reason, it is 
arguable that arbitral awards should be published in the public interest. A 
number of initiatives designed to increase transparency, yet at the same time 
respect the principle of confidentiality (at least to a certain extent), have been 
considered.205 One such transparency-enhancing proposal is the anonymous 
publication of investment arbitral awards.206 
The principle of confidentiality may also be exacerbating another problem 
associated with the current system of investment arbitration; that of inconsistent 
decisions. This issue has been discussed more fully above, and therefore does 
not warrant significant examination here. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
highlight the fact that the problem of inconsistent decisions has only recently 
come to light due to the publication of those decisions. It stands to reason that 
inconsistent decisions would not be identifiable unless those decisions were 
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made available for public scrutiny. In order to achieve greater consistency of 
decisions, it will therefore be necessary to publish all decisions.207  
 
-Encourages treaty, forum and nationality shopping 
The current system of international investment arbitration is encouraging 
foreign investors to cherry pick the rules, tribunals and nationalities which 
benefit them most at any particular time.208 
So called ‘treaty shopping’ occurs because foreign investors increasingly 
elect to regulate their investments under certain BITs. This is due to the fact that 
they typically have more advantageous terms, and the investor therefore 
expects to receive better protection under said BIT than under other forms of 
regulation, such as national legislation for example. 209  One of the major 
advantages of BITs is that they usually include dispute settlement provisions 
which allow any quarrels or conflicts which may arise during the course of 
investment direct access to international arbitration. 
Forum selection is not new in investment arbitration; most investment 
agreements (BITs or investment contracts) offer a ‘fork-in-the-road’ provision. 
Such provisions provide for the settlement of any arising disputes either by the 
national courts of the investment host state or by international arbitration. It is 
for the parties themselves to select the forum they would prefer. For many 
reasons, not least that they are dubious about the neutrality of national courts 
(so called ‘home court advantage’), investors usually favour the selection of 
international arbitration. 
 Nationality shopping has also increased in recent years. Nationality 
shopping involves investors relocating their homes and businesses in order that 
they are able to acquire a certain desired nationality. Having a particular 
nationality will in turn allow foreign investors to take advantage of a specific BIT 
which may have the most favourable terms for them. One example of nationality 
shopping can be seen in the case of Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of 
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Bolivia210 where a company transferred its registration from the Cayman Islands 
(which did not have a BIT with Bolivia) to the Netherlands (which did have a BIT 
with Bolivia) in order to bring a claim under the Dutch-Bolivian BIT. More 
recently, two Egyptian nationals were alleged to have acquired Italian nationality 
in order to file a claim under the Italian-Egyptian BIT.211 Nationality shopping 
occurs because foreign investors are usually treated more favourably than 
domestic investors. This is nonsensical, especially as the cornerstone of the law 
of foreign investment is the principle of non-discrimination. The rationale behind 
the law of foreign investment is that foreigners should not be discriminated 
against when carrying out their business in overseas territories. It seems that 
the tables have turned, and that ironically the issue of reverse discrimination is 
more pertinent at present; it is now domestic investors that face discrimination, 
being treated much less favourably than foreign investors. This reverse 
discrimination is a direct result of the emerging wider trend, which is arguably 
transforming the law of foreign investment into the law of the protection of 
foreign investors.212 
 
-Lack of appeal mechanism 
 Under the present system of international investment arbitration, all 
decisions and awards are final; there is no possibility of appeal. This finality of 
decision is traditionally thought to be one of the advantages of the current 
system of international investment arbitration. Dolzer sums up the rationale 
behind the principle of finality perfectly, stating that it ‘[serves] the purpose of 
efficiency in terms of an expeditious and economical settlement of disputes.’213 
This finality has to be balanced against another legitimate goal; that of 
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correctness of the decision. According to Dolzer, this is, ‘an elusive goal that 
takes time and effort and may involve several layers of control, a phenomenon 
that is well known from appeals in domestic court procedure.’214 Perhaps less 
controversially, Dolzer goes on to state that in international investment 
arbitration at least, ‘the principle of finality is typically given more weight than 
the principle of correctness.’215 
Whilst there is no possibility of appeal in international investment 
arbitration, in arbitrations that are settled under the auspices of ICSID, there is a 
very limited review facility. Under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, parties 
may request annulment of an award. There are in fact just five grounds on 
which annulment may be requested. The grounds for annulment under Article 
52 and the annulment procedure will be discussed more thoroughly in chapters 
six and seven. Suffice it to say at this point that the grounds for annulment are 
rather limited. 
 So although there is some possibility of reviewing decisions in 
international investment arbitration, it must be noted that this is only possible 
where decisions have been issued in ICSID arbitration, and even then, the 
scope for review is extremely limited indeed. Furthermore, it is important to 
highlight that there are a number of significant differences between annulment 
and appeal. Annulment is concerned purely with the legitimacy of the process, 
and can only result at most in the removal of the decision. Appeal, on the other 
hand is not only concerned with the legitimacy of the process, but also the 
correctness of the decision. Moreover, the effects of appeal are more 
substantial; successful appeal not only removes the original decision, but also 
replaces it with a new one.216 This issue will be discussed more thoroughly later 
in the thesis. 
 ICSID itself has considered introducing an appeal mechanism into its 
procedure. A 2004 Discussion Paper 217  issued by the ICSID Secretariat 
provided the forum for the debate of the issue. The decision not to integrate an 
appeal mechanism was taken in response to the reactions of ICSID’s member 
                                            
214 Ibid 278. 
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217 ‘Possible improvements of the framework for ICSID arbitration’ (2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm> accessed 20 July 2009. 
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states, who were largely against the proposal. The contents of the Paper and 
indeed member state’s reactions to it will be discussed in a later chapter.218  
 There has been an ongoing general debate about whether the system of 
international investment arbitration would benefit from the establishment of an 
appeal mechanism. The OECD issued a Working Paper on investment in 2006, 
outlining the benefits of the possible introduction of an appeal mechanism. The 
paper states that an appeal mechanism could contribute to greater consistency 
in international investment arbitration, and that ‘consistency and coherence of 
jurisprudence create predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the system of 
international investment arbitration.’219 The Working Paper also states that an 
appeal mechanism would be a useful mechanism to rectify legal and factual 
errors in arbitral proceedings, as well as allowing decisions to be reviewed by a 
neutral and impartial organisation.220 
Many commentators also believe that an appellate mechanism would be 
a welcome addition to the system of international investment arbitration, and 
that it may remedy many problems that are currently associated with the system. 
Scholars have asserted that an appeal mechanism would remedy the problem 
of inconsistency and incoherence221 within international investment arbitration 
as well as act as a corrective mechanism222 and enhance objectivity.223 
 Conversely, many other experts are of the opinion that an appeal 
mechanism should not be introduced. Some experts worry that the highly-
regarded principle of finality would be destroyed by an appellate mechanism.224 
Other alleged disadvantages of introducing an appeal mechanism are the 
potential increase in the number of cases 225 and the re-politicisation of the 
                                            
218 C Tams, ‘Is there a need for an ICSID appellate structure?’ (n 61). 
219 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (n 208). 
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221 M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (n 48) 36 and see K Yannaca- Small, ibid 192. 
222 Ibid K Yannaca-Small 193. 
223 A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in P 
Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 1157. 
224 J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is there 
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system of investment arbitration.226 Currently, the system is praised for its lack 
of political nature. 227  There is a danger that the introduction of an appeal 
mechanism may politicise the system; the expectation being that losing states 
would automatically appeal every case, and choose biased appellate panel 
members. Although there is a chance that the system could be politicised, the 
situation could be avoided with the establishment of several procedural 
safeguards. An example of a possible procedural safeguard that might be 
introduced is the requirement of depositing a bond when applying for leave to 
appeal; this would discourage automatic appeal. Additionally, if both parties 
have equal input in selecting appellate body members, the risk of bias will be 
minimal.228  
The most often cited justification for the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism is that it would reduce the risk of conflicting and incoherent 
decisions.229 Some commentators believe that consistency is an unattainable 
goal; that inconsistency is simply an unavoidable fact of life230. Assuming that 
consistency is possible to achieve (and that it is desirable goal) some experts 
have suggested that in order to achieve consistency, the best course of action 
would be to adopt a laissez-faire policy. By doing nothing, it is thought that 
consistency and predictability will be naturally achieved as tribunals gradually 
begin to favour one solution over another, causing custom to evolve.231 
Another issue which continues to arise when the possibility of 
establishing an appellate mechanism is discussed is the standpoint of 
developing nations. Traditionally, less economically developed states have 
been reluctant to lend their support to various innovations of international 
investment law policies that have been proposed. Such states have, for 
example, been less than enthusiastic about the possibility of creating a global 
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multilateral investment treaty, as well as an appeal mechanism. It is believed to 
be the case that developing nations are reluctant to enter into negotiations 
creating a multilateral treaty or an appeal mechanism due to their perceived 
lack of bargaining power. In previous international trade negotiations under the 
GATT 232 , richer, more developed states have been accused of hijacking 
proceedings and, to a certain extent, bullying poorer, lesser developed nations. 
These less economically developed nations believe that the same bulldozing 
effect may occur in the field of investment.  
As this section has briefly highlighted, there are a number of purported 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the creation of an appeal 
mechanism; the issue has been and continues to be hotly debated by experts in 
the field. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of all the 
issues surrounding the possible introduction of an appeal mechanism in 
international investment arbitration. A number of important aspects concerning 
the possible establishment of an appeal mechanism will be discussed more fully 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter has examined the functioning of the current system of 
international investment arbitration in great depth. A detailed analysis has 
revealed a haphazard system with multiple fora available for the settlement of 
international investment disputes. Numerous institutions as well as ad hoc 
tribunals are called upon to settle international investment disputes. An analysis 
of both forms of arbitration revealed strengths and weaknesses of both types of 
arbitration. The chapter also considered the advantages and disadvantages of a 
number of permanent arbitral institutions which are called upon to settle 
investment disputes. Again, these institutions have their own requisite strengths 
and weaknesses. Finally, the chapter went on to consider the functioning of the 
system of international investment arbitration as a whole. Although the system 
does have its advantages, it is fair to say that it also has serious deficiencies. 
The haphazard system of international investment arbitration, with the 
availability of multiple fora has lead to serious problems within the system itself. 
                                            
232 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is often referred to as ‘the rich 
man’s club’. 
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The main problem is a distinct lack of consistency of decision in the 
jurisprudence. Various examples of cases have been identified where different 
tribunals have reached very different decisions where the same or similar facts 
have been at issue.  
 The next chapter will examine in greater depth the central problem with 
the system of international investment arbitration; inconsistency and 
incoherence. The chapter will also consider whether the establishment of an 
appeal mechanism, as one proposed solution, could remedy the problem of 
inconsistency in international investment arbitration. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE CRISIS OF CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE PROPOSAL TO CREATE AN 
APPEAL MECHANISM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The first part of this chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the 
central problem with the chaotic system of international investment arbitration; 
the so called ‘crisis of consistency’1. Currently, international investment disputes 
are resolved by hundreds of different tribunals, as opposed to a single 
authoritative body. As there is no principle of binding precedent2, each tribunal 
is free to deliver any decision it sees fit. This has resulted in tribunals reaching 
diametrically opposing decisions in cases3 where the facts are similar or even 
the same. Thus, there is no coherent body of law emerging from the case law. 
The second part of the chapter will focus on one of the proposed 
remedies to the problem of inconsistency and incoherence; the establishment of 
an appeal mechanism.4 The aim of this chapter then is twofold; firstly, to clearly 
                                            
1 This term has been used by many commentators in relation to international 
investment arbitration recently. See for example M Dimsey, The Resolution of 
International Investment Disputes: International Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven 
International Publishing 2008) 35. 
2 For further discussion on the doctrine of precedent and its applicability to international 
investment arbitration see C Schreuer and M Weiniger, ‘Conversations across cases: is 
there a doctrine of precedent in investment arbitration?’ (2008) 3 Transnational Dispute 
Management, S Nappert, ‘”By writ or fortune led”: thoughts on a role for precedent in 
international commercial arbitration’ (2008) 3 Transnational Dispute Management, M 
Rodgers, ‘Bilateral investment treaties and arbitration: an argument and a proposal for 
the ICSID’s implementation of a system of binding precedent’ (2008) 3 Transnational 
Dispute Management and L Reed, ‘The de facto precedent regime in investment 
arbitration: a case for proactive case management’ (2010) 25 ICSID Review 47. 
3 See previous chapter for detailed discussion of such cases, including CME Czech 
Republic B.V. v Czech Republic, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Partial Award 
of 13 September 2001 and IIC 62 (2003), Final Award of 14 March 2003, Lauder v 
Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2001 (Ad hoc- UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules), SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) 42 ILM 1290, 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6 (2004), Pope & Talbot Inc. V Government of Canada (2002) ILR 293, 
S.D. Myers v Canada (2000) ILM 1408 (NAFTA Arb), Metalclad Corporation v United 
Mexican States (2000), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000) and Emilio Augustín 
Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (2000). 
4 For discussion of the proposal to establish an appeal mechanism see for example M 
Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International Commerce 
and Arbitration (n 1) 157-184, K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International 
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identify the central problem with international investment law dispute settlement, 
and secondly, to ascertain the desirability and feasibility of the introduction of an 
appellate mechanism in response to that problem. This dual aim is to be 
accomplished through the completion of a comprehensive survey of the existing 
relevant literature in this area. This literature review will demonstrate the nature 
of this complex problem as well as one possible solution. Relevant 
jurisprudence and treaty law will also be considered. 
 
4.2 The crisis of consistency in international investment arbitration 
4.2.1 Evidence of a crisis 
In recent years, many foreign investment experts have alleged that 
international investment arbitration is suffering at the hands of a so called ‘crisis 
of consistency’. Sornarajah states that ‘investment arbitration is in crisis’5, and 
refers specifically to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’6 which is being created by the sheer 
number of cases. Moreover, he notes a trend towards the creative interpretation 
of the treaties by the tribunals; this means that key BIT provisions are often 
being interpreted in a manner that was not contemplated by the parties to the 
agreement. This is particularly worrying because these cases are often settled 
by ad hoc tribunals, and there are no mechanisms in place to control the 
interpretative discretion which these tribunals are exercising.7 
Dimsey also refers to a ‘crisis of consistency’8 which she alleges has 
been aggravated by the principle of confidentiality. Confidentiality has long been 
hailed as a strength of the current system of international investment arbitration. 
However, Dimsey suggests that within the sphere of investment arbitration, 
confidentiality is the root of many problems. The main problem with 
confidentiality is that it has led to a process of dispute resolution which may be 
criticised for its lack of transparency. This in turn may be said to undermine 
                                                                                                                                
Investment Disputes (OUP 2008) and F Ortino et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: 
Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of International and Comparative Legal 
Studies 2006). 
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 M Sornarajah, ‘A coming crisis: expansionary trends in investment treaty arbitration’ in 
K Sauvant ibid 73. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid 41. 
8
 M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (n 1) 36. 
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legal certainty, which often leads to inconsistency, and moreover, an overall 
decrease in general confidence in the dispute resolution process.9 
 Linked inherently to the issue of confidentiality in international investment 
law arbitration, is the lack of binding precedent. There is no ‘overarching’10 
tribunal which has sole responsibility for hearing all investor-state disputes. 
Instead there is a myriad of dispute resolution options, with countless individual 
tribunals each settling investment disputes. As a result of this chaotic state of 
affairs (which is exacerbated by the absence of the common law doctrines of 
precedent and stare decisis), investment arbitration is plagued by inconsistent 
decisions and general incoherency.  
The traditional justification for the lack of binding precedence is the 
original purpose of arbitration itself; ‘[to] fulfil the desire of two parties to have 
their dispute resolved privately through alternative means.’11 In other words, 
precedent and stare decisis were never intended to operate, because each 
case was supposed to be considered in isolation. However, the investment 
arbitration landscape has changed dramatically over the years. With an 
increasing number of investment disputes arising and a fundamental change in 
the nature of disputes, this lack of binding precedent is increasingly being 
challenged. It is for these reasons that Dimsey believes that, ‘the long-held 
principle that arbitral awards have no binding effect on subsequent cases is in 
desperate need of re-evaluation, especially within the scope of investor-state 
arbitration.’12  
 A related issue is that of competing jurisdictions within international 
investment arbitration, which is, ‘perhaps the greatest general cause of the 
current problems with investor-state arbitration.’13  The main problem is that 
there is a multitude of fora available to the parties involved in international 
                                            
9
 Ibid. See also A Belohlavek, ‘Confidentiality and publicity in investment arbitration, 
public interest and scope of powers vested in arbitral tribunals’ (2011) 2 Czech 
Yearbook of International Law 23 and A Menaker, ‘Piercing the veil of confidentiality: 
the recent trend towards greater public participation and transparency in investor-state 
arbitration’ in K Yannaca-Small, Arbitration Under International Investment 
Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (OUP 2010). 
10M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (n 1) 40. 
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 Ibid 41. 
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 Ibid 42. 
13
 Ibid 74. 
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investment disputes, yet there is no mechanism to determine when two 
separate claims are identical and bar the second claim.14 
 The crisis of consistency is further exacerbated by the trend towards 
increased treaty, forum and nationality shopping. This involves investors cherry 
picking legal rules, tribunals and nationalities which offer the most 
advantageous conditions for them. In terms of forum shopping, in most cases, 
investors will prefer to have recourse to ad hoc tribunals. This is because they 
are able to retain more control over the proceedings, usually by being involved 
in choosing the arbitrators. Additionally, ad hoc tribunals notoriously provide 
wider interpretations of investment provisions.15  
Reinisch echoes these concerns, asserting that the proliferation of 
international investment arbitration ‘bears its own risks’ 16  such as the 
multiplication of proceedings, including parallel proceedings, re-litigation of 
already settled cases, and forum shopping. These problems can ‘contribute to 
the fragmentation of international law and weaken both...[its] coherence and 
credibility.’17 Furthermore, these risks may have already materialised; a number 
of cases highlight inconsistency in international investment arbitration.  
The SGS18 cases provide evidence for the existence of inconsistency. 
The SGS cases involved two different ICSID proceedings being initiated against 
Pakistan and the Philippines. The two tribunals came to different decisions on 
the crucial meaning of umbrella clauses. The Lauder/CME 19  cases also 
highlight inconsistencies. In the Lauder20 case, it was held that even though the 
Czech Republic had breached its obligations under the US-Czech BIT, no 
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 Ibid. See also R Kreindler, ‘Parallel proceedings: a practitioner’s perspective’ in M 
Waibel (ed), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Kluwer 2010) 131 
15M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
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liability had arisen. A short while after, in the CME21 case, the tribunal came to 
the opposite decision on similar facts. Finally, the Argentina22 cases provide 
more evidence of inconsistency in international investment arbitration. The 
cases considered whether the Argentinean economic crisis at the beginning of 
the 21st century constituted a state of necessity, as defined by Article 25 of the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility23 . One tribunal found that it did, whilst 
another found that it did not.24 The NAFTA25 cases also demonstrate significant 
inconsistency in international investment arbitration. 
Franck26 also refers to a crisis of consistency in international investment 
arbitration. She remarks that investor-state treaty arbitration has expanded 
quickly in recent years, and consequently,  
decisions about public issues with economic and political consequences are 
resolved in private before different sets of individuals who can and do come to 
conflicting decisions on the same points of law- and no single body has the 
capacity to resolve these inconsistencies.27 
There are a number of limited options for the review of investment 
awards; in ICSID arbitration, the only method of reviewing decisions is the 
annulment procedure.28 In non-ICSID arbitration, decisions may sometimes be 
challenged in the national courts of the place of arbitration, or alternatively one 
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 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic (n 3). 
22 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08 
(2003) 
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 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
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 S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
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may attempt to block the enforcement of the decision. As a result of this lack of 
a mechanism for review, inconsistencies have occurred in the case law.29 
The author believes that inconsistency is damaging to investment 
arbitration because, 
Inconsistency creates uncertainty and damages the legitimate expectations of 
investors and Sovereigns. Investors that have structured their investments in a 
manner to take advantage of coverage afforded by investment treaties suddenly 
discover they will not receive those benefits. Likewise, Sovereigns find 
themselves in an untenable position of explaining to taxpayers why they are 
subject to damage awards for hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in one case 
but not another.30 
 
4.2.2 Rebutting the claim of a crisis 
Paulsson31 believes that the quest for coherence and consistency is futile, 
branding it ‘impossible’ 32  to achieve. The author asserts that inconsistent 
decisions are actually much rarer than we are led to believe in any case and, 
furthermore that we should not be alarmed by inconsistency. 
Legum33 also seems to support this view, claiming that the excessively 
cited criticisms of inconsistency and incoherence are simply not compelling 
enough. 
Gill also weighs in on the matter. The author notes the variations in 
outcomes in both the Czech Republic cases 34  and the SGS 35  cases. Gill 
concedes that ‘these cases show that differently-constituted tribunals do, on 
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 S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law through inconsistent decisions’ (n 26) examines the Lauder and SGS 
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occasion reach conclusions which are difficult to reconcile.’36  However, Gill 
does point out that we are only aware that inconsistent decisions exist because 
those decisions are made available to the public. This is in contrast to most 
forms of commercial arbitration, where decisions are confidential. It is 
suggested that three issues often arise in the debate about consistency of 
decisions; predictability, reputation and appointment of the tribunal. 
Predictability is desirable in dispute resolution for the parties to the dispute as 
well as their advisers. It is important to know the chances of receiving a 
successful outcome before embarking upon costly legal proceedings. Usually 
one would review previous cases involving similar facts in order to determine 
the chances of success. Gill does note that there is no system of binding 
precedent in international investment dispute resolution, however she does 
acknowledge the soft precedential value of previous decisions. Linked to the 
issue of predictability, is the reputation of the system. The system will not enjoy 
a good reputation and be popular if it is perceived to be a lottery, rather than a 
system based on a fair, clear procedure. Finally, one of the important aspects of 
the appointment of the tribunal is the fact that each party to the arbitration is 
usually able to nominate an arbitrator. It is a widely known fact that parties often 
nominate arbitrators that they perceive will be sympathetic to their situation. 
This is viewed by most people as an unsatisfactory part of the dispute resolution 
process, as it is not an objective means of choosing arbitrators.37 
Having conceded that inconsistency is a feature of the current system of 
investment arbitration and analysed the reasons why this is so, Gill goes on to 
consider whether such inconsistency can and should be avoided. For the author, 
such inconsistency is a fact of life; inconsistent decisions are not and have 
never been a contentious issue elsewhere, only in international investment 
arbitration have they been so hotly debated. Inconsistency in decision making 
can be seen in other fields, yet it does not provoke the same level of interest 
and comment as in international investment arbitration.38  
 
4.3 Possible introduction of an appeal mechanism  
                                            
36 J Gill, ‘Inconsistant decisions: an issue to be addressed or a fact of life?’ in F Ortino 
et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume I (n 4) 24. 
37 Ibid. 
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 The preceding segment has highlighted the main problem associated 
with international investment law arbitration; significant inconsistency and 
incoherence in the case law. Although its existence has been contested by 
some, the jurisprudence speaks for itself; there are clear and obvious examples 
of inconsistent decision making in international investment arbitration. This 
inconsistency is a direct result of the lack of a permanent arbitral body; the 
hundreds of arbitral tribunals settling investment disputes can and often do, 
reach opposing decisions. The lack of a system of binding precedent in 
international investment arbitration serves to compound the problem. The 
problem is evident; what is less clear though, is how it may be solved. A number 
of different solutions have been proposed in this regard. One of the most hotly 
debated of these solutions is the possible creation of an investment appellate 
mechanism. In recent years there has been much debate about the desirability 
and feasibility of the introduction of an appellate mechanism in international 
investment law. 
 
4.3.1 Support for an appeal mechanism 
Numerous academics have declared their support for the creation of an 
appeal mechanism. Dimsey is of the opinion that an appeal mechanism could 
be beneficial. She examines the full range of legal review mechanisms already 
in operation, and comes to the conclusion that the existence of the, ‘various and 
diverse review mechanisms available under domestic legal systems...certainly 
give reason to examine the viability of a central appellate mechanism in 
investment dispute resolution.’39 
Dimsey believes that, 
An abridged and much more concise version of the current review possibilities 
in state courts could be the development of an appellate body specifically 
intended to deal with investment arbitration appeals. This would certainly do 
much to prevent the inconsistencies in decision-making and avoid the 
haphazard domestic frameworks that currently come into play in investment 
arbitration practice.40 
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The author then goes on to consider the approaches of two organisations 
that have already successfully41 established appellate mechanisms; the London 
Commodities Associations and the WTO. Dimsey proposes that elements of 
each of the two appeal mechanisms could be imported into the proposed 
international investment law appeal mechanism. 42  Similar to the appeal 
mechanism of the London Commodities Association, Dimsey proposes the 
assembly of a pool of international investment experts/specialists who would 
serve as appellate body members.43 Turning her attention to the WTO, Dimsey 
observes that the appellate mechanism of the WTO is widely regarded as a 
resounding success, and is often marketed as the perfect model for an appeal 
mechanism in international investment law. However, the author is keen to 
stress that no matter how highly regarded the system is, it is less than perfect. 
Whilst Dimsey recognises that the WTO’s mechanism could be an important 
source of inspiration, she is also keen to ensure that any mistakes made by the 
WTO in the creation of its appeal mechanism should not be repeated in the field 
of international investment.44  
 Dimsey also considers the need for a centralised appeal mechanism. 
She believes that simply allowing each of the existing tribunals to simply 
develop its own appeal mechanism will do nothing to remedy the problems of 
inconsistent decisions. In order that consistency, coherence and clarity of 
decisions may be achieved, Dimsey believes that what is required is the 
development of one centralised appeal mechanism.45 
 Subedi also considered ‘allow[ing] for an appeal against certain decisions 
of arbitral awards under narrowly defined conditions.’46 The author notes that an 
appeals facility could be implemented through existing arbitral mechanisms, 
such as ICSID or the UNCITRAL rules. The author highlights the discussion 
surrounding the possibility of extending ICSID arbitration to include appeals, as 
this has received the most attention. 47  Two papers 48  issued by the ICSID 
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secretariat are mentioned, both of which will be examined in greater detail later 
in this chapter. 
 Subedi seems to be of the opinion that an appeals facility would be a 
welcome addition to international investment arbitration, setting out the positive 
aspects of such a mechanism. He acknowledges that ‘the notion of appeal 
against arbitral awards is not new as it is the case already in many maritime and 
commodity arbitration systems.’49 Furthermore, provisions containing reference 
to an appeal mechanism are becoming increasingly common in investment 
treaties. An appeal mechanism was also discussed during the infamous MAI 
negotiations, and challenge of arbitral awards is currently available in many 
domestic legal systems. Moreover, the ICSID annulment procedure could be 
seen as a quasi-appeal mechanism. So it would seem that the possibility of an 
appeal mechanism is not novel or radical in any way. The author goes on to 
point out that an appeal mechanism could help harmonise interpretations of 
investment treaty provisions, therefore reducing the scope for inconsistent 
decisions to arise. Subedi asserts that, ‘an appeal mechanism...would bring 
about more cohesion and more legal certainty to this body of law.’50 
 The author goes on to point out that an appeal mechanism could help 
harmonise interpretations of investment treaty provisions, therefore reducing the 
scope for inconsistent decisions to arise.51 
Yannaca-Small has set out a number of potential advantages of the 
creation of an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration. Of 
course the biggest advantage would be ‘consistency and coherence of 
jurisprudence...[which would] create predictability and enhance the legitimacy of 
the system of investment arbitration.’ 52  An appeal mechanism would also 
                                                                                                                                
48 See ‘Possible improvements to the framework for ICSID arbitration’ (22 October 
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enable legal errors and serious errors of fact to be rectified, and review would 
be confined to a neutral tribunal as opposed to national courts which are often 
thought to be biased and unreliable. Furthermore, the creation of an appeal 
mechanism could contribute to more effective enforcement of awards. The 
author expressed concern at the thought of the introduction of more than one 
appeal mechanism, stating that multiple or ad hoc appeal mechanisms would 
not remedy the problem of inconsistency in international investment 
arbitration.53  
Bjoruklund54 has also written on the subject of appeal, from the viewpoint 
of two particular cases; Amco Asia55 and CME56. The author asserts that ‘both... 
[cases] raised concerns in the arbitral community; their outcomes seemed to 
threaten the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration.’ 57  Amco seemed to be 
concerned that annulment proceedings may too easily lead to full review 
through appeal, whereas in CME the unavailability of appeal appeared to cause 
concern. Bjorklund asserts that,  
given these concerns, it is not surprising that calls for a standing ‘appellate body’ 
for arbitration are gaining both in volume and in vigour...[and that] the time may 
well be ripe to establish a single appellate mechanism.58 
The author is keen to stress that an appellate mechanism should not be 
hastily established; instead time should be taken to ensure that the eventual 
facility is the best it could possibly be. Bjorklund warns that an appeal 
mechanism may not cure all the ills of arbitration, and perhaps we should re-
think using annulment, as opposed to appeal. Moreover, she suggests that 
appeal would increase costs and lengthen dispute resolution proceedings. The 
author also encourages reflection of Kaufmann-Kohler’s proposal to establish a 
consultative body, to which tribunals can refer troublesome questions. This 
process could enhance consistency, ‘without the drawbacks of a fully-fledged 
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appellate procedure.’59 Nonetheless, Bjorklund does recognise that an appeal 
mechanism could enhance the reputation of investor-state arbitration by 
providing better integrity of process, encourage better reasoned decisions at 
first instance, and encourage correctness of decision.60 
In terms of the creation of an appellate mechanism, Franck states that in 
light of recent inconsistencies in decisions, the call for such a body has been 
increased. Indeed, the US already refers to the creation of such a mechanism at 
some stage in the future in several of its most recently negotiated investment 
treaties. The author asserts that the goal of the appellate body would be to, 
‘provide a public forum for the review of public disputes and create a 
determinate and coherent jurisprudence.’61  Franck explains that the precise 
structure and mandate of the body would need careful consideration. The 
author outlines three different suggestions in this regard: inviting national court 
judges to preside over appeals; using ad hoc tribunals to provide appellate 
review; and establishing a new, permanent single body to administer appeals. 
The author suggests that the first proposition is not desirable, as national court 
judges are often accused of bias, as well as being already too busy. The 
second suggestion would only marginally enhance legitimacy, and different 
appeal tribunals could come to conflicting decisions, as is already the case at 
first instance, therefore the real problem of coherence and consistency in 
international investment arbitration would not be resolved. Franck is of the 
opinion that the third option, creating an independent, permanent appeal body 
would be most desirable, as it would enhance legitimacy and theoretically solve 
the problem of inconsistent decisions. Franck also suggests that formal, binding 
precedent in international investment law arbitration, increased transparency 
through publication of decisions, and a single investment treaty as part of a 
related network would be desirable. Although the author recognises that an 
independent, single appellate tribunal would be a welcome addition to 
international investment arbitration, she does concede that its implementation 
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would be ‘a challenging undertaking’.62 Nevertheless, she postulates that ‘the 
ultimate utility of the system...will not be fully realized until an appellate court is 
created which permits the correction of legal errors.’63 
Knull and Robins’ article64 focuses on the issue of finality. The authors 
note that finality is repeatedly referred to as the major advantage of arbitration;  
According to this position, one of the primary advantages of arbitration lies in 
the knowledge that once an award has been rendered, the parties’ conflict is 
essentially at an end, simultaneously cutting off the flow of expenses and 
allowing the parties to resume commercial relations if they so choose, efficiently 
calculating the risks of subsequent projects without the shadow of some far-off 
reversal of the result.65 
The authors go on to explain that whilst finality is regarded as an 
advantage of international arbitration, the system does boast other advantages 
(such as confidentiality, enforceability et cetera), which they suggest are even 
more significant than finality. Knull and Robins intimate that other concerns not 
only eclipse finality, but that ‘in many cases, finality in and of itself may appear 
to be a liability, rather than an asset, discouraging contracting parties from 
selecting arbitration.’66 In other words, finality is only an advantage, when the 
party is confident that there is little to no risk of losing the case. 
The article proceeds on the assumption that finality is still desirable, 
despite its presentation of evidence to the contrary, and asserts that the lack of 
an appeal mechanism does not automatically ensure finality of awards. This is 
because even after an award has been decided, a whole other host of litigation 
may ensure, including for example, enforcement litigation or national challenges 
to the award.67 
The authors go on to examine the avenues for the review of awards that 
are already in existence. Firstly, the losing party may try to petition the original 
tribunal for review. However this is highly unlikely to occur, and even if it does, 
the tribunal is even less likely to change its decision. The losing party may 
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sometimes, under the terms of the New York Convention try to have the award 
set aside, though this is subject to numerous restrictions. Also subject to 
stringent limitations, is the possibility of reconsideration by means of judicial 
review through contractual provisions.68  
Knull and Robins effectively conclude that there is currently no 
appropriate means of reviewing arbitral decisions. They go on to criticise what 
they call this ‘one-size-fits-all’ 69  approach to arbitration. They believe an 
appellate mechanism would give existing clients wider choice, and attract new 
clients who are reluctant to use arbitration currently because of the risk involved 
in its strict adherence to the principle of finality.70 
The article goes on to explore the existing internal review possibilities of 
some prominent arbitral institutions. ICSID for example provides a limited scope 
for review, as set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.71 The grounds for 
review are very narrow, and centre on abuse of procedure, rather than being 
concerned with the correctness of the decision or justice generally. The Centre 
for Public Resources (CPR) institute for dispute settlement is examined next. 
The CPR’s appeal procedure establishes six rather broad grounds for appeal, 
including errors of law and fact. The appeal tribunal is able to annul the original 
award and replace it with a new, binding decision. The CPR also incorporates 
two important provisions that are intended to discourage frivolous, costly appeal,  
first, where the appeal tribunal affirms the original award, the appellant is 
obliged...to reimburse the appellee for attorneys’ fees and other out-of-pocket 
expenses related to the appeal...second, parties to the appeal procedure 
undertake to reimburse opponents for costs associated with any unsuccessful 
subsequent court actions aimed at challenging the original or appellate award.72  
The authors conclude by offering a number of observations about the 
nature of a possible future investment appeal mechanism, suggesting that there 
should be an option to appeal, at the parties’ own discretion, rather than appeal 
being automatic or mandatory. They also suggest that any appeal procedure 
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should be detailed enough to be predictable and clear, but also that the 
procedure should retain a degree of flexibility. An expedited procedure is also 
desirable, as parties will not want to increase the time it takes to resolve a 
dispute or increase the costs involved in doing so. Knull and Robins suggest the 
inclusion of fast-track mechanisms, such as time limits on submission of 
documents and on the length of oral hearings for example. The authors also 
recommend a flexible approach to the scope and standards of review available, 
suggesting that this should be at the discretion of the parties, rather than being 
fixed. In this way then, procedures can be tailored to the disputes at hand, again 
increasing the parties’ choice and control over their own disputes. They also 
advocate that a minimum threshold of money should be at stake in the dispute 
in order that appeal be triggered. This would prevent flippant appeals and 
prohibit appeal where the costs of pursuit would outweigh what is at stake. This 
monetary threshold would of course be subject to negotiation by the parties. 
Another proposal to reduce frivolous appeals, and therefore the keep the 
caseload of the new appeal body relatively low is cost shifting; that is, requiring 
the unsuccessful appellant to pay their opponent’s fees. A deposit as security 
could also be taken for this eventuality. The right of appeal should also be in 
lieu of other judicial proceedings, and the parties should attest to this at the 
beginning of proceedings, wavering recourse to judicial remedies. Knull and 
Robins then turn to the important question of a permanent investment body 
versus ad hoc tribunals. The authors recognise the advantages and 
disadvantages of both types of body. They ultimately conclude that the optimal 
solution would be to incorporate the best parts of both types of tribunal. They 
therefore suggest that international arbitral institutions should maintain a shared 
list of approved investment appeal panellists who would be available to preside 
for a fee, if the parties have chosen leave to appeal. They go on to suggest that 
the appeal tribunal should be able to remove the original decision, replace it or 
simply reform it.73 
Qureshi also outlines several arguments in favour of the creation of an 
appeal mechanism. Firstly, he suggests that an appeals facility could act as a 
corrective mechanism in the event that a case is wrongly decided. Furthermore, 
an appeals mechanism would remedy the growing problem of inconsistent 
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decisions in international investment arbitration. In addition, the perceived 
success of the appellate body of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
could be replicated in the investment sphere. Also, the author notes that in 
certain sectors of investment, appeals procedures are already in place, thus a 
general appeals mechanism will reduce the risk of distortions in investment 
flows and forum shopping.74  
Qureshi proceeds by analysing the different options available for the 
establishment of an appellate mechanism. The author quite rightly believes that 
‘the discourse for an appellate process is not unconnected with the kind of 
appellate process and its locus.’75 Consequently, the author goes on to consider 
the different options available in this regard. Firstly, he considers ‘an appellate 
process added to existing adjudicative systems in the investment sphere ring-
fenced from other systems’.76 This type of appeal mechanism would promote 
transparency, fairness and a rules-based system of adjudication. The main 
advantage of this type of appeal mechanism would be simplicity; it adds to 
existing dispute settlement procedures, and the individual parties would be able 
to choose whether to include recourse to appeal in their own particular dispute. 
Despite its benefits, there are significant drawbacks, which is probably why 
support for the suggestion has been fairly muted. A major limitation of the 
proposal is that ‘[it] seems to run counter to the objectives of coherence and 
consistency for different appeal mechanisms to be set up under each treaty 
concerned.’77 
He then goes on to discuss the possibility of a single appeal mechanism 
to be set up under the auspices of ICSID, suggesting that this may be a serious 
option for consideration.78 
Another option which he goes on to consider is the possibility of 
extending the WTO’s existing appellate mechanism to the investment sector. 
This very question has been considered by the WTO’s Working Group before, 
who suggested that this could be achieved without the need to make significant 
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changes. 79  Although it should be noted that this was with a view to the 
introduction of a multilateral investment agreement, under which the WTO’s 
dispute settlement body (including its appellate mechanism) would operate. 
Many countries supported this proposition, including Japan, the EU and Canada. 
Despite widespread support for the idea, many other states (particularly 
developing nations) were less than enthusiastic about the idea. Nevertheless, if 
the WTO’s dispute settlement body were to become the go-to tribunal in 
investment disputes, Qureshi points out that a number of important questions 
would need to be answered. Questions such as whether investors would be 
granted standing, whether existing WTO sanctions such as compensation and 
suspension of concessions will operate in the investment sphere, the 
relationship the dispute settlement body would have with existing bilateral and 
regional agreements and so on.80  
The final option Qureshi discusses is the creation of what he refers to as 
‘a supreme investment court’81 which could be established in isolation, or as a 
chamber of the ICJ. The author analyses the ICJ proposal in greater depth. 
Firstly, he states that the investment chamber of the ICJ could serve a 
constitutional function, safeguarding the most important investment principles 
and procedural pillars. Additionally, the investment chamber would be the 
principal judicial organ for investment, facilitating the resolution of conflicts 
between different investment regimes and the application of general 
international law. The chamber could also play an important role in confirming 
fundamental principles of investment, but also international economic law more 
generally. Qureshi speculates that ‘arguably there may...be a case for a 
supreme investment type of court.’82 
After having briefly discussed each of the available options for the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration, 
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Qureshi concludes that ‘the main focus amongst the investment fraternity 
appears to be on ICSID, as a logical extension point in the arbitral process it 
offers in the investment sphere.’83  
Qureshi and Khan set out the basis for the call for an appeal process, 
observing that, ‘there is evidence of a growing consensus amongst investment 
practitioners and academics that there is a need for an appellate system in the 
investment sphere.’84 The authors remark that this need may be attributed to 
the desire to establish ‘coherence in the interpretation of investment 
provisions’ 85 . In other words, the authors believe that the problem of 
inconsistency and incoherence in investment arbitration could be remedied by 
the introduction of an appeals process. An appellate mechanism could 
contribute to improved consistency and coherence in several ways. Firstly, it 
could act as a corrective procedure in the case of wrongly decided cases. 
Furthermore, the authors allege that an appeal mechanism could address the 
sustainability issues associated with investment arbitration. With the number of 
disputes on the increase, the risk of inconsistent decisions has never been 
greater. The authors also make reference to the accomplishments of the WTO’s 
appellate mechanism, suggesting that its success could be repeated in the 
investment sphere, especially in light of the fact that ‘international trade and 
investment regimes operate in each other’s shadows.’86 The article also points 
out that the notion of appeal is not entirely new to investment; certain sectors 
already enjoy dispute settlement procedures which incorporate an appellate 
mechanism. Finally, the article highlights the fact that a number of treaties that 
envisage the eventual establishment of an appellate mechanism have already 
been concluded, with many more expected in the near future.87  
 The article proceeds on the basis that we accept that the creation of an 
appellate mechanism is a desirable goal.88 The article concludes by considering 
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how such a mechanism could, and indeed should be established, with particular 
emphasis on the potential consequences for developing nations. The authors 
consider several of the available options, including: the creation of appeal 
mechanisms into existing BITs; an appeal facility incorporated into the ICSID 
framework; an investment appeal mechanism integrated into the WTO dispute 
settlement structure; and the creation of a new, supreme investment court with 
its own specific appeals procedure.89  
 The authors seem to be of the opinion that ICSID would be the best 
option, at least from a developing country perspective. Consequently, they 
provide a detailed analysis of the ICSID proposal. 90  The ICSID appeal 
mechanism would of course require amendment to the ICSID Convention. It is 
intended that the ICSID appeals facility would be an alternative to the individual 
appeals mechanisms envisaged in individual investment treaties. A number of 
key features of the proposed ICSID appeals facility are noted. Firstly, the 
availability of appeal would depend on the individual parties’ consent. Thus, it 
will be possible for the parties to exclude the possibility of appeal from the 
outset. Also, it is proposed that an appeals panel would be established, 
consisting of fifteen experts in international investment law, each from a 
different country. This appeals panel set up would be very similar to the WTO’s 
own appellate panel body (though the WTO panel is actually smaller). It is also 
proposed that each appeal tribunal would consist of three of the fifteen panel 
members. The grounds for appeal would be limited to circumstances in which 
there has been a ‘clear error of law’91 or ‘any of the five grounds for annulment 
set out in Article 52 of the ICSID convention.’92 The tribunal would be able to 
uphold, modify, reverse or annul the award that it considers. Lastly, access to 
the appeals facility would require the approval of ICSID’s Secretary-General.93 
 Qureshi and Khan go on to evaluate the proposed ICSID appeals facility, 
taking into consideration a number of important points. They criticise the 
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appointment of panel judges at the sole discretion of the Secretary-General, as 
well as the lack of reference to the geographical distribution, level of 
development and investor home/host status of the countries from which the 
judges will originate. They also criticise the consent requirement, the fact that 
states may prefer to breach their obligations if they deem it more efficient than 
compliance (it may for example be cheaper to breach their obligations and pay 
damages than comply94), as well as what appears to simply be an extension of 
the existing review process, rather than a carefully considered opportunity for 
reform.95 
The authors are keen to ensure that the interests of developing nations 
do not get overlooked in the establishment of an investment appeal procedure. 
In this regard, the article does highlight several concerns that developing 
countries may have, including the fact that the development objective must be 
maintained throughout the process of establishing any appeal mechanism. In 
addition, the appeals process must be transparent and fair in all aspects, 
guaranteeing the contribution of developing countries in the appellate judicial 
forum. Qureshi and Khan are also at pains to ensure that the position of 
multinational corporations is not indirectly strengthened through the possibility 
of abuse of the appeals process, and that the legislating abilities of developing 
countries are not infringed by an appellate mechanism. Finally, the authors are 
concerned that the introduction of an appeals facility should not indirectly 
multilateralise the bilateral agreements that have been legitimately negotiated, 
thus compromising the flexibility of the current bilateral system.96   
Walde highlights an interesting point regarding the creation of an appeal 
mechanism. The author casts his mind back to the time when ICSID was 
created. He recalls that the institution was not popular when it was first created, 
then, over time, it became increasingly so. The author asserts that this is often 
the case when new infrastructures are developed; they come to be used when 
the time is right. Walde postulates that this could be the case with an appeal 
mechanism; once created, users will either choose to use it or not. Walde 
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suggests that the best way to establish an appeals facility would be through the 
existing ICSID framework, as an extension to the annulment procedure.  
 Walde97 then goes on to consider the impact of an appeals facility on 
those people that will be using the system, that is the parties themselves (with 
particular reference to the position of investors). The author is of the opinion 
that, ‘a well crafted appeals facility- not a very complicated one, not a very time 
consuming one- can help to enhance the quality and therefore the longer-term 
acceptance and force of investment arbitration.’98 In this way then, an appeals 
facility might enhance the legitimacy of investment arbitration, providing a 
greater sense of permanence, continuity and familiarity. The author goes on to 
warn that an appeal mechanism would also carry risks. For example, an 
appeals facility might increase the disequilibrium that investors already face with 
strong litigating governments as their opposition. From an investor perspective, 
the appeals facility should be reasonable, practical and cost effective. In terms 
of the hugely important question of the constitution of the panel, Walde 
suggests a standing appeal body, much like that of the WTO appellate body 
would be preferable.99  
Blackaby100 investigates the creation of an appeal mechanism from the point 
of view of one particular state; Argentina. The state of Argentina has been the 
defendant party to a record breaking number of cases (since 2002 almost half 
of new ICSID registered cases have named Argentina as the defendant).101 In 
the 1980’s, Argentina suffered from hyperinflation and instability of its economy. 
In order to fuel development and income, the government enacted a number of 
policies designed to attract foreign investment. These policies were highly 
successful, attracting billions of dollars into the Argentine economy. Then in 
January of 2002, following a prolonged recession the government enacted a 
new emergency law which effectively cancelled its previous investment policies, 
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leading to huge losses of profit for foreign investors. This chain of events led to 
the ‘single largest phenomenon in the history of treaty arbitration.’ 102  This 
significant increase in caseload led to a huge strain on ICSID arbitration. As a 
result of this, one issue that came to the forefront was the constitution of the 
tribunal. The main problem was finding qualified arbitrators; the skills needed 
were quite diverse. For example, finding experienced arbitrators who are foreign 
investment experts and who have a good enough grasp of Spanish, as well as 
knowledge of public international law generally was no mean feat. Moreover, 
arbitrators are not able to be acting on behalf of, perhaps as counsel, for any of 
the investors that are bringing the claim. Another important concern in the 
Argentine cases, and indeed in international investment arbitration generally is 
consistency and coherency of decisions. Each of the thirty cases revolved 
around whether expropriation had occurred, whether there had been a breach 
of fair and equitable treatment or whether the defence of necessity could be 
raised. There was therefore clearly potential for thirty different decisions on the 
same, fundamentally important issues. For the most part, the decisions 
rendered were consistent. This concern over consistency is problematic though, 
because if two conflicting and inconsistent decisions are rendered, they both 
possess the same legal status. Therefore, ‘for the moment it appears that one 
must be prepared to accept the lawful status of two or more inconsistent 
decisions.’103 
 The author proposes two solutions to remedy this situation. Firstly, it is 
proposed that arbitrators should be allowed to sit on more than one tribunal. A 
second proposal would see agreements to constitute an identical tribunal in 
cases where similar issues arise. Whilst both of these solutions would enable a 
degree of consistency to be achieved, ‘they remain very much ad hoc 
solutions.’104 This particular weakness could be addressed in several different 
ways, including the establishment of an appeal mechanism. This would of 
course be broader than the current system of annulment, and would hopefully 
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achieve greater consistency of decision, and be instituted in a more permanent 
manner than the ad hoc solutions examined above.105  
An article by Goldhaber106 contemplates the possible establishment of an 
investment appeal mechanism. The author highlights the Czech107 and SGS108 
cases and suggests that they are one example of the crisis of legitimacy that 
has emerged in international investment law arbitration. Goldhaber cites 
eminent practitioner Blackaby;  
An appeal mechanism is critical for the long-term survival of the investment 
arbitration system. Any system where diametrically opposed decisions can legally 
coexist cannot last long. It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness. Ultimately 
there must be a right answer.109 
 Goldhaber notes that whilst investment has overtaken trade in economic 
importance, it does not have any dedicated international institution, such as the 
WTO does for trade. When there is contention over trade issues and cases, 
parties can turn to the WTO’s dispute settlement body for answers. However, 
there is no equivalent action in investment disputes. The author suggests that 
radical action is required, namely the creation of a supreme investment tribunal, 
a world investment court of sorts. Goldhaber recognises that such a body may 
be ‘politically unfashionable, perhaps to the point of being unfeasible.’110 All the 
more reason it should be discussed fully, according to the author. 111 
 The arguments in favour of an appeals process are then set out by the 
author. He believes that an appeals mechanism would promote accuracy and 
uniformity of the law in this area, vesting the power of review in dedicated, 
permanent arbitrators, allowing review on broad grounds of errors of fact and of 
law. Accuracy in investor-state arbitration is important due to the public nature 
of the proceedings; decisions are published in the public interest due to the 
involvement of the state parties. The stakes are often high in investor-state 
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arbitration, both in terms of monetary value and public interest. Consistency and 
accuracy of decisions promotes justice and enhances the legitimacy of the 
system generally. Furthermore, a stable and robust dispute resolution system 
will promote foreign investment and economic growth more generally.112 
 Goldhaber then turns to the main objections to the establishment of an 
appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration. The central concern is 
that such a process will undermine the speed and finality of the dispute 
resolution system, two much revered benefits of the present appeal-less system. 
The creation of an appeals process will undoubtedly undermine speed and 
finality. However, Goldhaber points out that, ‘the preeminent goal of 
international arbitration is not finality...[rather, it is to] remove decision making 
from the hands of untrusted domestic courts.’113 This primary goal would be 
achieved by the creation of an appeals process. The author goes on to deal 
with the issue of speed and finality, stating that whilst these are desirable goals, 
when the stakes are high (as they often are in international investment 
arbitration) the parties will often willingly sacrifice finality for accuracy and 
justice. Moreover, the notion of finality is illusory, as the losing party often 
pressures domestic courts to intrude on the matter. In this way then, a 
dedicated investment appeal court could remove the opportunity for domestic 
judicial interference, and indirectly promote finality.114  
 Goldhaber goes on to examine the existing forms of review of decisions 
in international investment arbitration, which he refers to as ‘meagre’115. He 
highlights the possibility of annulment in ICSID cases, as well as the 
opportunities for review in non-ICSID proceedings. Such opportunities include 
the involvement of domestic courts. The author notes that existing means of 
review are largely only available on procedural, and not substantive grounds, 
and are therefore very narrow indeed.116  
 The author purports that the ideal solution to the problems that have 
been discussed above would be to establish a world investment court. The 
institution would be similar to the dispute settlement body of the WTO. The 
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court would have to be created by signing an international multilateral treaty or 
by adding a protocol to existing treaties. This would be the ideal scenario, 
however it is not easy to envisage it materialising. Negotiations for such a treaty 
have failed miserably in the past, and the prospects for the future are not 
exactly promising. This is largely due to the fact that mulilateralism may have a 
‘sinister ring’117 to it. In light of this, experts agree that a world investment court 
is ‘not...politically viable’118 at this moment in time. However, the idea has merit 
and could come into fruition at some point in the future. The author muses that 
a large enough shock to the investment system could trigger the negotiations 
for a world investment court.119  
 
4.3.2 Opposition of the proposal to establish an appellate facility 
Whilst an overwhelming number of commentators have expressed their 
support for the creation of an appeals facility, and even considered how such a 
mechanism might best be established, a number of particular concerns about 
the proposition and are against the establishment of such a facility have also 
been articulated. 
Dimsey, an undoubted proponent of the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism does recognise a number of potential downfalls of the idea. Dimsey 
intimates that the introduction of an appeal mechanism could be damaging to 
investment arbitration, stripping the first instance hearing of any significance or 
value, since it will be appealable. Furthermore, finality of the award, the often 
cited strength of the investment arbitration system as it currently stands, will be 
eroded.120  
Paulsson 121  muses that the proposed solution, in this case the 
establishment of an investment appeal mechanism, could be worse than the 
purported problem of inconsistency of decisions. Paulsson recommends a more 
laissez-faire strategy, asserting that any problems will naturally sort themselves 
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out without any un-necessary intervention, a process which he refers to as 
‘natural correction’.122 
Gill suggests that the utility of an appeal mechanism will very much depend 
on who will hear the appeal. The pool of arbitrators hearing investment cases 
are of a very high calibre. Despite this, experienced arbitrators sometimes do 
come to differing conclusions, as we have seen in the past. Furthermore, the 
system of appointing arbitrators will need to be addressed; should we continue 
to allow the parties to appoint the arbitrators themselves? There is much which 
will need to be clarified in this regard.123 Instead of establishing an appeals 
facility, Gill advocates the employment of a laissez-fair policy will allow for 
natural selection of the most appropriate approach to any given problem. She 
believes that, ‘the inconsistent decisions themselves will give rise to one 
approach being generally regarded as more preferable than another and so it 
will be adopted more frequently thereafter.’124  
Legum 125  also expressed doubt about the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism. In 2006, he highlighted several potential problems which would 
need to be overcome in order to successfully integrate an appeal mechanism in 
international investment law. Legum concentrates particularly on four issues: 
the relationship between the new appeal mechanism and national courts; the 
enforcement of awards pending appeal; the composition of the tribunal; 
questions of standard appellate review and precedential effects of appellate 
decisions.126 Legum deals with each of these topics in turn. 
With regard to the relationship between the appeal mechanism and the 
national courts, Legum points out that traditionally, outside of the context of 
ICSID arbitration,  
awards in investor-state arbitration are subject to set-aside and enforcement 
proceedings in national courts. Typically several levels of national court review 
are available. A court of first instance decides whether to set aside or enforce 
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the award. An appeal is generally available to an intermediate appellate court. 
In many systems, a final appeal is then available to the highest court.127 
Going through the several layers of national court review as detailed above is 
time consuming and expensive. It may be possible to add an additional layer to 
this procedure, namely leave of appeal to an international appeal body. 
However, this is probably not a desirable option, adding further delay and cost 
to the resolution of a dispute. It may be more efficient to constitute an 
international appeal mechanism that operates in a similar manner to the ICSID 
approach to review. ICSID annulment procedures effectively displace national 
court review of arbitral awards. In this way, awards issued under ICSID 
arbitration are not subject to review by national courts. Review of ICSID 
decisions is therefore only possible through the limited ICSID annulment 
procedure. A similar approach could be adopted for the proposed international 
investment appeal mechanism, making investor-state awards subject to one 
single level of review.128  
 The author goes on to state that, ‘another important topic that any 
appellate system must address is the question of enforcement of awards while 
an appeal is pending.’129 Should there be a presumption that the award may be 
enforced pending appeal, or instead should there be a stay of enforcement? 
Legum muses that,  
while a presumptive stay may be desirable for...reasons of procedure, as a 
matter of fairness it may also be desirable to require that the appellant 
presumptively post security against the eventuality that the appeal will be 
unsuccessful.130 
This has become the standard practice in ICSID annulment proceedings, 
though it is not a formal requirement. The posting of security would also provide 
substantial assurance that an appealed award would be paid, thus ensuring 
enforcement of said award. This is significant because it is notoriously difficult to 
enforce awards against foreign states. 
 Legum then moves on to examine what he believes to be the most 
important consideration for a future appellate mechanism; the composition of 
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the appeals tribunal. Equally, it may also be the most difficult consideration. 
According to Legum, the expectation would be to establish what he refers to as 
a ‘standing tribunal’131 made up of a limited number of serving individuals. This 
would be expected because it has been the approach which has been taken by 
the most recently established pubic international legal institutions, such as the 
WTO, the ICJ and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. The 
perceived advantage of having a small number of sitting members enables the 
tribunal to build up a relatively consistent and coherent body of jurisprudence. 
However, Legum asserts that there are, ‘important differences between the 
circumstances that gave birth to these international courts and those that exist 
today for the establishment of an appellate system for investment treaty 
disputes.’132  
The first important difference being that the aforementioned previously 
created courts were established through negotiation of an existing multilateral 
agreement with very broad state membership. In contrast, there is no 
multilateral investment agreement; there are instead thousands of bilaterally 
negotiated treaties. This lack of multilateralism makes it very difficult to establish 
a single appellate mechanism. Another important difference is that the courts 
that are already in existence decide appeals which emanate from the 
agreement that was negotiated at the time they were established. For example, 
the WTO appellate body hears cases arising from the WTO agreements. An 
investment appeal tribunal would not have a single agreement of set of 
agreements to interpret; rather it would have to interpret the thousands of BITs 
negotiated at different times, by different states, each with different provisions. 
Furthermore, states themselves will not be concerned about the interpretation of 
treaties to which they do not have membership. Indeed, they may actively seek 
to negotiate treaties that are substantively different. Whilst states may desire 
consistency in investment arbitration decisions, they certainly do not desire 
harmonisation of treaty provisions.133  
 As an alternative to the standing tribunal, Legum offers a roster style 
model for the constitution of the tribunal, similar in some ways to the ICSID 
annulment committees. Each state would have the right to appoint its own 
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members, providing assurance to states that they can expect consistent 
interpretations. A roster system would also be suitable for a mechanism that 
would originally be established by a certain number of member states, with the 
facility for other states to accede in the future.134 
 A final consideration for the future appeal mechanism is the standard of 
review which it will provide and the precedential value of its decisions. Legum 
suggests that it is desirable to enable review on the traditional grounds of 
annulment (as detailed by Article 52 of the ICSID Convention135) as well as on 
grounds beyond the scope of annulment. The question is how far beyond this 
should the scope of review extend? Should it for example extend to encompass 
both errors of law and of fact? According to Article 17 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding136, the WTO appellate body’s scope of review is limited to legal 
errors. Though, in one of its decisions137, the appellate body has stated that, 
‘[w]hether or not a panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before 
it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, is...a legal question which, if properly 
raised on appeal, would fall within the scope of appellate review.’138  Therefore, 
it seems the appellate body can in some limited circumstances offer a very 
narrow form of factual review. It may be argued that only errors of law should be 
reviewable, in order to minimise the amount of appeals sought. This will keep 
the caseload of the tribunal low and provide for efficient resolution of appealed 
disputes. On the other hand, it could be argued that a more flexible approach, 
with some capacity to correct errors of fact (as demonstrated by the WTO 
appellate body) should be taken.139  
 The author then turns to the issue of the precedential value of the 
decisions of the future tribunal. Legum doubts that a system of formal precedent 
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or stare decisis would be ‘necessary or desirable’140. It would not be necessary 
because international tribunals tend to give substantial weight to previous 
decisions, even though this is strictly not necessary in the absence of a formal 
requirement of stare decisis. Moreover, binding precedent may not be desirable 
in international investment arbitration because of the sheer number of treaties in 
existence; states will be unwilling to be bound by an interpretation of a provision 
of a treaty to which they are not party, even if there may be a similar provision in 
a treaty to which they are party. 
 Legum concludes that the establishment of an appellate mechanism in 
international investment arbitration will not be an easy feat. Many challenges, 
including the four he has dealt with in the chapter will need to be considered 
and overcome in order to do so.141 
In 2008, Legum142 considered the issue of introducing an appeal mechanism 
in international investment arbitration yet again. Legum notes that discussion 
about the introduction of an appeal mechanism was brought to the forefront in 
2002, which was the year that saw a US Trade Promotion Act identify as one of 
its objectives the negotiation of an appellate body in investment arbitration. 
Other subsequent acts followed suit. Legum then goes on to review where 
efforts to establish an appeal mechanism currently stand. The author remarks 
that the creation of such a mechanism under the ICSID framework is not 
probable, and that there are no other negotiations taking place. Hence, the 
author asserts that there are no options for establishing an appeal mechanism.  
The second part of Legum’s article continues by examining why this is the 
case. Legum believes that there are three main reasons for the lack of options 
for the creation of an appeal mechanism. Firstly, he is of the opinion that the 
current system of international investment arbitration is ill-suited to appeals. He 
goes on to explain that this is largely due to the fact that there is currently no 
multilateral investment agreement. Secondly, Legum thinks that the need for an 
appeals mechanism has yet to be properly established. For him, the excessively 
cited criticisms of inconsistency and incoherence are simply not compelling 
enough. Lastly, Legum, like Paulsson is afraid that ‘the cure...could be far worse 
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than the disease.’143 He rationalises that the hasty introduction of an appeal 
mechanism could ‘do a tremendous amount of damage.’144 
The OECD has also highlighted a number of potential disadvantages of 
an appeal mechanism in international investment law in its 2006 paper145. The 
OECD notes that the very concept of appeal is contrary to the principle of 
finality, which is itself believed to be the greatest benefit of investor-state 
arbitration. Thus, it is thought that an appeal mechanism will increase the costs 
associated with, and the time it takes to resolve investment disputes. Moreover, 
there is a danger that an appeals mechanism would lead to an increase in the 
caseload of investment arbitration, with challenges being automatically sought 
by the losing party. Additionally, there is a ‘concern that the de-politicisation of 
investor-to-state arbitration, could be undermined.’146 This may be a legitimate 
concern due to the fact that governments who are eager to please their 
constituencies will appeal on every occasion that they lose at first instance.147 
Brower is also rather sceptical about the establishment of an appeals facility;  
One should... recall the cold reception given to preliminary discussions within the 
OECD and ICSID regarding the establishment of a single appellate body for 
investment treaty arbitration... Given their historical and continuing role in 
promoting discord and fierce controversy in international relations, investment 
disputes simply may not involve the sort of technical matters that lend themselves 
to the top-down solution contemplated by permanent international courts.148 
Brower is of the opinion that a top-down solution such as an appeal mechanism 
would not work in international investment arbitration. Rather, he advocates a 
bottom-up solution, such as co-ordinating the work of the various tribunals 
involved in settling international investment disputes and strengthening the roles 
of those involved in settling disputes so that they are more aware of the context 
within which their decisions will sit.149 
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 The author recognises that one of the main justifications put forward for 
the establishment of an appellate mechanism is to increase consistency in 
international investment law arbitration. Addressing this, Brower suggests that 
the degree of coherence required is not only over-exaggerated, but also 
unattainable, given the sheer number of bilateral investment treaties from which 
disputes arise. Brower suggests that the system of international investment 
dispute settlement is unsuited to heterogeneous outcomes, not only because of 
the number of treaties under which disputes are settled, but also because there 
is no centralised, permanent body to supervise the field generally (such as the 
WTO does for trade-related matters). Moreover, investors are able to pursue 
claims in numerous fora, under the different treaties which they may apply.150 
 Sornarajah151 interestingly notes a significant downfall of the proposition. 
He believes that developing nations will be reluctant to commit to submitting 
themselves to an appeal mechanism, as this will simply increase the costs 
associated with investment arbitration. This will be unattractive to developing 
states, who obviously do not have as much money to spend on arbitration.152  
Deputy Secretary-General at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
Shifman 153  highlights some of the challenges of administering an appellate 
system for investment disputes. Shifman briefly introduces the PCA and 
highlights some of its central features. She then goes on to consider the 
challenges which will need to be faced in order to successfully establish and 
administer an appellate system for investment disputes. The author points out 
that the first of these challenges will be funding; who will fund the new appellate 
mechanism and how? Shifman states that the PCA is funded by member states 
which seems logical, under the ‘user pays’ principle, however this can be 
somewhat problematic. For example, developing countries may struggle to pay 
the fee. She goes on to point out that the new appellate body will require highly 
qualified and experiences multilingual staff. Such highly qualified persons may 
command a high price. In order to promote transparency and avoid 
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inconsistency, the body will also require funding for the publication and 
dissemination of its decisions. She then goes onto consider how appeal panels 
should be constituted. There are a number of options in this regard. Shifman 
seems to favour the idea of having a pool of potential arbitrators from which the 
panel should be constituted. Procedural rules will of course have to be created 
governing the appointment of arbitrators in each particular case.154  
 The author goes on to examine the other challenges that will need to be 
faced in establishing an appeal mechanism, once funding has been put into 
place, competent staff have been hired and procedural rules for the constitution 
of the panel are put into place. According to Shifman, this very much depends 
on the structure of the envisaged appellate system and the scope of its review. 
Other general issues which will need to be addressed include what will happen 
to the original decision/award until the appeal is decided; should it be 
suspended? Should interim measures be allowed? There are many issues to 
consider before an appeal mechanism could be introduced.155 
Tawil156 also examines the debate about the issues of consistency and 
predictability, the often cited would-be benefits of the appeal mechanism. He 
quickly moves on to highlight the fact that in the context of ICSID, appeal was 
never contemplated. He goes on to stress (albeit with particular reference to 
ICSID), that the system is working well overall. Disputes are resolved in a timely 
fashion, with minimal cost to the parties involved. Tawil is concerned that the 
introduction of an appeal system will result in increased delays and augmented 
costs. The author recognises that the present system is not perfect; there has 
been a slight increase in the time it takes to resolve a dispute, as well as some 
problems with the nomination of arbitrators. However, the author feels that the 
biggest problem is the enforcement of awards, or lack thereof. He suggests that 
efforts should be concentrated on resolving this issue rather than on 
establishing an appeal mechanism.157  
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Qureshi and Khan158 also set out a number of arguments against the 
creation of an appeal mechanism. The authors assert that inconsistencies in 
decisions have not been identified as occurring regularly, and moreover, that 
the creation of an appeal mechanism might actually increase fragmentation and 
inconsistency. Additionally, an appeal mechanism would detract from the finality 
of the award, and lead to further, costly, time consuming litigation.159  
Qureshi160 also highlights the arguments against the establishment of an 
appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration. The author reminds 
us of the main basis of the call for an appeal mechanism; to increase 
consistency and coherence in international investment law arbitration. He then 
goes on to state that this may not actually be a valid basis after all, because the 
alleged inconsistencies have not materialised, noting that, ‘significant 
inconsistencies have not to date been a general feature of the jurisprudence of 
ICSID.’161 He goes on to state that the establishment of an appeals mechanism 
may actually increase inconsistency and encourage fragmentation more than 
the current system, as well as detract from the finality of awards. Qureshi goes 
a little further than many other commentators, stating that the debate about the 
desirability of an appeals facility may be somewhat redundant, as it may not 
even be possible to establish an effective appeal mechanism within the current 
framework of international investment law (which relies on bilateral investment 
agreements between states). Qureshi asserts than an appeal mechanism may 
only be effectively introduced as part of a multilateral system. Although, he goes 
on to highlight that previous attempts to negotiate a global, multilateral 
investment agreement have failed miserably. He states that, ‘in short, advocacy 
of an appellate system can indirectly partake of the call for a multilateral 
investment agreement.’162 Additionally, he states that, 
the case for an appellate facility must be set against the objectives and 
purposes of the provision of dispute settlement in the international investment 
sphere...consistency and coherence in dispute settlement may be significant 
reasons for institutional reform for both states and investors- but there are other 
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concerns which may seek to trump these considerations- for example, human 
rights, environment, and of course the development objectives of the host 
state.163  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ICSID Secretariat has also 
investigated integrating an appeal mechanism into its own framework for 
dispute settlement. In its 2004 Discussion Paper, the Secretariat discussed the 
requisite advantages and disadvantages of the proposal. However, an appeal 
mechanism was never introduced. This will be discussed in greater depth in 
chapter six. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 Although some experts continue to deny the existence of the crisis of 
consistency in international investment arbitration, most eminent practitioners 
and academics specialising in the field do recognise that there is a problem. 
Interestingly, recognition of the problem is where agreement seems to end; 
there is no general consensus as to how the problem may be solved. Many 
different solutions have been proposed in an attempt to remedy incoherency 
and inconsistency in international investment arbitration, including increasing 
the role of national courts, allowing the WTO’s dispute settlement body to hear 
investment cases, and introducing an appellate mechanism.  
The present chapter has concentrated on reviewing this latter proposal, 
the creation of an appellate mechanism. As this chapter shows, this proposition 
has generated much debate. The discourse has centred around the desirability 
of the proposed appeals facility, with much of the literature focusing on the 
various advantages and disadvantages of such a mechanism. It is accepted by 
many experts that an appeal mechanism could increase the legitimacy of 
international investment arbitration by providing consistent decisions, leading to 
the creation of a coherent body of jurisprudence. Perceived disadvantages of an 
appeal mechanism include damage to the principle of finality of decisions, 
increased costs associated with investment arbitration, delays in resolving 
disputes, and an increased caseload.  
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Nonetheless, it is important to note that the debate has gone beyond 
issues of desirability of such a facility; it also extends to issues of feasibility. 
Even those commentators who accept that an appellate mechanism would be of 
considerable benefit to the system of international investment arbitration 
recognise that the establishment of such a facility will not be easy to achieve. 
There is also much debate surrounding the structure and mandate of the 
eventual appeal body. Several suggestions have been put forward in this regard, 
including, but not limited to suggestions such as constituting ad hoc appeal 
tribunals on a case by case basis, integrating the appeals facility into the 
existing ICSID framework, and establishing a single, independent, permanent 
investment appeal court. Reviewing the literature, it would seem that the 
proposals to integrate appeal into ICSID and creating a separate, single 
investment appeal court have received the most support. The ICSID secretariat 
itself has considered the possibility of integrating an appeals facility, having 
issued two publications on the matter. The secretariat essentially decided that 
at the present time at least, it would be unable to pursue the establishment of 
an appeals facility under the ICSID convention. This therefore leaves only one 
viable option; the creation of a single, independent, permanent appeal tribunal.  
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CHAPTER V: POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Having come to the conclusion in the previous chapters that the system 
of investment arbitration is not currently providing an adequate and effective 
means of settling investment disputes, it is necessary to examine how the 
situation might be ameliorated. Therefore, the objective of this present chapter 
is to discuss how the current system of international investment arbitration 
might be improved upon. A number of possible improvements have been 
proposed by various foreign investment experts in this regard. It would be 
impossible to compile an exhaustive list of such proposed improvements and 
discuss each thoroughly in turn. Such an extensive treatment of the subject is 
beyond this scope of this work. However, this chapter will serve to highlight 
some of the more prominent and interesting suggestions that have been put 
forward in recent years. 
 This chapter will examine the proposal to allow the World Trade 
Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body to take over the settlement of 
international investment dispute as well as the possible creation of interpretative 
guidelines on international investment arbitration. Another suggestion which will 
be considered is the possibility of strengthening the role of the national courts in 
the settlement of international investment disputes. The possible negotiation of 
a multilateral treaty will also be discussed, as will the potential creation of an 
appellate mechanism.  
 
5.2 Increasing the role of the World Trade Organisation’s Dispute 
Settlement Body 
 Before considering the proposal to increase the role of the WTO’s DSB in 
international investment arbitration, it is important to think about the relationship 
between trade and investment.1  The two fields have always been, and will 
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continue to be intertwined in a complex manner. The WTO recognised this 
necessarily close relationship from the outset, with many trade related issues 
spilling over into the sphere of investment. Thus, in 1996 the WTO established 
a Working Group on Trade and Investment. 2  The Working Group seeks to 
analyse the relationship between trade and investment, meeting regularly and 
outlining its findings in its trade and investment reports.3 The WTO has also 
incorporated the TRIMs agreement into its legal framework; 
[TRIMS] recognises that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. 
It provides that no contracting party shall apply TRIM [trade related investment 
measure] inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions) of the GATT.4 
Any non conforming TRIMs must be notified to the WTO and removed within 
either three or five years. The TRIMs Committee was established in order to 
monitor TRIMs matters.5 Investment is also addressed by the WTO through the 
GATS agreement.6  
With this necessarily close relationship between trade and investment in 
mind, it has been suggested that the WTO’s DSB could play a greater role 
within the settlement of investment disputes. It is thought that increasing the 
role of the WTO DSB might remedy some of the problems associated with the 
current system of international investment arbitration, most notably 
inconsistency and incoherence. At present, the DSB hears investment related 
trade disputes (as the tribunal is limited to hearing cases which arise under the 
WTO agreements). Therefore, in order for the WTO DSB to hear purely 
investment disputes, it would need to be given the authority to do so. This could 
be achieved by inserting provisions to this effect in the relevant investment 
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agreements that are already in existence or by the negotiation of a separate 
WTO treaty dealing with the settlement of international investment disputes. 
The idea of establishing a WTO multilateral treaty on the subject of investment 
dispute settlement might be met with cynicism, with a natural comparison being 
made to the failed efforts to negotiate a general comprehensive multilateral 
investment treaty. However, such comparisons would not be justified, as it 
would presumably be much easier to conclude a treaty dealing exclusively with 
dispute settlement, rather than an all-encompassing multilateral agreement on 
international investment.7 
 
5.2.1 Advantages of increasing the role of the WTO DSB 
The idea of allowing the WTO’s own DSB to settle international 
investment disputes is not novel. Such a possibility has already been 
considered by the WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment in its 2002 report.8 The report was largely positive, welcoming the 
integration of an investment framework into the WTO and its dispute settlement 
system. Through consultation with member states, the WTO found that the 
possibility of anchoring a ‘prospective investment agreement... in the existing 
WTO procedures, rules and structures of the WTO dispute settlement’9 system 
was well received. It was thought that the objective of securing a ‘transparent, 
stable and predictable framework for investment’10  would be best achieved 
through the employment of the existing WTO system for the settlement of 
disputes. Additionally, with many of the existing WTO agreements containing 
investment related provisions, the integration of an investment framework into 
the existing dispute settlement system would increase coherence.11   
                                            
7 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 209. 
8
 ‘Report of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment to 
the General Council of the WTO’ WT/WGTI/6 (2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%28+%40meta%5FSym
bol+%28WT%FCWGTI%FC%2A%29+and+not+%28W+or+M%29%29+and+%28%40
meta%5FTypes+Report%29%29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%
2FWGTI%2F6%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=6&popTitle=WT%2FWGTI%2F6> accessed 
9 February 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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 The report goes further, stating that ‘the possibility of employing the 
existing WTO dispute settlement mechanism was one of the main reasons for 
adopting a multilateral approach to investment rules.’12 It could therefore be 
argued that the settlement of investment disputes by the WTO DSB is a 
desirable alternative to the settlement of foreign investment disputes by ad hoc 
arbitration. 
 
5.2.2 Disadvantages of increasing the role of the WTO DSB 
 Although there is undoubtedly some merit to the idea of entrusting the 
WTO DSB with the settlement of investment disputes, the Working Group did 
suggest some areas which would need to be given careful consideration. For 
instance, there would need to be strengthened consultation mechanisms on 
dispute settlement in the investment sphere, in order to ensure that the interests 
of both investor home states and investment host states could be effectively 
served.13 A number of other concerns, such as the level of compensation which 
should be awarded, were also discussed.14 The Working Group did not treat 
such concerns as arguments against the settlement of investment disputes by 
the WTO DSB, but rather as issues which would need to be carefully 
considered and accommodated.15 
Despite the generally positive approach of the Working Group, some 
international investment experts have voiced concerns about whether the WTO 
DSB has the capacity to handle the high number of international investment 
disputes at present. Subedi notes that ‘the current legal, institutional and 
physical infrastructure of the DSB may not be able to cope with the possible 
flood of investment disputes.’16 It is anticipated that a massive influx of cases 
would occur, due to the fact that the number of investment disputes is rather 
high and does continue to rise.17  
                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 7) 210. 
17 Statistics show that the number of investment cases has risen rapidly, though there 
has been a slight decrease in recent years, undoubtedly due to the global financial 
crisis. For more information see K Sauvant, ‘The rise of international investment, 
investment agreements and investment disputes’ in K Sauvant (ed), Appeals 
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 Furthermore, allowing the WTO DSB to settle investment disputes would 
mean allowing private investors standing before the WTO DSB. The 
significance of this fact should not be underestimated; at present, the WTO DSB 
is only able to settle trade disputes between two state parties. In addition to the 
problem of increasing the caseload of the WTO DSB, enabling private investors 
to bring investment disputes before the WTO DSB may have another important 
effect. If private investors are permitted to bring investment cases before the 
DSB, they would certainly demand such access in trade disputes.18 When this 
occurs (as it unquestionably would) it would be difficult for the WTO to justifiably 
deny such access. Consequently, the DSB would need to be significantly 
expanded. Such mammoth expansion would of course require a significant 
increase in the DSB’s budget, which ultimately the WTO member states would 
have to fund. This would be particularly problematic for less economically 
developed WTO member states. This possible budgetary problem could of 
course be resolved by requiring private investors to pay the costs associated 
with DSB dispute resolution (as they are already required to pay the costs of 
international arbitration at present). However, this would not remedy the 
problem of increased costs of litigation for member states though, who would 
undoubtedly have to defend themselves in more disputes. Subedi does state 
that the potential cost problems could be resolved through the creation of an 
international fund which could be accessed by lesser developed states and that 
even at present, states have to defend themselves against private investors 
taking disputes to international investment tribunals under BITs. For these 
reasons, the issue of cost may be less significant than may have been 
anticipated at the outset.19  
 Another potential problem with increasing the role of the WTO DSB is the 
restricted membership of the WTO. At present, WTO membership consists of 
                                                                                                                                
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP 2008), ‘UNCTAD Latest 
developments in investor-state dispute settlement’ (2009) 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf>, ‘UNCTAD: World 
Investment Report 2011’<http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-
en.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012 and ‘UNCTAD: FDI 
Statistics’<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88> 
accessed 9 March 2012. 
18 For an in-depth discussion of state-state and private individual-state dispute 
settlement, see W Choi, ‘The present and future of the investor-state dispute 
settlement paradigm’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 725. 
19 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 7) 210. 
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15720 states from all corners of the globe. However, there are up to 19621 
sovereign states in the world; thus, approximately 40 states are not members of 
the WTO. At present, in order for a case to be heard by the WTO’s DSB, both 
parties to the dispute must be members of the WTO.22 If the WTO’s DSB were 
to become the central or only body hearing international investment cases, the 
situation might arise where one WTO member state or an individual from a 
WTO member state wishes to take action against another state or individual of 
a state who is not a WTO member. This jurisdictional issue would need to be 
remedied. 
 Geographical issues may also be an obstacle to increasing the role of 
the WTO’s DSB. The WTO DSB sits at the WTO headquarters in Geneva, 
Switzerland 23 . At present, the parties to investment disputes may usually 
choose the seat of the tribunal which will hear the case. The parties will 
presumably choose a location which is easy and inexpensive for them to travel 
to. If the WTO DSB became the default investment arbitration hearing body, all 
disputes would be heard in Geneva, which may be far away from the parties’ 
location. Thus, the travel costs involved in arbitration might increase 
dramatically. Increasing costs contradicts one of the rationales behind the use 
of arbitration as a form of dispute settlement; that it is a relatively low cost 
option. 
 
                                            
20
 As of 10 May 2012 there are 157 WTO member states. For a full list of members see 
‘Understanding the WTO: The Organisation, Members and Observers’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 25 August 
2012. 
21 The exact number of states is not a settled issue. There are 193 state members of 
the United Nations (‘Member states of the United Nations’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/members/> accessed 20 February 2012), whilst the US 
government recognises 195 independent states (‘US Department  of State, Recognised 
Independent States <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm> accessed 20 February 
2012), however some reports suggest the inclusion of Taiwan would mean there are 
196 nations (‘BBC, Taiwan Country Profile’ 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/1285915.stm> accessed 
20 February 2012). 
22
 The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes 1994 (full text) is available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm> accessed 9 August 2012. 
The Understanding was negotiated as part of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, 
signed in Marrakesh in 1994 and entered into force in January 1995. 
23 ‘Understanding the WTO: who are we’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm> accessed 28 
September 2011. 
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5.3 Establishment of guidelines for international investment arbitration 
Interestingly, there are guidelines already in operation on the treatment 
of foreign direct investment. In 1991, the World Bank, MIGA and the IMF joined 
forces through a Development Committee in order to create a legal framework 
for the promotion of FDI. In 1992, the Committee adopted the Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment24. These three institutions do not have 
the authority to adopt a legally binding instrument; accordingly, the guidelines 
are voluntary. Nonetheless, the guidelines do carry a certain amount of weight 
due to the fact that they were established under the auspices of three of the 
most important global financial institutions. However, the guidelines have been 
criticised for being too protectionist towards foreign investors, and providing little 
assistance for investment host states.25 
It is possible that similar guidelines on the subject of international 
investment arbitration could be introduced in order to remedy some of the 
fundamental problems associated with the system of international investment 
arbitration and the framework of international investment law. The introduction 
of investment arbitration guidelines would provide tribunals with assistance 
when interpreting key investment law principles. This would in turn, hopefully 
lead to more consistent interpretations of key terms and therefore remedy one 
of the central problems associated with international investment arbitration as it 
currently stands; inconsistency and incoherence. This is an interesting proposal 
for many different reasons, not least because it would not require a radical 
overhaul of international investment law. The future guidelines would clarify the 
existing law, rather than replace it. This is therefore one of the simplest of all the 
proposed possible improvements to the system to introduce. All that would be 
required would be a basic document which outlines and defines all the key 
principles of investment law; a much less radical undertaking than some of the 
other suggestions which will be discussed in this chapter. Subedi summarises 
the aspects of international investment law which could be covered in the 
guidelines as, 
                                            
24
 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 1992 found in 
‘World Bank: Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment 
of Foreign Direct Investment’ (1992) 31 ILM 1363. 
25
 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 7) 34-35. 
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(i) the definition, meaning and scope of the principle of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’; (ii) the definition of ‘indirect expropriation’; (iii) the nature and scope 
of both ‘legitimate regulatory’ powers or the ‘police powers’ of states; and (iv) 
the ‘umbrella clause’ as these are becoming more controversial and complex 
issues both in the literature and in the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals.26 
 Similar guidelines have successfully been produced in other areas of 
international law. In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) created the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts27. 
Until 2001, the law of state responsibility was somewhat unclear and 
underdeveloped. The ILC used the Draft Articles as a vehicle to codify existing 
rules and move progress in the area forward. The Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility have generally been very well received28, and have even been 
referred to by the ICJ.29 Other examples of the successful establishment of 
guidelines come in the form of the 1978 ILC Draft Articles on the Most Favoured 
Nation Clauses 30  which set out the extremely important investment most 
favoured nation principle, and the 2006 ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection31. 
 
                                            
26 Ibid 199. 
27 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, available 
at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf> 
accessed 8 August 2012. 
28 For discussion of the process of drafting the articles (including government 
responses to the drafting process and final text) see J Crawford, J Peel and S Olleson, 
‘The ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
completion of the secondary reading’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 
963. For more information on the Draft Articles and the international law of state 
responsibility see J Crawford, A Pellett and S Olleson (eds), The Law of International 
Responsibility (OUP 2010).  
29 The ICJ cited an early draft of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts in the case of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7 as cited in S Schwebel, Justice in International Law: Further 
Selected Writings (CUP 2011) 85. 
30 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Most Favoured Nation Clauses 
(1978) full text available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_3_1978.pdf> 
accessed 11 June 2012. 
31 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) full text 
available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf> 
accessed 16 August 2012. 
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5.3.1 Possible advantages 
The ILC issued guidelines are not hard law32, and as such are not legally 
binding documents. Rather, they are soft law33 instruments. At first glance, the 
lack of binding force of such documents might appear to be problematic and 
represent a weakness or shortcoming. However, a closer inspection might 
reveal that a soft law approach to governance might yield important benefits at 
a lesser cost.34 One of the major advantages of soft law instruments is that they 
are easier to negotiate and therefore, the costs involved in their negotiation are 
much lower. Furthermore, the costs associated with post-agreement, including 
managing and enforcing commitments are also much lower. The main reason 
for the relative ease of negotiation and lower costs involved in soft law 
instruments is that states do not feel obliged to exercise as much caution when 
agreeing non-binding agreements, and moreover that the costs of violation are 
naturally much lower.35 Another advantage of soft law governance is that states 
suffer less in terms of cost to their sovereignty. When states accept legally 
binding obligations, they commit to a loss of sovereignty of varying degree 
(depending on the particular obligation). Soft, non-binding instruments do not 
involve such a significant loss of authority on the part of the committing state.36 
Furthermore, soft law instruments are much more easily renegotiated and 
withdrawn from than hard law agreements, thus they are more attractive to 
states. 37  Another advantage of soft law agreements is that can provide a 
compromise at a particular point in time and serve as a stepping stone to the 
conclusion of a binding multilateral agreement at some later stage. Abbott and 
Snidal eloquently explain this point;  
Soft law can ease bargaining problems among states even as it opens up 
opportunities for achieving mutually preferred compromises. Negotiating a hard, 
highly elaborated agreement among heterogeneous states is a costly and 
protracted process. It is often more practical to negotiate a softer agreement 
that establishes general goals but with less precision and perhaps with limited 
                                            
32 The term ‘hard law’ refers to binding legal instruments. 
33
 The term ‘soft law’ refers to quasi-legal instruments that may not have legally binding 
force. 
34 K Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and soft law in international governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 421 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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delegation. Soft legalization allows states to adapt their commitments to their 
particular situations rather than trying to accommodate divergent national 
circumstances within a single text.38  
 Soft law agreements also provide a compromise between states in a 
weaker bargaining position and those in a stronger bargaining position.39 This 
unequal bargaining power is often said to be one of the main reasons why 
attempts to negotiate a global, comprehensive multilateral investment treaty 
have failed in the past. 
 
5.3.2  Possible drawbacks 
 As has been touched on above, there are a number of perceived 
drawbacks to the creation of international investment guidelines or a draft 
interpretative statement. Most obviously, such a document would be of a non-
binding nature, thus states are not bound to comply with the definitions or 
obligations which may be set out. Breaches of the guidelines might occur 
frequently, and when such breaches do occur, there may be very little that can 
be done about them (due to the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms 
being available).40  
 In order to encourage states to volunteer themselves to be bound by 
them, soft law instruments can often be vague in terms of the exact scope of the 
obligations that they create. This can be problematic, as it might be difficult to 
ascertain whether or not a state is indeed acting in accordance with its 
commitments, thus creating greater opportunity for states to avoid 
responsibility.41 
 Furthermore, the guidelines might be criticised for lacking legitimacy, 
having been issued by a single body consisting of unelected members. The 
International Law Commission for example, which has issued several important 
draft articles on various aspects of international law, actually consists of 34 
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40 G Shaffer and M Pollack, ‘How hard and soft law interact in international regulatory 
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members chosen by the United Nations General Assembly. The committee 
members supposedly act on an individual basis, and as such are not chosen to 
represent their respective states. However, there may be issues of bias, with 
some members consciously or subconsciously acting in the best interests of 
their home state.42 
 
5.4 Increasing the role of national courts 
  In order to address some43 of the problems associated with the current 
system of international investment dispute settlement that were discussed in the 
previous chapters, it has been suggested that the role of national courts could 
be strengthened. This could mean that foreign investors may be required to 
submit disputes which arise during the course of foreign investment to the 
investment host state’s national courts in the first instance, rather than being 
able to go straight to international tribunals. This would essentially mean a 
revival of central aspects of the Calvo doctrine (namely the doctrine of the 
exhaustion of local remedies).44 
 
5.4.1 Benefits of increasing the role of the national courts 
 There are several important advantages of increasing the role of the 
national courts in international investment dispute settlement. Subedi 
summarises them well, stating that,  
resort to national courts in the first place for the settlement of such [investment] 
disputes would address some of the deficiency of legitimacy, transparency, and 
accountability that exists in the systems such as those under ICSID or 
UNCITRAL.45 
Subedi acknowledges that some states do not (at least at present) have 
well enough functioning judiciaries to be able to handle investment disputes. 
Nevertheless, he asserts that such states could enact laws establishing 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
43 G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 175. 
44 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 7) 218-
219. 
45 Ibid. 
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separate investment courts which could deal exclusively with investment 
disputes. Subedi believes that this should be the,  
long-term aim of the international community in this age of globalisation of 
values, ideas and principles. Since it is widely acknowledged that international 
law has a role as a gentle civiliser of states, its aim should be to encourage 
states to develop legal systems that conform to international standards.46 
Encouraging such states to develop their legal regimes in order to cope 
with the demands of settling international investment disputes, will also enable 
them to free themselves from the (sometimes arbitrary) rulings of international 
investment tribunals, which often award huge amounts of compensation to 
foreign investors which the state has to pay.47 
Other commentators have advanced similar theories. For example, 
Ginsburg asserts that widespread use of international investment arbitration has 
discouraged domestic courts from seeking to improve, and that ‘allow[ing] 
powerful actors to avoid local judicial institutions’48 can lead to a reduction in the 
‘local institution quality.’49 In turn, ICJ Judge Sepulveda Amor concludes that 
investment arbitration ‘diminishes the value of...[the mexican] juridical order.’50 
Another possible advantage of strengthening the role of national courts in 
international investment dispute settlement is the reduction of forum shopping. 
Under the present system of international investment arbitration, parties to a 
dispute have at their disposal the services of a number of different tribunals. 
Parties are therefore often able to cherry-pick the tribunal with which they feel 
(for whatever reason) that they might have a greater chance of being successful. 
This cherry-picking is possible, due to the multitude of international investment 
agreements in existence under which they can bring a case. The phenomenon 
of forum shopping could be completely alleviated if national courts are 
mandatorily called upon to settle any disputes that arise from an investment in 
their territories. If cases are obligatorily heard by the investment host state 
national court, the choice of forums will be completely removed. This would also 
                                            
46 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 D Ginsburg, ‘International substitutes for domestic institutions’ (2005) 25 International 
Review of Law and Economics 107. 
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 Ibid. 
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 B Sepulveda Amor, ‘International law and national sovereignty: the NAFTA and the 
claims of Mexican jurisdiction’ (1997) 19 Houston Journal of International Law 565 
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solve the problem of multiple and parallel proceedings; since the case would 
have to be heard in national courts, parties could not initiate proceedings 
elsewhere.  
Furthermore, if disputes are necessarily brought to the investment host 
state national court, the court will be able to formulate its own body of 
jurisprudence on investment matters, which may lead to more consistent and 
coherent decisions in investment disputes. Currently, international investment 
arbitration is often criticised for its toleration of inconsistent and incoherent 
decisions, with different (and sometimes the same tribunals) issuing 
diametrically opposing decisions in cases where similar or the same facts are at 
issue. 
Another advantage of strengthening the role of national courts in settling 
international investment disputes is that local judges are better placed to 
understand national law and policy than for example international tribunals. 
Such an in-depth local knowledge might enable judges to make more 
enlightened, fairer judgements. 
Enabling the national courts of the investment host state to settle 
international investment disputes may also reduce the costs associated with 
investment arbitration. Obviously, there would be little or no cost involved in the 
parties having to travel to the seat of arbitration. Furthermore, the institutional 
costs of arbitration might be significantly lowered, because there would be no 
fee payable to an external arbitral institution such as ICSID for example, and 
there would be no inflated expert arbitrator’s fees (as the national judges would 
be hearing the case). This reduction in costs would be desirable to both parties, 
especially in the difficult economic climate. 
One final advantage of increasing the role of national courts in 
international investment dispute settlement is that it would be a popular move 
with developing nations. Developing states are the usual defendants in 
international investment disputes, and are often landed with huge compensation 
payments by international tribunals (who can seemingly sometimes act in an 
arbitrary manner). If investment disputes were to be settled by their own 
national courts, developing nations may feel that their interests are being 
represented in a fairer manner. This will also enable developing nations to take 
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on an increasingly important role and a give them a greater voice on the world 
stage. 
5.4.2 Potential problems with increasing the role of the national 
courts 
 The main problem with this proposal is that traditionally, foreign investors 
have been opposed to the settlement of investment disputes by the investment 
host state’s national courts. It is easy to see why foreign investors are less than 
keen on the idea of increasing the role of the host state national courts; seeing 
as investors typically hail from richer, developed nations, and the states that 
they invest in are usually poorer, less developed nations. Poorer, less 
developed nations often have lesser developed legal frameworks and judiciaries. 
Their judges are often less well educated, and sometimes corruption is rife 
within the domestic legal system. Foreign investors have legitimate concerns 
that their dispute may not be handled in a fair and appropriate manner. 
Accordingly, requiring the submission of disputes to national courts can only 
happen if the domestic legal systems of investment host states can provide a 
credible, efficient and unbiased alternative to international arbitration in practice, 
and not just simply in theory.51 
 To combat this problem, Subedi believes that the international 
community should encourage nations with substandard domestic legal systems 
to act to strengthen their systems, perhaps through the enactment of new laws. 
Alternatively, such nations could work to establish separate investment courts 
and tribunals with efficient, unbiased procedures and personnel. This would 
almost certainly give investors greater confidence in settling their investment 
disputes through the courts of the investment host state.52 The author believes 
this should be the ultimate aim of the international community; to encourage the 
development of better legal systems that conform to international minimum 
standards all around the world.53 
 Another potential drawback to increasing the role of national courts in the 
settlement of international investment disputes is a loss of flexibility in dispute 
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settlement proceedings. With arbitration, comes a great deal of choice for the 
parties to the dispute. Parties can choose institutional or ad hoc arbitration, the 
location where the arbitration should take pace, as well as the arbitrators 
themselves et cetera. If national courts are called upon to settle international 
investment disputes, the parties will lose this flexibility. 
 A further potential disadvantage of strengthening the role of national 
courts is the potential loss of privacy and confidentiality. Although national laws 
and rules of arbitration can vary greatly in the amount of privacy and 
confidentiality they accord, there is general consensus that arbitration rules offer 
greater privacy and confidentiality. 54  In arbitration, the parties can usually 
choose to have private, closed oral hearings and choose whether they wish to 
publish the award rendered.55 Such a high level of privacy and confidentiality is 
not necessarily to be expected if a case is settled in the national courts of the 
investment host state. 
 A final important disadvantage of allowing the national courts to settle 
investment disputes is that the award rendered by the national court might be 
open to appeal through the domestic court structure. This might be 
disadvantageous as it would obviously negatively impact the principle of 
finality56. Finality of decision is of course one of the central values of the system 
of international investment arbitration; it would not be a stretch to assert that 
finality might be seen as one of the pillars upon which the system is indeed 
founded. 
 
5.5 Creation of a global multilateral investment treaty 
                                            
54 See ‘Privacy and Confidentiality’ section of ‘Arbitration and Mediation – The Basics’ 
of the London Court of Arbitration’s website 
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ics.aspx> accessed 17 August 2012. See also G Born, International Arbitration and 
Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing (3rd Edition, Kluwer 2010) 11. 
55 For information on the publication of awards rendered under ICSID see E Gaillard 
and J Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer, 1999) 151 and for awards rendered under the UNCITRAL Rules 
see S Jagusch and J Sullivan, ‘A comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: 
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Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 2010) 95. 
56 See J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is 
there a need for reform?’ (2009) 26 Journal of International Arbitration 437. 
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 The concept of negotiating a global multilateral investment treaty is not 
revolutionary. There have in fact already been several attempts to establish 
such a treaty57. All said attempts to negotiate have been unsuccessful, and thus 
a multilateral investment treaty has never come to fruition. Before examining the 
possibility of creating a multilateral investment treaty in the future, it is 
necessary to analyse why previous negotiation attempts failed, and determine 
whether any valuable lessons can be learned from these failures. 
 
5.5.1 Previous attempts to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty 
 The very first attempt to introduce multilateral investment rules came 
immediately after the Second World War in 1948 with the creation of the 
Havana Charter. 58  It was intended that the Charter would establish the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO), the international body that would 
regulate world trade. Interestingly, the Charter did contain investment provisions 
which were quite far reaching and would give member states relatively wide 
authority to regulate foreign investment. The Charter was signed on the 24th of 
March 1948 by 53 countries, though it never entered into force.59 This was 
largely because it was repeatedly rejected by US Congress which felt that it 
extended beyond the realms of international trade and into domestic policy, and 
furthermore that its provisions were too vague and unclear.60 Additionally, at the 
time, the Cold War was emerging, which dampened the negotiating efforts 
somewhat. 
 After the failure of the Havana Charter, came waves of expropriations 
that affected foreign investors in many socialist, communist and newly 
independent states. Consequently, foreign investors became increasingly 
preoccupied with the risk of expropriation and they continued to press for firm 
rules on the protection of foreign investment. Developing nations, on the other 
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hand relished their newly acquired power to expropriate and their political 
independence, and as such had no desire to limit their authority in any way.61 
 In response to the wave of expropriations, a number of proposals for the 
establishment of a multilateral investment treaty emerged in the 1950’s. Such 
proposals were mainly at the request of the business community, who wished to 
have greater protection and security for their foreign investments. One such 
proposal took the form of the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad62 (also 
known as the Abs-Shawcross Draft). The Draft Convention ‘proposed a regime 
that aimed at the comprehensive protection of foreign investment’63. Although it 
was never implemented, it heavily influenced another draft multilateral 
agreement, the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
property 64 . It too contained a relatively high level of protection for foreign 
investors. Consequently, it failed to garner enough support from OECD 
members, and also failed to be implemented. The developing and developed 
countries could not agree about the level of protection which should be afforded 
to foreign investors.65  
 The 1960’s and 1970’s provided a fairly hostile climate for the negotiation 
of a multilateral investment treaty: two UN General Assembly Resolutions66 
aimed to put an end to the requirement that governments should compensate 
for expropriating the assets of foreign investors.67 During the same era, BITs 
became increasingly popular. Gradually, BITs encouraged a change in attitude 
towards the protection of foreign investment. With the end of the Cold War and 
the decline of socialism, ‘market ideology became the prevailing model for 
organising the economy.’68 Additionally, it became a widely recognised fact that 
foreign investment stimulated economic development. Accordingly, the global 
community as a whole became much more interested in the protection of 
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foreign investment and open to the possibility of the creation of a multilateral 
investment treaty.69 
 The Convention on the Settlement of International Disputes 70  was 
concluded in the mid 1960’s. Although, the Convention created a multilateral 
framework for resolving international investment disputes, rather than a general 
comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment.  
In 1985, the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)71 was concluded; its primary aim was to provide a 
multilateral insurance framework for foreign investment projects. The successful 
conclusion of these agreements demonstrates that consensus between 
developing and developed nations on foreign investment issues can be reached, 
and that states are indeed willing to commit to multilateral investment 
instruments.72 
 The United States took it upon itself to bring the subject of a multilateral 
investment agreement to the forefront of the GATT / WTO system. The USA did 
achieve some limited success, with some investment related provisions in 
certain GATT / WTO agreements being implemented. However, the rules were 
very limited indeed, and it was hoped that more far-reaching provisions would 
come to fruition in the future (preferably in an investment-dedicated multilateral 
agreement). Accordingly, the issue of negotiating a multilateral investment 
agreement was kept on the WTO agenda during the 1990’s. Although, at the 
First Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996, a Working Group to examine the 
relationship between trade and investment was established, no mention was 
made of conducting negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral 
agreement.73 
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With hope of negotiating a multilateral investment agreement under the 
auspices of the WTO fading fast, and also encouraged to some extent by the 
successes of ICSID, MIGA, and the GATT/WTO, efforts to negotiate an 
overarching multilateral investment agreement were revitalised in 1995. OECD 
member states agreed to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI). Initially, the objective was simply to 
multilateralise the bilateral investment treaty model. However, a more ambitious 
goal soon arose; ‘to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the process 
of globalisation’74. It was thought that in order to achieve this ambitious goal, the 
agreement could not be limited to ‘traditional’ investment protection, but that it 
should contain ‘new’ international investment related issues, such as 
environmental protection, human rights and sustainable development. As such, 
the MAI would have far-reaching effects and go beyond the scope of what 
model BITs envisaged.75 
 A draft MAI text was completed in 1997 and accidentally leaked to the 
public. The text attracted fierce criticism from non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), citizen’s groups and a number of governments of developing countries, 
and it was therefore never implemented. Schill believes that the MAI 
negotiations failed for a number of different reasons.76 The fact that France 
withdrew from the negotiations was significant. However, one of the main 
reasons that the MAI ultimately failed was the fact that OECD member states 
were unable to reach consensus on several important contentious issues. 
Secondly, the negotiations were criticised for failing to allow developing nations 
the chance to participate in a meaningful, useful manner. As a direct result of 
this lack of voice, several developing nations, such as India opposed the MAI. 
Thirdly, the MAI suffered criticism from many third parties, including NGOs who 
were concerned about the impact that high standard of investment protection 
would have on other issues, such as environmental protection and human rights 
standards. Finally, the negotiations became increasingly complicated, and 
consequently MAI negotiations were suspended for a period of six months from 
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April 1998. However, in December 1998, the OECD announced that further MAI 
negotiations would not be taking place.77  
After the failure of the MAI negotiations, all was quiet on the multilateral 
investment treaty front for a number of years, until the WTO took it upon itself to 
re-initiate negotiations on the subject. The 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Doha,  
recognised the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable 
and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly 
foreign direct investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the 
need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area.78 
Based on the declaration, it was ‘agreed that negotiations will take place after 
the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision taken, 
by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations.’79  
However, the following year in 2004, these negotiations were terminated 
after the failure of the negotiating states to agree on almost all issues, including 
the basic definition of investment. It is thought that the negotiations failed due to 
the clashing of opposing opinions of developing and developed nations. The 
primary concern of the developing nations is alleged not to have been the scope 
of investment protection, as it had been in the 1970’s, but rather a concern for 
the sustainability and comprehensiveness of the development perspective in 
international trade relations. As a result of the failure of these most recent 
negotiations, the negotiation of a multilateral investment treaty has now been 
removed from the WTO’s agenda. As such, the scope for the negotiation of 
such a treaty in the near future, under the auspices of the WTO at least, does 
seem bleak.80 
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 As has been seen, there have been several different attempts by 
different organisations to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty. Each of 
these previous attempts has failed. It is frequently suggested, (though has 
never been particularly well articulated in any great amount of detail),81 that the 
main reason that all previous negotiations failed is the fact that they did not fully 
take into account the needs of developing nations.82 For example, the WTO is 
widely regarded as a ‘rich man’s club’, that is, predominantly operated and 
controlled by wealthy, developed nations who seek to serve their own 
agendas.83 Additionally, it is thought that states may be reluctant to disregard 
BITs in favour of a multilateral agreement. BITs are negotiated between two 
nations and remain valid for a period of typically 10 to 20 years. After that time, 
the BIT can be renewed or renegotiated according to the current needs of the 
parties to the agreement. Furthermore, it is relatively easy for states to 
denounce or withdraw from bilateral agreements. This system provides a great 
deal of flexibility84 for states. States may therefore be reluctant to disregard BITs 
and the flexibility which they provide, and submit themselves to a multilateral 
agreement which will, once ratified, presumably remain in force indefinitely, and 
be much more difficult to repudiate. This will be especially true if the multilateral 
investment agreement is negotiated under the auspices of the WTO, which 
does not allow members to cherry pick which agreements they will sign up to 
and which they will not. If a member state does wish to withdraw from any 
single WTO agreement it cannot do so; it must withdraw its membership from 
the WTO itself. Finally, internationally concluded treaties, such as the possible 
future multilateral investment agreement, are regarded as general international 
law which would be binding on all. Once the treaty had been agreed and ratified, 
it would be extremely difficult to renegotiate or renounce.85 
 It would probably be easier to admit defeat and accept that a multilateral 
investment treaty will never come to fruition, as it is simply too difficult to reach 
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any general consensus about the content of any future agreement and 
delicately balance the needs of both developed and developing nations in terms 
of foreign investment. Whilst this may indeed be easier, refusing to act will not 
ameliorate the situation in any way, and will not diminish the basis of the call for 
a multilateral investment treaty.  
 
5.5.2 The basis of the call for a multilateral investment agreement 
 Many experts are of the opinion that there is a legitimate call or need for 
a global investment treaty and that the negotiation of such a treaty could have 
important benefits.86 As discussed previously in this thesis, the international law 
of foreign investment has developed in a chaotic manner, representing an 
awkward blend of customary international law rules and bilateral investment 
treaty based rules. Numerous commentators have argued, and continue to 
argue, that it would be beneficial to abandon the chaotic system of investment 
law which is currently regulated by customary international law and individual 
BITs and strive towards the creation of a single, global overarching investment 
treaty.87 
 Subedi states that ‘an ideal solution to address many of the problems in 
foreign investment law would, of course, be to have a comprehensive global 
investment treaty.’88 He goes on to say that a global treaty would enable the 
harmonisation of investment rules, ensuring a greater level of consistency and 
coherence. Eliminating the need for bilateral investment treaties would also 
contribute to combating the recent trends in foreign investment law towards 
treaty, forum and nationality shopping.89  
 The author goes on to note that inconsistencies are arising in the 
interpretation of even very basic concepts in foreign investment law, due to the 
absence of ‘both a global treaty and a hierarchy of international tribunals 
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required to follow precedent.’90 As a result, the various tribunals are free to 
interpret the law in any manner they wish, which often leads to liberal 
interpretations, to say the very least. Furthermore, it seems that the law of 
foreign investment is rapidly becoming the law of the protection of foreign 
investors, with tribunals extending the protections available to foreign investors, 
with little or no regard for the interests and regulatory authority of the state 
parties. Consequently, the legitimate concerns of state parties, such as 
environmental protection and the protection of human rights are frequently 
being disregarded.91 In response to the concerns that developing nations have 
expressed during the past attempts to negotiate a multilateral treaty, Subedi 
asserts that, 
Many developing countries that have opposed the adoption of an international 
treaty on investment within the WTO have been forced through the decisions of 
ICSID and other investment tribunals to accept pro-investment standards. It is 
better for developing countries to have an internationally negotiated treaty than 
for them to accept the often unbalanced and controversial dicta of such 
tribunals.92 
Kennedy 93  summarises the arguments for the establishment of a 
multilateral agreement on investment. He believes that a multilateral agreement 
is an important developmental tool, as it will attract foreign direct investment, 
which will in turn increase competitiveness and promote the transfer of 
technology from the investor’s home state to the investment host state. 
Secondly, a multilateral agreement will increase the transparency, predictability 
and legal security of the foreign investment process. Additionally, he asserts 
that national investment legislation does not regulate foreign investment 
adequately. This is certainly true from the point of view of the foreign investor. A 
multilateral investment agreement will give the foreign investor greater 
confidence that the investment host nation’s laws and policies (which may have 
a detrimental effect on the foreign investment) will not be changed at will or on a 
whim. Kennedy goes on to say that a multilateral agreement will bring 
coherence to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of investment treaties that currently govern the 
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area. Furthermore, a multilateral investment agreement will benefit those 
countries that, at present, are not party to bilateral or regional investment 
treaties, as they will not be marginalised. Also, a multilateral agreement will put 
an end to investment incentives which aim to attract foreign investment; the 
playing field will be much more level. Moreover, states that are party to a 
multilateral agreement will increase their credibility and become known as 
territories that are hospitable to foreign investment.  
Karl94 also suggests that there a number of reasons why a multilateral 
investment agreement might be justified. He states that global issues (for 
example international foreign investment) should be addressed globally; this will 
enable links to be formed into other important investment related issues such as 
environmental protection and human rights. He believes that separate BITs and 
other international agreements on issues such as the environment and human 
rights cannot regulate the field and its crossovers adequately. Furthermore, Karl 
states that ‘BITs cannot satisfactorily reflect the increasing multilateralization of 
investors (participation of investors from several countries) and the trend to 
establish global linkages.’95 Finally, Karl suggests that aside from establishing a 
global legal investment framework, a multilateral treaty might also provide an 
international political forum for the discussion of investment related issues. 
Such a forum cannot exist through the network of individual BITs that is 
currently in existence.96 
Amarasinha and Kokott97 state that a multilateral investment agreement 
could ‘help overcome the deficiencies of the current patchwork of bilateral, 
regional, sectoral and few multilateral rules of investment by establishing a 
framework of transparent, stable, and predictable rules.’98  This would be of 
significant benefit to not only investors, but also investment host countries as it 
would undoubtedly result in an increase in foreign investment. Foreign 
investment is seen as desirable as it results in capital inflow as well as 
technology transfer, creation of jobs, competition and innovation. Host states 
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may also benefit from positive changes to their institutions through increased 
efficiency and transparency. The authors also assert that another possible 
advantage of multilateral investment rules is that they would allow closer 
scrutiny of investment matters by the general public, including NGOs and civil 
society. This, in turn may have an important impact on the negotiating process 
and the final draft of future rules. This would increase the legitimacy of a 
multilateral agreement and it would be more favourable in this regard than a 
privately negotiated BIT between two states. A related issue is that of the 
bargaining power of different nations; in the one-to-one negotiations of BITs, 
negotiations tend to be dominated by the richer, more developed nations.99 This 
lack of equal bargaining power would probably not occur in the negotiations for 
a multilateral treaty because weaker, poorer or less developed nations could 
form alliances with each other to ensure that a more balanced agreement which 
takes into account the interests of these lesser developed states is 
negotiated.100 
Qureshi and Ziegler’s work101 also discusses the potential benefits of a 
multilateral framework for the regulation of international investment. They argue 
that multilateralism is beneficial because all states have an interest and that ‘a 
multilateral framework would facilitate binding commitments on the admission of 
investment.’ 102  They goes on to say that a multilateral agreement would 
strengthen the power of governments in relation to protectionist forces, and that 
multilateralism will assist with policy coherence.103 
 Other commentators, most notably Schill 104  argue that international 
investment law is being multilateralised, despite the obvious lack of a 
multilateral instrument. He asserts that,  
even though multilateralism usually emerges on the basis of multilateral treaties, 
it can also develop on the basis of bilateral treaties...[and that] even though 
direct and open multilateralism has failed in the context of foreign investment 
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protection, bilateral treaties have filled the remaining gap by serving as a 
substitute for genuine multilateralism in the field.
105 
Schill essentially argues that bilateral investment treaties are often similar, if not 
identical ‘in structure, content, and objective.’106 Taken together, Schill believes 
that the BITs ‘establish a largely uniform regime for the protection of foreign 
investment that is based on identical principles independent from the specific 
bilateral treaty relationship in question.’107 Whilst this is an interesting argument, 
it does have several important flaws. Firstly, each individual bilateral investment 
treaty contains its own unique provisions. Whilst some treaties may appear to 
be very similar, there may be subtle differences in the wording of certain 
provisions, which may alter the meaning. It is therefore not possible to make 
sweeping generalisations and allege that similar provisions create a general 
principle. Furthermore, it is not possible to try to establish a multilateral 
framework based on the many BITs in existence because states have never 
negotiated the provisions by which they would, in theory, be bound. States are 
sovereign entities that should not be bound by rules to which they have not 
agreed. Multilateral investment provisions should come to fruition through fair, 
reasoned negotiations to ensure the maximum fairness for all states. 
 
5.5.3 Arguments against the negotiation of a multilateral investment 
agreement 
 A number of experts have stated that a multilateral investment treaty 
should not be negotiated. Kennedy108 summarises the arguments against the 
creation of a multilateral investment treaty well. He questions whether the need 
for such an agreement has actually been established. He believes that private 
investors have not yet complained that there is a lack of access to foreign 
markets for their investments, due to overly restrictive foreign investment laws. 
Kennedy argues that if private investors had been denied access, they would 
have been urging their governments to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty. 
The author suggests that the lack of interest in a multilateral agreement by the 
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investment community shows that the current framework for regulating 
international investment, through customary international law and individually 
negotiated bilateral or regional investment treaties, is not broken. The foreign 
investment statistics lend some support for this view; despite the lack of a 
multilateral investment agreement, international foreign investment has 
flourished. Kennedy also asserts that,  
while the rule of law does provide transparency, stability, and predictability, the 
fact does not necessarily mean that the proper legal instrument for encouraging 
and promoting such transparency, stability, and predictability in the context of 
foreign investment has to be international in scope.109 
He goes on to argue that the network of bilateral and regional investment 
treaties is an adequate means of regulating foreign investment. The author also 
states that developing nations have legitimate concerns about the impact a 
multilateral investment agreement would have on their national sovereignty and 
their ability to effectively regulate the activities of foreign investors. Furthermore, 
the author notes that previous attempts to establish a multilateral investment 
agreement have failed, and that the reasons why such attempts have failed will 
need to be addressed before progress can be made in this regard. He suggests 
that the traditionally contentious issues have yet to be resolved, and as such 
any further attempt to establish a multilateral agreement is almost doomed to 
fail. Finally, Kennedy reflects on whether international trade in goods and 
services should be integrated with foreign direct investment through a WTO 
investment agreement. He asserts that there is a strong case for such an 
integration; namely that national laws which discriminate against foreign 
investment distort international trade in the same way that tariffs, quotas and 
other barriers to trade do. Kennedy does concede though that such 
discriminatory laws may not be such a problem, with states being more likely to 
enact laws which are hospitable to foreign investment in order to attract it. 
Moreover, countries that do have various restrictions on investment are often 
amongst the most popular destinations for foreign investors, as illustrated by the 
case of China.110 
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 Karl 111  suggests that there is no need to establish a multilateral 
investment treaty for two important reasons. Firstly, that the global network of 
BITs that is now in existence provides sufficient means for investors to protect 
their interest and investments. Secondly, Karl makes reference to the old adage 
‘if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it’, arguing that foreign investment statistics show that 
the amount of investment has risen dramatically over recent years, despite the 
fact that a multilateral treaty has not been in operation. In his view, this provides 
proof of the fact that a global multilateral treaty is not required.112 This is not a 
convincing argument; perhaps the increased growth of foreign investment in 
recent years demonstrates that the need for a multilateral agreement is growing. 
Previous attempts to negotiate a multilateral treaty may have failed because the 
level of investment was not significant enough to warrant it, but the trend 
towards increasing FDI provide evidence for the fact that a multilateral 
agreement needs to be established in the future in order to support 
stratospheric levels of worldwide foreign investment. 
 Amarasinha and Kokott113  state that the current system of regulating 
foreign investment through individual investment agreements provides the legal 
framework for international investment to take place, yet at the same time 
allows investment host states a certain degree of flexibility. They argue that this 
flexibility is necessary in order to regulate investment, and at the same time 
achieve their domestic regulatory objectives which may include the furtherance 
of development. Many (developing) nations fear that multilateral rules would in 
effect, limit the scope for host state government intervention, restricting the 
ability of governments to react to crises and pursue their individual national 
interests. Sceptical states also question the fact that multilateral rules would 
lead to greater in-flows of investment, asserting that this may not necessarily be 
the case. 114  Again, these arguments are not convincing; flexibility may be 
desirable from the host state perspective, but it also leads to uncertainty. 
Investors are keen to know that the climate in the host state is not likely to 
change once they have invested for reasons of security. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to state with any level of certainty what may or may not happen to the 
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level of FDI if a multilateral treaty is established. Therefore, it seems 
unreasonable to cite concerns about the potential lack of increase in the amount 
of investment as a reason not to strive towards the negotiation of a multilateral 
treaty. 
 
5.6 Creation of an appeal mechanism 
 The final proposed solution to remedy the problems associated with the 
system of international investment arbitration which will be considered in this 
chapter, is the possible establishment of an appellate mechanism. 
 
5.6.1 The current situation 
 At present, in international investment arbitration, all decisions and 
awards are final. This means that if the losing party feels that the tribunal 
settling the dispute has come to the wrong decision, they have no recourse or 
right of appeal. This principle of finality has traditionally been a highly regarded 
feature of the system of international investment arbitration, enabling arising 
disputes to be settled in the quickest, most economical manner. However, most 
recently, some experts have questioned its prominence, suggesting that the 
principle of correctness of decision is or should be more important, and that the 
parties to the case would much rather the tribunals reach the correct decision 
than save time and money.115  
 At this stage it is perhaps helpful to draw a preliminary distinction 
between annulment and appeal. Both are forms of reviewing decisions, 
however they certainly do not have the same effects. Annulment of a decision 
simply means nullifying a decision, usually due to some kind of abuse of 
process, whereas appeal involves evaluating the substantive correctness of the 
decision and may result in the replacement of the original decision with a new 
one.116 Currently in international investment arbitration, there is some scope for 
                                            
115 J Clapham ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is there 
a need for reform?’ (n 56). 
116 For discussion of the difference between annulment and appeal see D Caron, 
‘Reputation and reality in the ICSID annulment process: understanding the distinction 
between annulment and appeal’ (1992) 7 ICSID Foreign Investment Law Journal 21 
and C Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (CUP 2001) 891. 
172 
 
the review of decisions, albeit very limited indeed. The forms of review available 
will be touched on in the present chapter, and discussed at length later in the 
thesis. 
 
i) ICSID Convention Arbitration 
In ICSID arbitration, the award may be annulled if it can be shown that 
there are grounds for annulment. Article 52117 of the ICSID Convention sets out 
five very limited grounds for annulment which are based upon abuse of process 
and concerns about the legitimacy of the procedure. The grounds for annulment 
will be discussed thoroughly in chapter six and seven. 
 As mentioned above, ICSID itself did contemplate incorporating an 
appellate mechanism into its framework for arbitration. Its 2004 Discussion 
Paper 118  set out some of the possible advantages and disadvantages of 
establishing an appellate mechanism. Following the Discussion Paper, many 
ICSID members expressed their views on the possible introduction of an appeal 
mechanism. Many member states were largely negative about the possibility, 
and as a result, the proposal was abandoned. 119  This will be discussed in 
greater depth in Chapter six. 
 
ii) Non-ICSID Convention Arbitration 
In cases where arbitration is not administered under the ICSID Convention, 
awards or their enforcement may be challenged under national law, the New 
York Convention120, and various other treaties. The national law of the seat of 
arbitration will be the relevant national law in such an instance. National laws on 
the review of awards and decisions obviously vary greatly from state to state. 
Generally, most national laws on the matter provide very limited grounds on 
                                            
117 Article 52, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (n 70). 
118
 ‘Possible improvements of the framework for ICSID arbitration’ (2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm> accessed 20 July 2009. 
119 C Tams, ‘Is there a need for an ICSID appellate structure?’ (2004) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341268> accessed 18 January 
2011. 
120
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention) 1958 (full text) available at 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf> accessed 
10 August 2012. 
173 
 
which awards may be challenged, or defer to the UNCITRAL Rules 121 . 
Incidentally, the UNCITRAL Rules themselves defer to the New York 
Convention122. Article 5 of the New York Convention provides the following 
grounds for the review of awards, 
“1) incapacity of the parties to enter into the arbitration agreement or 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement; 2) lack of proper notice to a party or 
incapacity to present its case; 3) inclusion in the award of matters outside the 
scope of submission; 4) irregularities in the composition of the tribunal or the 
arbitral procedure; 5) non-arbitrability of the subject matter and 6) violation of 
domestic public policy.”123 
As can be seen, the grounds for review in this regard are again rather limited. 
 
5.6.2 Purported benefits of an appellate mechanism 
 Many experts believe that the introduction of an appellate mechanism in 
international investment arbitration would solve many, if not all, of the problems 
associated with investment arbitration currently. This section will highlight the 
main purported benefits of the introduction of an appeal mechanism. 
 In 2004 the British Institute of International and Comparative Law held its 
inaugural annual conference which centred on a discussion of the proposal to 
create an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration. Several of 
the speakers discussed the potential advantages of the possible creation of an 
appeal mechanism, including: greater consistency of decisions; increased 
predictability of the law; increased objectivity in decision making; and greater 
sensitivity to legitimate governmental concerns.124 
Indeed, the most often cited benefit of an appeal mechanism is that it is 
thought that it will improve coherence and consistency. As has been discussed 
in the previous chapter, the main problem in international investment arbitration 
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 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976 and amended in 2010 (full text) are 
available at 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html
> accessed 10 August 2012. 
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 New York Convention (n 120). 
123 Article 5, New York Convention ibid. 
124 The conference papers were published in F Ortino et al (eds), Investment Treaty 
Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of International and Comparative Legal 
Studies 2006). 
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is inconsistency of decisions. Often, diametrically opposing decisions are given 
in cases where the facts are very similar, if not identical.125 A 2006 OECD 
Working Paper126 discusses the benefits of achieving greater consistency in 
international investment arbitration, stating that, ‘consistency and coherence of 
jurisprudence create predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the system of 
investment arbitration’ 127 . Finally, on the topic of consistency, the Working 
Paper asserts that ‘an appellate mechanism could provide a more uniform and 
coherent means for challenging awards if traditional bases for annulment were 
incorporated and it became the exclusive means to challenge an award.’128 
 Other authors, including Dimsey, have articulated support for the 
establishment of an appellate mechanism on the basis that it would ‘prevent the 
inconsistencies in decision-making and avoid the haphazard domestic 
frameworks that currently come into play in investment arbitration practice.’129 
Subedi also asserts that, ‘if there was an appeal mechanism, it would bring 
about more cohesion and more legal certainty to this body of law.’130 
 The 2006 OECD Working Paper also states that an appeal mechanism 
would contribute to the rectification of legal errors and serious errors of fact. The 
Paper asserts that this could also encourage public support for investor-state 
arbitration by allaying fears that decisions affecting important aspects of public 
policy may be enforced despite serious error. The significance of this should not 
be underestimated, especially at a time when the number of investment cases 
continues to increase rapidly.131 
Furthermore, an appellate body would enable decisions to be reviewed 
by a neutral body, which would reinforce the biggest benefit of international 
arbitration: neutrality and impartiality from national courts. Additionally, the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration 
                                            
125 For examples of conflicting decisions, see previous chapter detailing the problems 
associated with international investment arbitration at present. 
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 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (2006) <http://www.oecd.org/china/36052284.pdf> accessed 16 July 2009. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 177 
130 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 7) 207. 
131 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview (n 126). 
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could also serve to enhance the enforcement of awards, which is often a 
problem in international investment arbitration.132 
Qureshi also sets out the basis of the call for an appellate process.133 He 
believes most importantly, that an appellate system would operate as a 
corrective mechanism in case an arbitral award was made wrongly. Secondly, 
the dramatic increase in the number of cases, particularly under the ICSID 
framework, has marked an increase in the potential risk for inconsistent 
decisions. Thus, an appeal mechanism might help address issues of 
sustainability of the system of international investment arbitration. Furthermore, 
an appeal mechanism would enable a greater level of coherency and 
consistence to be achieved in investment arbitration, as well as enhance the 
predictability, objectivity and sensitivity of judicial decisions. Finally, certain 
sectors within the trade and investment regime already allow appeals; this leads 
some commentators to question why there is no general appeal mechanism 
already in operation. Moreover, the lack of a general appeal mechanism leaves 
the system open to distortion by investors engaging in forum shopping. An 
appeal mechanism could ensure greater consistency in the investment 
regulation regime and exclude the possibility of forum shopping.134  
 
5.6.3 Alleged disadvantages of an appeal mechanism 
This section will consider some of the most prominent alleged 
disadvantages of the possible establishment of an appeal mechanism in 
international investment arbitration that have been put forward by experts in the 
field.  
In the 2004 British Institute of International and Comparative Law’s 
Investment Treaty Forum, some of the speakers highlighted potential 
disadvantages of said proposal. Alleged disadvantages of the proposed 
introduction of an appeal mechanism include: inconsistent decisions being an 
unavoidable fact of life; the argument that the problem of unpredictability will 
remedy itself naturally as tribunals begin to favour one interpretation over the 
                                            
132 Ibid. 
133 A Qureshi ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in P 
Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008). 
134 Ibid. 
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other and consequently customary international law will evolve; and a lack of 
enthusiasm from developing nations and developmental concerns.135 
The OECD’s 2006 Paper on Investment136  also set out a number of 
disadvantages which may be associated with the creation of an appeal 
mechanism in international investment arbitration. The first such disadvantage 
is that a right to appeal would naturally have negative consequences for the 
principle of finality. As has been discussed in previous chapters of this work, the 
principle of finality has long celebrated as one of the most important advantages 
of the system of international investment arbitration as it currently stands. An 
appeal mechanism would extend the currently limited grounds of the 
reviewability of investment awards, thus compromising the finality of the award. 
Although this is true, recent debate on this issue has centred on whether as 
much emphasis should be placed on finality of decision in investment arbitration, 
as opposed to correctness of decision. This is probably a very legitimate 
argument (given that investment arbitration typically involves important issues of 
public policy), and the risk of flawed decisions cannot be justified with 
arguments regarding finality of decision.137  
Another alleged disadvantage of establishing an appeal mechanism in 
international investment arbitration is that the period of time it takes to settle 
cases will naturally increase, and this in turn may cause the costs of arbitration 
to increase. However, it has been argued that the rules for reviewing investment 
awards that operate at present (ICSID annulment and review by national courts 
for example) do already cause considerable delays in arbitration, with review 
often taking years to be completed.138 Thus, a centralised appeal mechanism 
may actually speed up the process, rather than slow it down as alleged. 
Moreover, the problem of additional delay could be remedied by imposing strict 
time limits for the new appellate process. As regards to the issue of increased 
costs, recent data139  suggests that the costs of investment arbitration have 
skyrocketed in recent years, and that the additional costs incurred in appeal 
                                            
135 F Ortino et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (n 124).  
136 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
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 ‘UNCTAD Investor- state disputes: prevention and alternatives to arbitration’ 
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may not be as significant overall as it might first have been thought. Additionally, 
the costs associated with the process of a proposed appellate mechanism may 
actually be much cheaper than the cost of review under the current system, for 
example through ICSID or through the national courts of the seat of 
arbitration.140  
A further alleged disadvantage of the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism is the increase in caseload that it would cause. It follows that 
increasing the grounds on which review of cases may be undertaken, a higher 
rate of cases being challenged would be expected. There has been concern 
that the losing party of every case would challenge the decision through the 
new appellate mechanism. This may lead to a decrease in confidence in the 
overall system of international investment arbitration, calling into question 
respect for first instance decisions and their arbitrators. In response to this 
problem, it might be necessary to consider creating disincentives to appeal 
every case, perhaps by requiring the deposit of a bond to secure the award or 
the costs of appeal would discourage routine appeal.141  
A final purported disadvantage of an appeal mechanism discussed in the 
OECD Working Paper, concerns the re-politicisation of the system of 
investment arbitration. The de-politicisation of the system is regarded as one of 
the greatest achievements of investment arbitration, which could in turn be 
undermined by the introduction of an appeal mechanism. There is concern that 
host state governments are likely to appeal every case lost at first instance, in 
order to gain favour with their constituents. As such, governments may stand to 
benefit the most from the establishment of an appeal mechanism, with bias 
therefore being against investors. Experts have responded to this with counter-
arguments, stating that investors could also benefit greatly from an appellate 
mechanism. Firstly, statistics do not demonstrate a significant difference in the 
number of cases won and lost by states and individual investors respectively, 
therefore investors would have the same opportunities to appeal. Secondly, the 
posting of a bond before appeal takes place would provide investors with 
greater security in the appeal process.142  
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After discussing the various purported advantages and disadvantages of 
the possible creation of an appellate mechanism in international investment 
arbitration, the OECD’s Working Paper on Investment concludes that it is,  
[too] premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this stage, 
particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised. The ICSID 
Secretariat, will continue however to study such issues to assist member 
countries when and if it is decided to proceed towards the establishment of an 
ICSID appeal mechanism.143 
More recent publications have also discussed the possibility of 
establishing an appeal mechanism. Dimsey144 asserts that the introduction of an 
appellate mechanism might be damaging to international investment arbitration, 
stripping the hearing at first instance of any inherent value, since it will be 
appealable, and destroying the principle of finality at the same time.145 
Brower146 is also sceptical about the possibility of success, stating that 
‘investment disputes simply...[do not] lend themselves to the top-down 
solution.’147 He goes on to say that one of the main justifications of an appeal 
mechanism (to achieve consistency in international investment arbitration) is 
over exaggerated and that consistency is actually unattainable anyway.148 
An interesting article was written by Clapham 149  on the subject of a 
possible appeal mechanism. Clapham does not frame his argument against the 
creation of an appeal mechanism in terms of the alleged disadvantages of such 
a mechanism. Instead, he argues that there is no need to establish such a 
mechanism because the parties to investment disputes have always, and will 
always continue to favour the principle of finality of award over the principle of 
                                            
143 Ibid and see also  ‘Suggested changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations’,  
Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat, May 12 2005 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-sgmanual.pdf> accessed 27 May 2011. 
144 M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: International 
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147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is there 
a need for reform?’  (n 56). 
179 
 
correctness. Thus, in order to maintain the attraction to arbitration, the finality of 
awards must not be opened up to challenge.150  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has briefly explored a number of the suggestions that have 
been proposed in the past, in order to improve the system of international 
investment arbitration. The solutions that have been discussed do not represent 
an exhaustive list of each and every possible proposal that has ever been put 
forward in this regard; such a comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of 
this work. Rather, the proposals discussed are some of the more prominent 
suggestions. Each of the proposals has its requisite advantages and 
disadvantages, and ranges from entailing relatively minor tweaks to the current 
system to somewhat of a radical overhaul of said system. 
 It is arguable that the problems associated with the system of 
international investment arbitration that have been discussed in previous 
chapters are too serious to be fixed with minor reforms. International investment 
experts have been making reference to a ‘crisis of consistency’ in investment 
arbitration. The deliberate use of the word ‘crisis’ implies deep rooted issues 
within the system of investment arbitration and indeed within the broader 
framework of international investment law generally. Such deep rooted 
problems will require a radical remedy.  
 One of the more radical proposals which has been most hotly debated is 
the possible establishment of an appeal mechanism. The present chapter has 
briefly highlighted some of the main arguments which have been put forward for 
the creation of an appeal mechanism, such as increased consistency and 
coherence in investment arbitration. However, the chapter has also highlighted 
a number of disadvantages associated with the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism, such as for example, the possible increase in the time it takes and 
the costs associated with the settlement of investment disputes. The next 
chapter will explore the proposal to establish an appeal mechanism in greater 
depth. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN APPEAL MECHANISM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The idea of establishing an appellate mechanism in international 
investment arbitration is not novel. The issue has been debated by leading 
international investment experts in the recent past.1 Some experts believe that 
an appeals facility would be a welcome addition to the system of international 
investment arbitration. They believe it may go a long way to resolving many, if 
not all of the problems currently associated with the field. 2  Other scholars 
disagree, being of the opinion that the basis of the call for such an appeal 
mechanism has yet to be established3, or that it would not remedy any existing 
problems.4 Some experts have even gone so far as to suggest that an appeal 
mechanism might create problems in international investment arbitration, rather 
than resolve them.5  
One of the main criticisms of the proposed appeal mechanism is that it 
would dramatically reduce the flexibility of the system of arbitration. Flexibility 
has long been heralded as one of the strengths of commercial arbitration, and 
one of the main reasons it became a popular alternative to the resolution of 
disputes through domestic courts. However, it can be argued that the nature of 
the disputes that arise has changed in recent years. Commercial disputes 
traditionally involved the examination of rather technical aspects of the law 
which had little effect outside of the particular dispute within which they had 
                                            
1 Discussion of an appeals facility can be traced back as far as the early 1990s, see E 
Lauterpacht, Aspects of the administration of international justice (Grotius Publications 
1991) and S Schwebel, ‘The creation and operation of an international court of arbitral 
awards’, taken from M Hunter et al (eds), The Internationalisation of International 
Arbitration (Graham & Trotman 1994). 
2 See chapters three and four of this thesis for in-depth discussion of problems 
associated with international investment arbitration, and see for example M Goldhaber, 
‘Wanted: a world investment court’ (2004) 3 Transnational Dispute Management for 
analysis of how an appeal mechanism might benefit international investment arbitration 
and solve some of its problems. 
3 B Legum, ‘Options to establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes’ in K 
Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP 2008) 
231-240 and J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ in K Sauvant ibid, 267-
280. 
4 J Gill, ‘Inconsistent decisions: an issue to be addressed or a fact of life?’ in F Ortino et 
al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 2006) 27. 
5 B Legum (n 3) 231-240. 
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arisen. This is no longer the case; today, commercial disputes can, and often do 
involve broader issues of public policy, such as human rights or environmental 
protection for example. In light of this change in the nature of disputes, a high 
degree of flexibility in arbitration is perhaps no longer justifiable. This idea will 
be examined in greater depth throughout this chapter. 
This chapter will explore the possibility of establishing an appeal 
mechanism in international investment law. The chapter will begin by evaluating 
the current options for the review of investment awards that are available in 
both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. As shall be seen, the current options for 
the review of investment awards are in theory extremely limited. The chapter 
will go on to explore the discourse that has emerged from the debate 
surrounding the creation of an appellate mechanism in international investment 
arbitration. Firstly, the chapter will investigate whether there is a need for an 
appeal mechanism, as well as examining the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of an appeals facility.  
Even if it can be shown that the introduction of an appeal mechanism 
would be beneficial for the system of international investment arbitration, this 
would only settle one half of the debate. If it is accepted that an appeals facility 
is desirable, questions naturally arise regarding the practicalities of the creation 
of such a mechanism; how might such a mechanism be best introduced? 
Several suggestions have been put forward in this regard, including the 
incorporation of an appeals facility into the ICSID framework6, as well as the 
creation of a world investment court7. The final section will investigate these and 
the several other suggestions regarding how an appeal mechanism might best 
be established in international investment arbitration.  
 
6.2 Existing review procedures in international investment arbitration 
                                            
6 This possibility has been considered by the ICSID Secretariat itself in a series of 
Discussion and Working Papers. See ‘Possible improvements to the framework for 
ICSID arbitration’ (22 October 2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm> accessed 20 July 2009 
and ‘Suggested changes to the ICSID rules and regulations’ (12 May 2005) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Ope
nPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Ar
chive_%20Announcement22> accessed 27 May 2011. 
7 See M Goldhaber, ’Wanted: a world investment court‘ (n 2). 
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 As briefly discussed in the preceding chapter, awards in international 
investment arbitration are considered to be final; this means that decisions are 
not subject to an appeal procedure.8 The finality of awards has been a long 
standing feature of international investment arbitration, and it is widely regarded 
as one of the most important of its principles.9 Finality is thought to be beneficial 
in a number of important ways: perhaps the most significant advantage of 
finality is that it enables international investment disputes to be settled as 
quickly and as cheaply as possible.10 However, finality does conflict with other 
important principles, such as correctness and justice. A balance between these 
two competing principles needs to be struck in any form of dispute settlement, 
and any such balance will always represent a compromise. Currently in 
international investment arbitration at least, ‘the principle of finality is typically 
given more weight that the principle of correctness.’11 
Although investment awards cannot be appealed, there is, at least some 
scope for their review. The exact nature of the review is dependent upon the 
forum within which the case has been heard. The ICSID Convention12 provides 
for the review of awards that have been rendered under it, whilst non-ICSID 
awards may be reviewed under the law of the national court of the seat of 
arbitration, under the New York Convention13, or under some other international 
treaty.  
 
6.2.1 ICSID Convention arbitration 
                                            
8 R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 
277. 
9 Clapham argues that both investors and states hold the principle of finality in the 
highest regard. See J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide 
turned and is there a need for reform?’ (2009) 26 Journal of International Arbitration 
437.  
10 ‘UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development’ 
<http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13762&intItemID=2340&lang=1
&mode=downloads> accessed 28 January 2011. 
11 R Dolzer and C Schreuer (n 8) 277. 
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 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States (signed 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 
159, available at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-
final.pdf> accessed 27 August 2012. 
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 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention) 1958 (full text) available at 
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10 August 2012. 
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 The ICSID Convention does provide some scope for the review of 
decisions. Article 52 of the ICSID Convention states that, 
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application 
in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following 
grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal 
has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of 
a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the 
reasons on which it is based.14 
 The application for annulment made under Article 52 must be submitted 
within 120 days of the award being rendered, or within 120 days of corruption 
being discovered if that is the ground upon which annulment is being requested. 
On receipt of the request, the Chairman will appoint an ad hoc committee of 
three arbitrators to examine the case. The members of the ad hoc committee 
must not have been members of the original tribunal which gave the first award 
or be a national of the same state of any of the members of the original tribunal. 
Additionally, the members of the ad hoc committee must not have the same 
nationalities as either of the parties to the dispute, they must not have been 
designated to the original panel of arbitrators by either of the parties, or have 
acted as a conciliator to the parties throughout the case. The ad hoc committee 
has the power to annul all, or any part of the original award. The committee also 
has the power to temporarily stay the enforcement of the award, pending its 
final decision. If the committee does choose to annul the award, the parties may 
request that the dispute be submitted to a newly constituted tribunal which will 
re-hear the case.15 
 Of the five possible grounds for review, only three have been known to 
be used in practice as the basis for the annulment of an award: manifest excess 
of powers; failure to state reasons; and serious departure from a fundamental 
rule of procedure. It is unknown whether the other two grounds for review 
(improper constitution and corruption) have ever been invoked.16 In the last ten 
                                            
14 Article 52 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (n 12). 
15 Ibid. See also C Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (CUP 2001) 881-
1075. 
16 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Annulment of ICSID awards: limited scope but is there potential?’ 
in K Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements (OUP 
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years, 30% of ICSID annulment applications have led to eventual annulment of 
the award.17  
 An analysis of the review of awards under Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention demonstrates that it provides a very narrow scope for the review of 
decisions in both theory and practice. The exhaustive list of the five grounds for 
review that is provided in Article 52 is extremely limited indeed. The grounds are 
simply concerned with the legitimacy of the process of arbitration, and not at all 
with the substantive correctness of the decision. Moreover, of the applications 
for annulment, a relatively low figure of 30% is successful.18 
 Interestingly, some academics have argued that the Article 52 annulment 
procedure is actually being used as a de facto appeal mechanism. It has been 
submitted that a number of cases demonstrate that ICSID tribunals do not know 
where to draw the line between annulment and appeal. In both Klöckner v 
Cameroon19 and Amco v Indonesia20, ‘each annulled a tribunal’s award based 
on an arguable re-examination of the merits of the award’21. In Klöckner, a 
foreign investor concluded several contracts with the Cameroon government in 
order to establish a fertiliser factory in Cameroon as a joint venture. After 
operating at a loss for some time, the government eventually closed the factory. 
The investor filed for ICSID arbitration, claiming the balance of the price of the 
factory. The government counterclaimed for damages for the losses it had 
sustained due to the project. The tribunal found in favour of the investor, but the 
annulment committee found that the original tribunal had failed to apply the 
proper law and had therefore manifestly exceeded its powers and that it had 
failed to state the reasons upon which its decision was based. The committee 
stated that, ‘[o]n the basis of the Award’s own citations, [its] conclusion does not 
necessarily follow, nor does it conform to the understanding of the [annulment] 
committee may have of this area of law.’22 This statement makes it clear that 
the annulment committee disagreed with the reasons on which the original 
                                            
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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 Klöckner Industrie-Analagen v Republic of Cameroon (Klöckner I) ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/2, Decision on annulment (3 May 1985), 2 ICSID Rep 95 (1994). 
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 Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia (Amco Asia) ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 
Decision on annulment (16 May 1986), 1 ICSID Rep 509 (1993). 
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 D Kim, ‘The annulment committee’s role in multiplying inconsistency in ICSID 
arbitration: the need to move away from an annulment based system’ (2010) 86 NYU 
Law Review 242. 
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tribunal had based its decision; thus, the committee actually reviewed the 
decision on its merits. 
 The case of Amco had a similar outcome. The case concerned a dispute 
involving agreements between a foreign investor (Amco) and the Indonesian 
government, which detailed that the two parties would jointly develop and 
manage a hotel and office block in Indonesia. Amco agreed to invest at least $3 
million. Whilst the hotel was in operation, Amco became involved in a dispute 
with its local partner company, which led the partner to take control of the hotel 
with the help of the Indonesian armed forces. The government also revoked 
Amco’s investment license, claiming that Amco had not upheld its side of the 
bargain. Amco therefore submitted a request for ICSID arbitration. The tribunal 
found in favour of the investor, stating that under Indonesian law and the 
applicable international law rules, the government was not justified in revoking 
the investment license without due process. The annulment committee annulled 
the decision, asserting that the original tribunal had manifestly exceeded its 
powers in failing to apply the correct law to the contract. However, the tribunal 
had in fact undertaken a detailed analysis of Indonesian law to determine the 
amount of investment, thus the annulment committee’s reasoning could be 
called into question. Through its decision to annul, the committee had 
eliminated any distinction between non-application of proper law (which 
constitutes grounds for manifest excess of powers) and erroneous application of 
proper law (which actually constitutes review of the merits of the decision).23  
 Other more recent annulment decisions such as Mitchell v Congo24, CMS 
v Argentina25, MHS v Malaysia26, Sempra v Argentina27 and Enron v Argentina28 
could also be said to have exercised de facto appeal under the guise of 
annulment. The fact that annulment committees are going beyond annulment of 
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decisions and into appeal territory provides further evidence of the need for the 
establishment of a fully-fledged appeal mechanism. 
 
6.2.2 Relevant provisions under other conventions 
 There is some scope for the review of decisions provided in the relevant 
provisions under a number of other conventions.  Awards rendered in non-
ICSID arbitration may be challenged by a variety of different means: under 
national law; under the New York Convention 29 ; and under various other 
international treaties. 
 
i) National law 
The courts of the country in which the tribunal had its seat, or the courts of 
the country tasked with enforcing the award may have the power to review non-
ICSID investment awards. Any comprehensive evaluation of the applicable 
national laws is practically impossible (at least in the present work) because, ‘in 
order to map this field correctly, one would have to deal with some 200 national 
legislations.’30 It is therefore very difficult indeed to authoritatively draw any 
general conclusions on the scope of review of investment awards under 
national law.  
Tams31 attempts to generalise the review procedures under national law, 
though he does recognise that accurate generalisation is not possible;  
At the risk of over-simplification, national laws tend to circumscribe the grounds for 
vacating awards rather narrowly. In some countries (including Switzerland, France 
and South Africa), awards can only be set aside if they suffer from serious 
procedural defaults. Other national laws permit a limited review of the merits of an 
award, often by providing for some form of public policy exception. However, 
notwithstanding occasional attempts, by national courts, to use public policy 
arguments in order to enter into a substantive review of awards, the general 
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tendency is for national courts to set aside investment awards in highly exceptional 
circumstances only.32 
The relevant national law of a limited number of states will be briefly 
examined in order to compare and contrast the relevant provisions of different 
states. In the United Kingdom, the Arbitration Act of 1996 is the governing 
statute in this field; Sections 45 and 69 of the Act contain the relevant 
provisions.33 Section 45 enables English courts to determine a question of law 
which arises out of arbitral proceedings. Section 69 states that, ‘unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may...appeal to 
the court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the 
proceedings.’ 34  Section 69 goes on to state that the court may choose to 
confirm the award, vary the award, remit the award in whole or in part to the 
tribunal for reconsideration, or set the award aside in whole or in part.35 Franck 
points out that the relevant sections of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 permit the 
parties to the arbitration to ask English courts to rule on substantive issues.36 
In the United States, the governing Federal Arbitration Act37 permits review 
on substantive points where there has been a ‘manifest disregard of the law’38. 
Where this is found to be the case, the court is empowered to strike down the 
decision. The American Act is very similar to the English Act in this regard. 
The Italian national law on the challenge of awards rendered through 
international arbitration is contained in Article 829 of the Italian Civil Code39. 
Article 829 provides for challenge of awards where: the arbitration clause is void; 
the tribunal was improperly constituted; the reasons for the award are not given; 
the award was rendered after the deadline for the award had passed; 
procedural rules have not been complied with; the award conflicts with another 
                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 S.69 Arbitration Act 1996 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/section/69> 
accessed 9 June 2011 and S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty 
arbitration: privatizing public international law through inconsistent decisions’ (2005) 73 
Fordham Law Review 1521. 
34 Ibid, Arbitration Act 1996. 
35 Ibid. 
36 S Franck (n 33). 
37 US Federal Arbitration Act 1925 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode09/usc_sup_01_9.html> accessed 9 
June 2011. 
38 S Franck (n 33). 
39
 Article 829 of the Italian Civil Code in S Beltramo, The Italian Civil Code and 
Complementary Legislation (West 2012). 
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award rendered in the same dispute; or due process was not complied with.40 
The grounds for review provided by the Italian Civil Code bear remarkable 
resemblance to the grounds for review provided in the New York Convention. 
A brief examination of the national laws of a handful of states highlights the 
lack of a common approach in this area. Some states permit review in cases of 
abuse of process, whilst others allow review on substantive issues 41 ; it is 
therefore practically impossible to generalise findings. It should also be noted 
that many states do not have their own national laws on the subject, having 
instead chosen to adopt a relatively uniform approach to the review of awards 
by deferring to the UNCITRAL Model Law42 rules on the matter. Incidentally, the 
UNCITRAL rules themselves make reference to the grounds for review of 
awards that are found in the New York Convention.43 With many states making 
reference to the UNCITRAL Rules, which themselves refer to the New York 
Convention, the role of national law in the review of awards is often rather 
limited. 
The role of national law in the review of international investment awards is 
also somewhat limited in practical terms for two important reasons. Firstly 
because most international investment disputes fall within the scope of the 
ICSID Convention, and their review is therefore confined to the limits contained 
in the Convention itself. Furthermore, the handful of cases that are left, which 
do not fall under the ICSID Convention would only affect a select number of 
states.44 
 
ii) New York Convention 
The New York Convention, which has over 130 signatories from around the 
globe, sets out the grounds for review of non-ICSID awards. Article 5 of the 
                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 For discussion of the national laws of some states and an attempt to generalise 
findings see C Tams, ‘An appealing option? The debate about an ICSID appellate 
structure’ (n 31). 
42 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006 amended 
version) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.htm
l> accessed 27 May 2011.  
43 V Balas, ‘Review of awards’ (n 30) 1137.  
44 Ibid. 
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New York Convention provides the following seven grounds for the review of 
awards, 
1) incapacity of the parties to enter into the arbitration agreement or invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement; 2) lack of proper notice to a party or incapacity to present its 
case; 3) inclusion in the award of matters outside the scope of submission; 4) 
irregularities in the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure; 5) non-
arbitrability of the subject matter; 6) violation of domestic public policy; and 7) 
recognition would be contrary to the public policy of the country of enforcement.45 
 The list of grounds set out in Article 5 is completely exhaustive. As can 
be seen, the grounds for review provided by Article 5 are rather limited. Review 
can only be requested where there is a potential complaint concerning the 
legitimacy of the process of arbitration, rather than on any substantive issues or 
concerns about the correctness of the decision. The New York Convention does 
not allow for annulment or appeal of the award, even where one of the seven 
grounds listed in Article 5 is present, it simply means that the award may not be 
enforced.46 
iii) Other treaties 
The UNCITRAL Model Law also provides opportunity for the review of non-
ICSID arbitral awards. Interestingly on the matter of the review of awards, 
Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules provide a limited number of grounds 
for the review of awards. Incidentally, Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 47  are actually based on the grounds for the review of awards 
contained in Article 5 of the New York Convention48.  
 
6.2.3 Annulment vs. appeal 
 As has been seen, awards rendered in international investment 
arbitration disputes are not appealable (at least in theory). Nevertheless, there 
is scope for the review of such awards in both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
                                            
45 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention) 1958 (n 13). 
46 S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law with inconsistent decisions’ (n 33). 
47
 Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (n 42). 
48
 Article 5 of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention) 1958 (n 13). 
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In ICSID, the type of review that is available is annulment. It must be stressed 
that annulment is very different from appeal. Annulment is issued where there 
has been some problem with the legitimacy of the process of decision and not 
with the substantive correctness itself. On the other hand, appeal is concerned 
with both the process and the correctness of the decision. The consequences of 
appeal and annulment are also very different. Successful appeal may result in 
the replacement of the decision by a new one, whereas annulment only serves 
to remove the original decision.49  
Yannaca-Small explains eloquently that,  
review of the process is a narrow standard of evaluation which allows the 
limited sacrifice of finality for a greater integrity and fairness in the decision-
making process. Review of the substantive correctness entails a higher level of 
scrutiny to obtain greater accuracy in the legal reasoning.50 
 Yannaca-Small highlights the fact that annulment, as a form of review of 
awards, places more emphasis on the importance of finality of decision, rather 
than concerns with correctness or justice. Annulment favours the finality of 
awards because an annulment tribunal may only set aside an award on very 
limited grounds which generally concern some abuse of process. Moreover, an 
annulment tribunal is not (in theory) able to review the award on the merits of 
the decision or to replace the original decision with its own views on the 
matter.51 
The fact that the current system of international arbitration explicitly 
incorporates an extremely limited scope for the review of decisions through 
annulment serves to highlight the fact that at present, the system of 
international investment arbitration is weighted more towards the principle of 
finality, and less towards the principles of correctness and justice.52 
 In the present day (and in light of the fact that ICSID could be said to be 
operating a de facto appeal mechanism), perhaps the balance between finality 
and correctness in international investment arbitration should be re-evaluated 
                                            
49 R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 8). 
50 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Annulment of ICSID awards: limited scope but is there potential?’ 
(n 16). 
51 Ibid.  
52 See J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is 
there a need for reform?’ (n 9). 
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and it is time to institute a de jure appeal mechanism. International investment 
disputes often involve huge sums of money being contested, as well as 
important issues of public policy53. With the stakes becoming increasingly high, 
it might be time to prioritise the correctness of the decision over the principle of 
finality in international investment disputes. Introducing an appeals facility in 
international investment law would in fact elevate correctness of decision over 
finality once and for all. The following section will evaluate the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of creating an appeal mechanism in 
international investment law. 
 
6.3 A cost- benefit analysis of the proposal to establish an appellate 
mechanism 
 The previous chapter has already briefly examined some of the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of the creation of an appeal mechanism in 
international investment law. The aim of this section is to go beyond what has 
already been discussed, exploring in greater depth the basis of the call for such 
an appeals facility. It will consider whether an appeal mechanism is actually 
necessary; whether the basis for the call has legitimately been established. The 
section will also explore the potential advantages and disadvantages of an 
appeal mechanism in greater depth, executing a cost-benefit analysis of the 
proposal. Academics have been debating these issues for a number of years 
now, and as such, much relevant literature has been generated; this literature 
will form the basis of the discussion.54 
                                            
53 For more on public policy issues in international investment law and arbitration see 
for example C Brower and S Schill, ‘Is arbitration a threat or a boon to the legitimacy of 
international investment law?’ (2008) 9 Chinese Journal of International Law 471 and M 
Footer, ‘BITs and pieces: social and environmental protection in the regulation of 
foreign investment’ (2009) 18 Michigan State Journal of International Law 33. 
54 See for example M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: 
International Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2008), F 
Ortino et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Legal Studies 2006), K Sauvant (ed), Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP 2008), A Qureshi, ‘An appellate 
system in international investment arbitration?’ in P Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008), W Choi, ‘The present and 
future of the investor-state dispute settlement paradigm’ (2007) 10 Journal of 
International Economic Law 725, and W Knull and N Rubins, ‘Betting the farm on 
international arbitration: is it time to offer an appeal option?’ (2000) 11 American 
Review of International Arbitration 531. 
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6.3.1 The basis of the call for an appeals facility and its potential 
advantages 
i) The basis of the call 
 Many international investment experts attribute the basis of the call for an 
appeals facility to the incoherence and inconsistency of the present system. A 
number of high profile recent cases have highlighted the real and potential risk 
of inconsistent arbitral decisions. As the Lauder 55 , SGS 56 , NAFTA 57  and 
Maffezini58 cases (discussed in chapter three) show, inconsistent decisions are 
a reality in international investment arbitration. Inconsistency is damaging to the 
system of international investment arbitration for a number of different reasons; 
it leads to unfairness and injustice, is damaging to the rule of law, causes 
unpredictability, and ultimately leads to concerns regarding the sustainability of 
the system of international investment arbitration as a whole.59  
 
ii) Potential advantages of an appeals facility 
- Greater consistency and coherence 
 Enhancing consistency and coherence is undoubtedly the most cited 
potential advantage of establishing an appeal mechanism in international 
investment arbitration. This chapter has highlighted several high profile cases 
(which have been thoroughly discussed in chapter three) in which inconsistent 
decisions were rendered, exemplifying the problem. Moreover, the ever 
increasing number of international investment disputes means that the potential 
for inconsistencies to arise is also increasing.60 According to the OECD,  
                                            
55 CME Czech Republic B.V. v Czech Republic, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
Partial Award of 13 September 2001 and IIC 62 (2003), Final Award of 14 March 2003 
and Lauder v Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2001 (Ad hoc- UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules). 
56 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) 42 ILM 1290 and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004). 
57 S.D. Myers v Canada (2000) ILM 1408 (NAFTA Arb), Metalclad Corporation v United 
Mexican States (2000), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000) and Pope & Talbot Inc. v 
Government of Canada (2002) ILR 293. 
58 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (2000). 
59
 See chapter three of this thesis for a more thorough discussion of the disadvantages 
of inconsistency in international investment arbitration. 
60 See M Goldhaber, ’Wanted: a world investment court‘ (n 2). 
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one of the main advantages for the creation of an appellate mechanism 
advanced by its proponents is consistency. Consistency and coherence of 
jurisprudence create predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the system of 
investment arbitration.61 
The OECD Working Paper goes on to highlight a number of inconsistent 
decisions which have been reached on the same or broadly similar facts which 
have received widespread attention. The Working Paper asserts that such 
inconsistencies might have indeed been avoided if an appeals facility had been 
operational at that time. The OECD asserts that the,  
notion of consistency has been viewed to go beyond the situation when two 
panels constituted under different agreements deal with the same set of facts 
and give conflicting opinions or reach a different conclusion. It might also 
encompass coherence of interpretation of basic principles which may underlie 
differently worded provisions in particular agreements and therefore might 
enhance the development of a more consistent international investment law.62 
Numerous academics have echoed the points made in the OECD’s 2006 
Working Paper regarding the potential positive effects on consistency and 
coherence of international investment jurisprudence of establishing an appeal 
mechanism in investment arbitration.63  
 
- Corrective mechanism 
Tribunals of first instance are obviously not infallible; sometimes they 
may make the wrong decision. An appeals mechanism would enable legal 
errors and serious errors of fact to be rectified.64 This means that the ‘correct’ 
decision is more likely to be reached. This is hugely important, as it should 
arguably be the main objective of any dispute settlement mechanism. Reaching 
                                            
61 K Yannaca-Small, ’Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview‘ (2006) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/36052284.pdf> accessed 16 July 
2009. 
62 Ibid. 
63 For example M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: 
International Commerce and Arbitration (n 54), G Van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) and S Subedi, International Investment Law: 
Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing 2008). 
64 K Yannaca- Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (n 61) and A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment 
arbitration’ (n 54) 1157. 
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the correct decision is also important because of what may be at risk for the 
parties; international investment arbitration often involves huge sums of money 
and critical issues of public policy. With such critical issues being at stake, it is 
also important that the correct decision is reached so that the decision can be 
reconciled with the broader framework of public international law. 
Traditionally in international investment arbitration, concerns about the 
correctness of the decision have been overshadowed by concerns about 
finality65, speed and economy.66 Thus, flawed decisions which can and often do 
have a significant impact upon important aspects of public policy, and the costs 
of which may run into millions or billions of pounds are potentially being 
enforced. An appeal mechanism could rectify these errors from the outset, 
which could in turn enhance public support for international investment 
arbitration at a time when it is witnessing an ever-increasing caseload.67 
 
- Creation of a more sustainable system 
 Some authors, including Bishop68 have expressed concern regarding the 
sustainability of the current system of international investment arbitration. 
Speaking at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law’s 
inaugural Investment Treaty Forum Conference in May 2006, which focused on 
the debate surrounding the establishment of an appellate mechanism in 
international investment arbitration, Bishop stated, ‘what I think we are seeing 
today [the call for an appeals facility] is some concern, some lack of 
confidence...in the sustainability of the system [of international investment 
arbitration] itself.’69  
 Franck explains that concerns about the sustainability of the system stem 
from concerns about legitimacy;  
                                            
65 J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is there 
a need for reform?’ (n 9). 
66 ‘UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development’ (n 10). 
67 K Yannaca- Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an 
overview’ (n 61) 
68 D Bishop, ‘The case for an appellate panel and its scope for review’ in F Ortino et al 
(eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (n 54) as cited in Qureshi, ‘An 
appellate system in international investment arbitration’ (n 54) 1157. 
69 Ibid. 
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without the clarity and consistency of both the rules of law and their application, 
there is a detrimental impact upon those governed by the rules and their 
willingness and ability to adhere to such rules, which can lead to a crisis of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy depends in large part upon factors such as determinacy 
and coherence, which can in turn beget predictability and reliability.
70  
Simply put, the inconsistent and incoherent decisions being reached in 
international investment arbitration are leading to the questioning of the 
legitimacy of the system itself. Ultimately the future and sustainability are also 
being brought into question. 
Bishop believes that issues surrounding the sustainability of the system 
of international investment arbitration might be remedied by the establishment 
of an appeals facility; ‘an appellate body can reduce the risk of inconsistent 
decisions...[and] help legitimize and institutionalize the process of investor state 
dispute settlement and aid in making the system more sustainable.’71  
 
- Sensitivity 
 An appellate mechanism could provide greater sensitivity to the 
legitimate concerns of investment host state governments.72 There has been 
concern in the past that investor-state investment arbitration is not sensitive 
enough to such governmental concerns. 73  When investment host state 
government policy makers have attempted to justify their actions (which may 
have inadvertently negatively impacted the investments of foreign investors) by 
arguing that the policy is intended to address a legitimate public policy concern, 
investment tribunals have been accused of being insensitive to such concerns. 
Investment tribunals often brandish the state’s action as amounting to 
expropriation and requiring compensation to be paid to the investor. It is often 
issues involving human rights or environmental concerns that are contested.74 
                                            
70 S Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law through inconsistent decisions’ (n 33). 
71 D Bishop, ‘The case for an appellate panel and its scope for review’ (n 68) 17 and A 
Qureshi (n 54) 1157. 
72 Ibid, A Qureshi. 
73 Ibid. 
74 A comprehensive treatment of the topic in relation to environmental concerns at least 
can be found in K Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: 
Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy (CUP 2009) and for 
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For example, a host state government may enact new environmental laws in 
order to improve environmental standards in its territory. However, the new law 
could negatively impact a foreign investor’s investment by making their 
business (at the very extreme) illegal, or (at the very least) much more costly to 
carry out, thus affecting the profitability of the business. The investor will then 
seek compensation through arbitration, and they are in fact very often 
successful. It is in this way then, that international investment arbitration could 
be accused of being insensitive to legitimate concerns of the host state 
government. It is thought that an appeals facility may provide more sensitivity in 
this regard, especially if there is a single, permanent appeals tribunal which is 
less influenced by the parties to the dispute. Such a committee would probably 
provide a more objective and independent decision. 
 
- Objectivity 
 The establishment of an appellate mechanism might serve to enhance 
the objectivity of the system of international investment arbitration.75 Although 
one might assume that investment arbitration already provides an objective 
process for the settlement of investment disputes, this may not always be the 
case. With ad hoc disputes in particular, there may be legitimate concerns 
about the objectivity of the dispute settlement process.76 In ad hoc arbitration it 
is very often the parties themselves who are very heavily involved in, if not 
solely responsible for the selection of arbitrators. For a typical three-arbitrator 
tribunal panel, two of the three arbitrators are selected by the respective parties, 
meaning each party has full control over the selection of one arbitrator. The 
third arbitrator is often selected by the mutual agreement of both parties.77 
Allowing the parties to the dispute so much freedom in the selection of 
arbitrators can be dangerous, as each party is likely to select arbitrators whom 
they feel will be most sympathetic to their own position and are more likely to 
settle the dispute in their favour.78  
                                                                                                                                
discussion of environmental protection and human rights see S Subedi, International 
Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 63) 165-170. 
75 A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ (n 54) 1157. 
76 C Harris, ‘Arbitrator challenges in international arbitration’ (2008) 4 Transnational 
Dispute Management. 
77 Ibid. 
78
 Ibid. 
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 An appeal mechanism would have the potential to enhance objectivity in 
investor-state arbitration greatly. However, the precise extent to which 
objectivity may be enhanced does depend on the way in which the appeals 
facility is established and how it functions. For instance, if appeals are 
introduced, but are handled on an ad hoc basis (with tribunals being convened 
when necessary) the scope for enhancing objectivity is limited, especially if the 
parties are responsible for or have an influence on the choice of appellate 
arbitrators. If this type of appeals mechanism were to be introduced, the same 
problems which can occur at first instance concerning objectivity would be 
present at the appellate stage of proceedings. Alternatively, if appeals are 
handled by a single, permanent, dedicated and authoritative body, over which 
the parties have no influence (especially in the selection of appellate arbitrators) 
then the scope for the enhancement of objectivity is extremely significant. 
 
- Predictability 
 Inconsistency and incoherence in international investment arbitration 
leads to unpredictability of the law. If cases involving the same or similar facts 
are decided in different ways, the outcomes of future cases will be 
unpredictable. This lack of legal certainty undermines the rule of law.79 As has 
been seen above, a number of broadly similar cases80 have been decided in 
different ways, and consequently the law in these areas is unclear. A fully 
functioning appellate process could have provided a final and ultimate ‘correct’ 
interpretation of the law in these cases, thus clearing any confusion and 
clarifying the law for future reference. With the emergence of one clear and 
authoritative interpretation, the outcome of future cases would have been easier 
to predict. Predictability of the law is important for several reasons. As this work 
is focused on international investment law, the importance of the predictability of 
international investment law will be considered. Predictability of international 
                                            
79 L Yves Fortier, ‘Investment protection and the rule of law: change or decline?’ (2009) 
<http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12392785460140/0732_001.pdf> accessed 27 
February 2012. 
80 Inconsistent decisions have been reached in a number of high profile cases; these 
have been discussed at length in previous chapters. See for example CME Czech 
Republic B.V. v Czech Republic (n 55) and Lauder v Czech Republic (n 55). See also 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Pakistan (n 56) and SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Philippines (n 56). 
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investment law is important, firstly so that investors and states know what action 
is and is not permissible in the course of their dealings. Secondly, it is important 
in case a dispute arises; being able to predict which party might be successful 
in arbitration will have a bearing on the decision to pursue arbitration (taking into 
account considerations of costs and delay involved and chances of success). 
Thirdly, predictability of the law is important for the stability and sustainability of 
the legal framework.  
 The issue of predictability cannot be discussed without also considering 
the issue of precedent, or rather lack thereof (at least in terms of formal 
precedent 81 ) in international investment arbitration. A system of formal 
precedent would obviously go a long way to enhancing the predictability of the 
law in international investment. However, the current ‘spaghetti bowl’ system of 
international investment law is not particularly well suited to binding precedent. 
With the myriad of different international investment agreements, BITs, and 
different fora available, a system of binding precedent, would inevitably be 
impossible to achieve. The creation of an appeal mechanism in international 
investment arbitration may facilitate the introduction of a system of binding 
precedent in international investment arbitration, depending of course on how 
the appeals facility is going to be introduced. If for example the appeal 
mechanism is introduced in such a way as to drastically reduce the number of 
tribunals hearing investment, cases, or indeed become the central tribunal, 
precedent may be able to be established, and consequently the predictability of 
the law will be enhanced. 
 
- Harmonisation 
 An appeal mechanism would obviously harmonise the different trends 
which are emerging in the interpretation of various international investment law 
rules and the seemingly diverging opinions of different investment tribunals.82 
                                            
81 Tribunals have consistently pointed out that they are not bound by previous 
decisions. Despite the lack of formal precedent in international investment arbitration, it 
has been suggested by several authors that there is a de facto form of precedent; see 
C Schreuer and M Weiniger, ‘A doctrine of precedent?’ in P Muchlinski et al (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 1189-1196, and A 
Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ (n 54)1157. 
82 W Knull and N Rubins, ‘Betting the farm on international investment arbitration: is it 
time to offer an appeal option?’ (n 54). 
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However, the capacity for an appellate facility to harmonise would extend 
beyond this.  
It is interesting to note that certain sectors of international investment 
arbitration already make use of dispute settlement mechanisms which include 
appellate procedures 83. For example, ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations) permits the appeal of decisions. The 1992 Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co-operation 84  established the basis for 
economic co-operation in several important sectors (including investment) by 
ASEAN member nations. Recognising that an integral aspect of that economic 
co-operation would require an outlet for the settlement of any disputes which 
might arise during the course of that co-operation, a dispute settlement 
mechanism was established in 1996. The dispute settlement mechanism is 
patterned on the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Firstly, an attempt is 
made to settle the dispute through consultation with the parties. If consultation 
is unsuccessful, the dispute can be referred to the Senior Economic Officials 
Meeting which may choose to establish a panel which will be charged with 
hearing the dispute and formulating a report. The panel’s report is considered 
by the Senior Economic Officials which will rule on the dispute. The ruling of the 
Senior Economic Officials may be appealed within 30 days of the ruling being 
given.85 As has been seen, certain sectors of international investment arbitration 
already incorporate an appeal mechanism into their dispute settlement 
procedures. The establishment of a general appellate mechanism would 
therefore harmonise investment arbitration as a whole. 
 As briefly discussed earlier in this chapter, the nature of commercial 
disputes has changed dramatically recently. Commercial disputes traditionally 
involved the settlement of private disputes often involving the clarification of 
technical aspects of law between two parties which were very much only 
applicable in the single case within which they arose. However nowadays, 
                                            
83 For example, the dispute settlement mechanism of the ASEAN allows appeal of 
trade and investment related decisions. 
84 ‘Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Singapore, 
28 January 1992’ full text available at <http://www.aseansec.org/12374.htm> accessed 
24 August 2012. 
85 UNCTAD, ‘Dispute Settlement: Regional Approaches 6.3 ASEAN’ (2003) 
<www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add29_en.pdf> accessed 16 September 2011. 
For more information on ‘ASEAN’ (including dispute settlement procedures see 
<http://www.aseansec.org/index2008.html> accessed 24 August 2012. 
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international investment disputes often involve issues of public policy. This 
usually occurs because a state has introduced new legislation or policy 
intended to safeguard human rights or the environment. However, in doing so, 
the state may have inadvertently devalued the investment of a foreign investor, 
thus giving that investor recourse to dispute settlement. In this way then, 
international investment tribunals have to pronounce on matters of public policy 
and public interest. This means that international investment tribunals now have 
to fulfil a role which includes public purpose. In light of this public purpose role, 
it is asserted that investment tribunals should therefore be obliged to operate 
within a public international law framework. A centralised appeal mechanism 
could help to ensure that international investment arbitration is compliant with 
general public international law principles, carrying out its new public purpose 
role with due diligence. 
 
-Prevent distortion 
 The current system of international investment arbitration allows, and 
some might say even encourages distortion in its functioning. At present, 
investors are able to cherry pick the nationalities, investment agreements and 
forums for arbitration which they believe will afford them the greatest benefits 
and chances of success in case of a dispute. 86  The establishment of an 
appellate mechanism might prevent such distortion through forum shopping by 
providing a central, single authoritative body which would have the final say on 
the dispute. Furthermore, depending on how the appellate mechanism is 
established, it may contribute to the prevention of distortion through nationality 
and investment agreement selection: for example if the appellate mechanism is 
introduced as part of a wider reform (perhaps including the negotiation of a 
multilateral investment treaty), then the need for the thousands of BITs and 
nationality selection in order to take advantage of the most favourable of those 
BITs would be effectively eradicated. 
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6.3.2 The alleged lack of necessity and the possible drawbacks of 
establishing an appeal mechanism 
  i) Lack of necessity 
 The preceding section highlighted the fact that for many scholars, the 
basis of the call for an appellate mechanism in international investment 
arbitration is based on alleged inconsistencies and incoherence within the 
system. However, some experts have disagreed, contending that this is not a 
valid argument. Prominent academics have argued that inconsistency and 
incoherence have to date, not been a significant feature of international 
investment arbitration.87 As regards to the creation of an ICSID appeals facility 
specifically, the ICSID Secretariat itself noted that, ‘significant inconsistencies 
have not to date been a general feature of the jurisprudence of ICSID.’88 
Some experts go beyond stating that real inconsistencies have yet to 
occur, suggesting that even if inconsistencies and incoherence do occur in the 
future, there is no cause for concern, as inconsistencies should simply be 
viewed as an unavoidable fact of life.89 Gill also believes that we must accept 
inconsistency as inevitable; inconsistencies are not unique to international 
investment arbitration. Many domestic courts and international tribunals reach 
inconsistent conclusions on a regular basis, yet they are not attacked for it like 
international investment tribunals are.90 
Other academics have suggested that if inconsistencies do occur in the 
future, and we accept that they are undesirable, there is no need to worry, as 
the inconsistency will correct itself naturally over time when one solution is 
favoured over the other, meaning that the one solution will be applied more 
consistently. Paulsson for example, believes that there is no need for appellate 
intervention, and that any inconsistencies will remedy themselves in due 
course.91 Gill also favours this ‘laissez-faire’ solution, asserting that;  
over time the position in relation to many of the issues that are currently being 
debated will become more settled...inconsistent decisions themselves will give 
                                            
87 B Legum, ‘Options to establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes’ (n 
3) 231-240 and J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ (n 3) 267-280. 
88 ‘Possible improvements of the framework for ICSID arbitration’ (n 6). 
89 J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ (n 3) 267-280. 
90 J Gill, ‘Inconsistent decisions: an issue to be addressed or a fact of life?’ (n 4) 27. 
91 J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ (n 3) 267-280. 
202 
 
rise to one approach being generally regarded as more preferable than another 
and so it will be adopted more frequently thereafter.92 
There has also been some discussion about the suitability of an appeal 
mechanism within the current framework of international investment arbitration. 
Legum argues that the current system of international investment law is ill-
adapted to appeals, largely due to the lack of a multilateral investment 
agreement.93 
 
ii) Potential disadvantages 
-  Absence of flexibility 
 As described previously 94 , international investment arbitration is 
administered through either permanent arbitration institutions or ad hoc 
tribunals. Both institutionalised and (especially) ad hoc arbitration provide a 
great deal of flexibility to the parties to the dispute. More often than not, the 
disputing parties can choose exactly how their dispute should be settled, 
including (but not limited to) where the arbitration should take place and who 
should pronounce on the matter. Indeed the parties are able to exercise an 
extremely high degree of control over the entire process of the settlement of the 
dispute. Arbitration thus provides one of the most flexible means of settling 
disputes; this high degree of flexibility is widely regarded as one of the greatest 
advantages of settling disputes through arbitration. This high degree of flexibility 
and control was ideal for the settlement of commercial disputes (including 
international investment disputes) which traditionally involved the settlement of 
a specific technical aspect of the law which was applicable in that single case. 
 However, times have changed and today commercial disputes have 
taken on a completely different nature. For example, international investment 
disputes usually involve private investors (either individuals or companies) in 
dispute with the governments of the states within which they have invested. 
Often investors complain that the value of their investment has fallen due to 
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some new policy or regulatory measure put in place by the investment host 
state, alleging that this is tantamount to expropriation. These new policies often 
concern issues of broader public policy such as environmental or human rights 
protection. With such issues at stake in commercial disputes, such a high 
degree of flexibility is no longer justifiable. Therefore, perhaps the purported 
disadvantage of losing flexibility as a result of establishing an appeal 
mechanism is not a valid concern. Perhaps it would be better to sacrifice 
flexibility for greater certainty where important matters of public policy are at 
stake.  
 
- Fragmentation 
 It has been suggested that an appeals facility might actually cause 
significant fragmentation in international investment arbitration. Concern has 
particularly been expressed regarding the creation of an appeals facility under 
the auspices of ICSID. Some experts fear that fragmentation could occur if 
some ICSID awards are subject to appeal and others are not.95 
 
- Damaging to the principle of finality 
 Finality simply means that ‘the decision of the tribunal is the final word on 
the facts and law of the case before it’96, meaning that there is necessarily a 
‘lack of appeal on the merits of the dispute.’97  Finality of decision is often 
thought to be one of the most important aspects of the current system of 
international arbitration; it is often said that finality of decision is one of the 
greatest advantages of the current system of international investment 
arbitration.98 The establishment of an appeals facility would obviously destroy 
the principle of finality in international investment arbitration, making awards 
subject to appeal on the merits. A number of scholars have suggested that the 
tide may be turning regarding the traditional favouring of finality, with more 
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emphasis being placed upon the correctness of the decision and justice.99 An 
appeals mechanism in international investment arbitration would undoubtedly 
ensure that the correct decision is reached in each individual dispute, providing 
an opportunity to remedy any incorrect decisions that have been made at first 
instance. The movement towards the favouring of correctness and justice is 
supported by the fact that international investment disputes often involve issues 
of public interest and public policy which therefore ‘make the acceptance of the 
risk of flawed or erroneous decisions less justifiable in the name of finality than 
it may be in traditional commercial arbitration.’100 
 
- Increased delay and costs of arbitration 
 One of the many reasons why international investment arbitration 
became so popular is that it provided means of settling disputes in the quickest 
and most economical manner. However, it has been noted that the cost of 
investment arbitration has ‘sky-rocketed’101 in recent years due to increased 
costs in conducting arbitration procedures and the high level of damages that 
are frequently awarded in international investment cases. It is thought that the 
introduction of an appellate mechanism, which would essentially mean the 
addition of an extra layer of arbitration, will further increase the delay and costs 
involved in international investment arbitration. It should be noted however that,  
there are already considerable delays in the set aside proceedings under the 
national court systems which given the existence of different layers of appeal 
(first instance, appeal court, supreme courts), could take years before a final 
decision is rendered.102    
 The addition of an extra layer of arbitration through appeal does not have 
to necessarily equate to massive increases in delay and costs. If the appellate 
procedure is established and managed in an appropriate manner, there is no 
reason why there would be a significant increase in delay and cost. If strict 
deadlines are enforced from start to finish of the appeals process, the appeal 
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could be dealt with in a matter of weeks or months. This means that any 
additional delay caused by appeal would be minimal, and might be much 
shorter than applying for the setting aside of the decision through national 
courts. Additional arbitration would result in some cost increase. However, if the 
length of the appeals process is minimised, costs should not massively increase, 
and will be relative to the amount already spent on the dispute. Furthermore, if 
the appeal is a success, it could save the client money in damages.  
 
- Increase in caseload 
 It is alleged that introducing an appeals facility will cause a marked 
increase in the number of cases.103 This assumption is probably correct; there is 
a risk that it might become standard practice for the party that loses the case at 
first instance to automatically appeal the decision. Of course, this would lead to 
a significant increase in the number of cases. There might be several important 
implications, for example, the creation of a de facto two tier system of arbitration 
based on automatic appeal.104 Automatic appeal will also call into question the 
value and respect for first instance decisions and the arbitrators who render 
them.105  
 The risk of automatic appeal and the loss of respect and authority of first 
instance decisions are significant potential disadvantages of the establishment 
of an appeal mechanism. Although, it must be pointed out that automatic appeal 
and the creation of a two tier system could be discouraged through the creation 
of disincentives to appeal every case. For example requiring the deposit of a 
bond might be one way of resolving this potential problem. 
 
- Re-politicisation of the system of international investment arbitration 
 The de-politicisation of the system is regarded as one of the greatest 
achievements of the system of international investment arbitration, which was 
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largely facilitated by organised dispute settlement. 106  Before the advent of 
arbitration, international disputes that arose often escalated to physical conflicts 
which became political in nature, and ultimately harmed international 
relations. 107  International investment arbitration also contributed to the de-
politicisation of dispute settlement by providing means for investors to bypass 
often biased home state courts and allowing access to neutral, independent 
international tribunals.108 It is alleged that the establishment of an appellate 
mechanism might re-politicise the system by encouraging states that are 
unsuccessful at first instance to automatically appeal the award. It is expected 
that losing states will always attempt an appeal in order to gain popularity with 
their citizens.109 If this were to happen, it would be states that would stand to 
gain the most from the introduction of an appeal mechanism potentially 
weighted in their favour. However, it must be noted that experts have 
responded to this criticism, arguing that statistics do not show any difference the 
number of cases won and lost by states and investors respectively.110 Thus, the 
assertion that states would have more opportunity to appeal is not substantiated 
by the relevant statistics. Furthermore, automatic appeal could be discouraged 
through a number of disincentives, such as the requiring of a deposit of a 
security bond towards the cost of the appeal before initiation of the appeal.      
 
- The solution could be worse than the problem 
 A few scholars have suggested that the establishment of an appellate 
mechanism could do more harm than good.111 For example, Legum muses that, 
‘the cure...could be far worse than the disease’112, and that introducing the 
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wrong sort of appellate mechanism could ‘do a tremendous amount of 
damage’113. Paulsson114 is of a similar opinion to Legum. 
 
6.4 Practicalities of establishing an appeal mechanism 
 Having carefully considered the various advantages and disadvantages 
of establishing an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration, it 
seems that the benefits would outweigh the burdens. Having concluded that the 
creation of an appellate mechanism would be beneficial to international 
investment arbitration for several important reasons, the next logical step is to 
consider how such a mechanism might best be established. A number of 
suggestions have been made in this regard, the most prominent of which will be 
discussed below. 
 
6.4.1 An appeal mechanism incorporated into the ICSID framework 
 The possible incorporation of an appeals facility into the ICSID 
Convention has arguably been the most seriously debated of all the 
suggestions. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the ICSID 
Secretariat itself considered the possibility of creating an ICSID appeals facility. 
In its 2004 Discussion Paper115 which focused on possible improvements to the 
ICSID framework for arbitration, the possibility of creating an ICSID appeals 
facility was discussed. The Discussion Paper acknowledges the fact that much 
interest has been shown in the possible creation of an ICSID appeals facility, 
with several treaties having been concluded by ICSID member states which 
include provisions making reference to such a mechanism.116 The Paper notes 
that the one of the central arguments in favour of the creation of an appeals 
facility is that it would ‘be intended to foster coherence and consistency in the 
case law emerging under investment treaties.’117 However, the Secretariat feels 
that, ‘significant inconsistencies have not to date been a general feature of the 
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jurisprudence of ICSID.’118 The Paper goes on to warn that an appeals facility 
could be detrimental to the ICSID framework, causing fragmentation in the 
ICSID arbitral regimes (where for example some arbitrations would be subject 
to the mechanism, and others would not). The Paper goes on to state that 
another detrimental effect would be the detracting from the finality of the award 
and causing delays in enforcement.119 
 However, the Secretariat does recognise that although inconsistencies 
have not been a problem as of yet, there is certainly scope for inconsistencies 
in the case law to develop in the future. This is especially the case given the 
increased caseload and the fact that disputes may be submitted to different 
ICSID and non-ICSID forms of arbitration. The Secretariat also notes that as 
regards to fragmentation, this may already be a problem as there are already 
multiple forms of ICSID arbitration. The Secretariat points out that the creation 
of an appeals facility would extend a further dispute settlement option to 
interested parties; this might enhance the acceptability and legitimacy of 
investor-state arbitration.120 
 The Discussion Paper goes on to highlight an interesting problem; the 
potential for the multiplicity of appeals facilities. If a number of different appeal 
mechanisms are created, this would seem to run counter to the achievement of 
the objectives of consistency and coherence. The Secretariat suggests that the 
achievement of said objectives might be better served by the establishment of a 
single appeal mechanism under the auspices of ICSID, and it would be ‘on this 
assumption that the Centre might pursue the creation of such an...appeals 
facility at this stage.’121 
 The Discussion Paper seems largely positive about the creation of 
an ICSID appeals facility; though several years later it is yet to be established. 
In 2005, a follow-up Working Paper122 was issued by the ICSID Secretariat 
which might explain why the establishment of an ICSID appeals facility has to 
date, not been pursued. The Working Paper represented a summary of the 
comments submitted to the Secretariat in response to the original 2004 
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Discussion Paper. The Working Paper agrees that if an appeals facility is to be 
created, it would be best achieved through a single mechanism. It then goes on 
to say that, ‘most [member states who submitted comments]... considered that it 
would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this 
stage, particular in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised in the 
Discussion Paper.’123 The Working Paper concludes that, ‘the secretariat will 
continue to study such issues to assist member countries when and if it is 
decided to proceed towards the establishment of an ICSID appeal 
mechanism.’124 The Working Paper comments showed support for the notion of 
introducing an appeal mechanism under the auspices of ICSID, with many 
commentators agreeing that an appeals facility would be best established 
through ICSID, as opposed to different means. Nevertheless, general 
consensus also appeared to show hesitancy towards the creation of an appeal 
mechanism at that time, due to the cost concerns of many developing 
nations.125 Accordingly, the proposal was promptly abandoned.126 Consequently, 
there are no current plans to introduce an appeal mechanism into the ICSID 
Convention. 
In recent months there has been some discussion of a background paper 
being prepared by the ICSID Secretariat. The paper will focus on reviewing the 
ICSID annulment procedure, with a view to introducing reforms to the process 
depending on the findings of the analysis.127  
 Many commentators have offered their opinions on the subject of a 
possible appeals facility being incorporated into the ICSID framework; opinion 
appears to be quite divided on the issue. Many experts have asserted that an 
ICSID appellate mechanism would be beneficial; arguing that having a 
permanent body of experts in the field of international investment might remedy 
the problems of consistency in investment jurisprudence, which would in turn 
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enhance the level of predictability in ICSID arbitration.128 Additionally, ‘perhaps 
more importantly, an appellate body might be able to perform a systematic 
function by observing the developments in international investment law and 
policy and analysing the underlying issues that threaten the system.’129  
Tams also asserts that the introduction of a second tier of dispute 
settlement within ICSID will ensure that the ‘correct’ decision is reached, thus 
enhancing the accuracy of decisions. 130 Additionally, setting up an ICSID 
appeals facility might increase the authority of international investment 
awards.131 
 Despite the potential advantages of an ICSID appeals facility, some 
scholars have raised concerns about the possibility. Subjecting awards to 
appeal will undoubtedly involve lengthening the process of ICSID arbitration; 
‘the more steps there are in ICSID arbitration, the longer and more expensive 
the process will be, and thus fewer stakeholders would be able to appear before 
the appellate body.’ 132  An ICSID appeals facility would also have negative 
consequences on the finality of the award, and there is a risk of creating a 
permanent two-tier system. Losing parties might launch appeals as a matter of 
routine, thus diminishing the value of the award at first instance. 133  Some 
experts have argued that the need for an appeal mechanism in international 
investment law has not been established. Paulsson believes that there is no 
problem with the consistency and coherence of decisions, and that inconsistent 
decisions occur less frequently than we might have been led to believe. 
Paulsson goes on to say that even if inconsistencies did occur, we should not 
be alarmed by this, as inconsistencies will naturally disappear as one solution is 
routinely favoured over another.134 Tams also points out that it may not be 
politically feasible to introduce an appeals facility into the ICSID framework and 
that non-consenting member states could halt the proposal from the outset.135 
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 With a lack of consensus regarding the possibility of establishing an 
ICSID appeals facility, things seems to be at an impasse. In order for progress 
to be made in this regard, Penusliski136 suggests that a move to create a future 
ICSID appeals body must take into account the considerations set out above. 
The appellate body must be creatively integrated into the ICSID framework in 
order that it improves the overall system. In order to address some of the 
concerns that have been voiced, appeal could be limited to a certain number of 
grounds, the appellant could be asked to provide collateral for the costs of the 
appeal, and decisions of the appellate body could be mandatorily published.137 
 
6.4.2 Making use of the World Trade Organisation’s Appellate Body 
 The idea of increasing the role of the WTO’s dispute settlement body in 
the settlement of international investment disputes more generally was 
examined thoroughly in the previous chapter (as one of the suggested 
improvements to the system of international investment arbitration). A number 
of advantages of increasing the WTO’s role in the settlement of international 
investment disputes were identified, such as the potential to create a 
‘transparent, stable and predictable framework for investment.’138 However, a 
number of potential disadvantages or concerns were also highlighted, including 
the bodies’ lack of capacity to cope with the undoubted influx of investment 
disputes at present. Although this could be relatively easily remedied with the 
provision of extra resources, a more valid concern might be the implications of 
allowing private individuals (investors) standing before the WTO DSB. At 
present, in trade-related disputes, the WTO DSB is able to examine cases 
between two state parties only. By nature, investment disputes usually involve a 
state party and a private investor, thus enabling the WTO DSB to settle 
investment disputes would mean giving private individuals standing. The 
implications of this should not be underestimated; before long private individuals 
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would surely demand locus standi in all matters, including trade disputes. It 
would be difficult for the WTO to deny such access to the DSB in trade disputes 
if private investors were to be granted access in investment disputes. This 
would undoubtedly cause a huge increase in the WTO DSB’s caseload, which 
would require significant budgetary expansion. Considering the cost of the WTO 
DSB is borne by the member states, requests for additional funds are likely to 
be met with a negative response (especially in such economically difficult times), 
and particularly from developing nations with less funds at their disposal.139 
 An alternative to increasing the role of the WTO DSB to such a large 
extent so as to include access to all its facilities in international investment 
disputes, could be to allow access to the appeals facility only. To present 
knowledge, this possibility has never been examined. As such, it is very difficult 
to comment on how simply granting appeal to the WTO DSB appellate panel 
might work. Perhaps the appellate body could review awards rendered by the 
many different international investment tribunals in existence and provide a 
central, overarching interpretative mechanism, or perhaps it might function as 
one of many different options for appeal. In any case, simply granting access to 
the WTO appellate mechanism might not be the most appropriate method of 
integrating an appeals facility; it would do little to simplify the already over-
complicated system of international investment arbitration, perhaps only serving 
to add a further layer of confusion. This proposition would therefore require 
serious consideration from a practical point of view. Furthermore, appeal of 
investment decisions to the WTO appellate body would obviously lead to a 
significant increase in the workload of the body. This could have huge resource 
and funding implications. 
 
6.4.3 An appeals facility added to existing international investment 
arbitral mechanisms which would be ring-fenced from other 
systems 
It could be the case that the introduction of an appeal in international 
investment arbitration could be driven by the insertion of new or revised clauses 
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to that effect into existing or newly negotiated BITs and other investment 
agreements. For example, Article 28(1) of the US model BIT of 2004 required 
parties to ‘strive to reach an agreement’140 for appellate review in the event that 
a multilateral investment treaty was negotiated. However, the US model BIT of 
2012141 states that the parties to the BIT should ‘consider’142 whether arbitral 
awards rendered under the BIT should be subject to any such new appeal 
mechanism that may be created in the future. The newer BIT is noticeably less 
committed to the creation of an appeal mechanism than its predecessor. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of an appeal mechanism could be driven 
by the insertion of such clauses into new and existing BITS. If this is the case, 
appeal would not operate under a multilateral investment framework, therefore it 
is unlikely that one single appellate body would be created. Instead, an extra 
appellate layer of arbitration to existing arbitral mechanisms under each of the 
different treaties concerned. Qureshi explains that such a system would provide 
greater transparency, equity and facilitate a move towards a rules-orientated 
system of adjudication.143 Qureshi asserts that there has been general support 
for the introduction of such an appeal mechanism, with UNCTAD canvassing 
support for it.144 Perhaps the biggest advantage of this proposal is simplicity; it 
would simply require the augmentation of dispute settlement procedures and 
practices that are already in existence, rather than requiring the creation of new 
ones. An additional benefit is that it would leave the parties to existing individual 
investment agreements to decide whether to incorporate into them the appellate 
procedure. Such a mechanism would achieve the goal of instituting appeal and 
correcting mistakes that may have been made at first instance. Moreover, a 
similar approach has been suggested in other fields; in double taxation 
agreements for example, the OECD proposed the introduction of an appellate 
mechanism be added on to the Mutual Agreement Procedure. Qureshi does 
concede that there are drawbacks to the suggestion which he summarises well; 
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It would...seem to run counter to the objectives of coherence and consistency 
for different appeal mechanisms to be set up under each treaty concerned. 
Efficiency and economy, as well as coherence and consistency, might best be 
served by ICSID offering a single appeal mechanism as an alternative to 
multiple mechanisms.145 
Thus, the establishment of an appeal mechanism in this way would have 
several likely consequences. On a positive note, it is probably the simplest 
method of establishing an appeal mechanism as it would not require a new 
world investment organisation, nor would it require the negotiation of a 
multilateral framework. Furthermore, it would enable incorrect first instance 
decisions to be corrected. However, an appeal mechanism established in this 
way would not lead to greater consistency and coherence in international 
investment arbitration (as each appeal tribunal would be free to reach whatever 
decision it sees fit). The problem of multiplicity of fora and forum shopping 
would not be solved. In fact, establishing appeal in international investment 
arbitration in this way could actually lead to greater fragmentation.  
6.4.4 A world investment court 
 Some commentators believe that the existing institutions (for example 
ICSID or UNCITRAL) do not have the capacity to, nor are capable of 
incorporating an appeal mechanism. Subedi asserts that, ‘the new 
developments within foreign investment law...call for a balancing act on the part 
of dispute settlement mechanisms in order to reconcile the competing interests 
and principles.’146 Subedi casts doubts over the capability of existing institutions 
of rising to such a huge challenge. Mann and Moltke agree that existing dispute 
settlement institutions ‘were not designed to address complex issues of public 
policy that now routinely come into play in investor-state disputes.’147 It has also 
been suggested that the ICJ could be called upon to settle investment disputes. 
However, this is a dubious proposition because the ICJ’s mandate allows it to 
settle state-state disputes currently. Investment disputes typically involve one 
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state party and one private party, thus this would be impossible for the ICJ at 
present. 
 So, if existing dispute settlement institutions are incapable of 
implementing a successful appeals mechanism, what may be required is a 
completely new institution; a quasi-judicial body akin to a world investment court.  
 The question is then, how can this world investment court be established? 
There is no simple answer. Different authors have put forward different 
proposals as to how a world investment court could be established and how it 
should function. Van Harten has articulated his views on the matter in great 
detail.148 He believes that the way forward is to encourage states ‘to support a 
multilateral code that would establish an international court with comprehensive 
jurisdiction over the adjudication of investor claims.’149 He goes on to state that 
the newly created world investment court he envisages would ideally have 
obligatory jurisdiction over all claims filed by investors in the first instance, 
where the states involved were members to the multilateral code. According to 
Van Harten, a less desirable option would be to give the world investment court 
only appellate jurisdiction over the awards rendered by the numerous different 
tribunals already in existence. Turning his attention to the staffing of the court, 
the author asserts that twelve or fifteen judges would be required, and that they 
should be appointed by states for ‘a set term based on the model of other 
international courts.’150  Being staffed in this way would enable the court to 
ensure the independence of its judges, and the number of judges would allow 
several three-judge panels to sit simultaneously in order to keep up with the 
increased demand which has been witnessed in investment arbitration. The 
judges would be selected to hear cases on a rotating basis by the court’s 
president or by random assignment. If the impartiality of a judge is challenged, 
the other members of the court will pronounce on the matter. As with other 
international courts, the judges of the world investment court would be 
prohibited from taking part in activities that might be deemed incompatible with 
their professional duties and which may compromise their independence. Van 
Harten then turns to discussing matters of procedure. The author states that the 
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court’s first instance decision would be appealable to a ‘special assembly of the 
court, representing a majority of its members.’151  
He does go on to say that the world investment court’s awards should be 
enforceable under the ICSID Convention 152  as well as the New York 
Convention153. This would mean that awards would be subject to review by 
national courts. Practically speaking, there would be no need to designate a 
seat of arbitration for each claim because the court would be an international 
court rather than an ad hoc tribunal, though it would not be problematic to have 
to do so,  
considering that domestic courts have thus far deferred to investment treaty 
tribunals and that the courts in the place of enforcement could enforce an award 
even if it was set aside in the seat of arbitration. Above all, the decision where 
to locate claims for purposes of domestic court review would be made by an 
independent judicial body.154 
The final section of Van Harten’s discussion focuses on the prospects for 
the future of his proposal, essentially, the likelihood of its chances of success. 
The author believes that capital-importing counties would benefit from an 
international court in which they would have real influence in the process of the 
appointment of arbitrators, as opposed ‘to a system of private arbitration, biased 
against host governments, in which they have little say at all.’155 For the major 
capital-exporting states, the proposal ‘asks them to sacrifice little in exchange 
for an international judicial body that is more likely to have political staying 
power than the current system.’156 Van Harten does recognise one potential 
criticism of his proposal; multiplication of international courts. The author 
responds by pointing out that the creation of a world investment court would 
consolidate hundreds of tribunals, even if it stops short of becoming the only 
investment tribunal in the world. He believes that such a world investment court 
would be open, accountable, consistent and independent, and for those 
reasons it is worthy of state support. Ultimately though, the court can only be 
created if the key state players in international investment law prioritise the 
                                            
151 Ibid 181. 
152 Convention for the Settlement of International Investment Disputes (n 12). 
153 New York Convention (n 13). 
154 G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 63) 180. 
155 Ibid 183. 
156 Ibid. 
217 
 
reform of the system, ‘not so much because it fits their particular interests...but 
because they wish to defend long-cherished principles of judging in public 
law.’157 
Qureshi examines the possibility of establishing a supreme investment 
court, suggesting that such a court could either be set up as an independent 
institution, or as a chamber of the ICJ. The ICJ suggestion would be a non-
starter due to the reasons of its mandate as discussed above.158 
 As has been seen, several international investment experts have 
articulated their views about the creation of a world investment court. 
Suggestions range from (relatively) modest plans to incorporate a world 
investment court that might function within the current framework of the system 
of international investment law, to more drastic proposals which would involve a 
radical overhaul of the entire system of international investment law. A detailed 
analysis of the current system of international investment arbitration (in earlier 
chapters) has revealed a number of fundamental flaws. The evidence suggests 
that the time for minor changes and tweaks to the system has passed; 
international investment law is at a crossroads. In order to create an optimally 
functioning overall system, what is required is the creation of a new international 
organisation which supervises and facilitates international investment; the 
investment equivalent of the WTO which carries out the same duties in respect 
of international trade. This new institution could then initiate the negotiation of a 
multilateral investment treaty. The multilateral treaty could replace the current 
law which consists of an awkward blend of customary international law rules 
and bilateral investment treaties. Having a global investment treaty would mean 
that all the investment rules would be found in one place, making them much 
more accessible and clearer. The multilateral treaty would also incorporate a 
dispute settlement mechanism, consisting of a single tribunal which would be 
solely responsible for the settlement of all international investment related 
disputes. The single investment tribunal would replace the numerous tribunals 
in existence which currently deal with investment disputes. Having one forum 
for the settlement of investment disputes will alleviate many of the problems 
associated with the current system of international investment arbitration, such 
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as inconsistency, incoherence, and a lack of legitimacy. The single dispute 
settlement body could also incorporate a dedicated appeals facility. This vision 
of the future of international investment arbitration would seem to be supported 
by Van Harten.159 
 The creation of a world investment court with an appellate mechanism, 
as detailed in the preceding paragraph would be no mean feat. It would involve 
the creation of a new global institution as well a multilateral treaty. Legitimate 
concerns about the feasibility of successfully undertaking such an endeavour 
would inevitably be raised. Indeed, such concerns have been raised in the past, 
with global institutions being branded ‘politically unfashionable, perhaps to the 
point of being unfeasible.’160 
6.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined in great detail the possibility of establishing 
an appeal mechanism in international investment arbitration. As has been seen, 
there is already some scope for the review of international investment law 
awards through a number of different means, depending on whether the award 
has been rendered through ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration. The ICSID 
convention does itself provide for the annulment of awards, but only if there has 
been some procedural deficiency. In non-ICSID arbitration, awards made in 
international investment disputes can be challenged under the national law of 
the seat of the arbitration, under the New York Convention or under some other 
international treaties. Again, the opportunity for review is often limited to 
situations where there has been some abuse of process, rather than providing 
substantive review of decisions on their merits. In short, the opportunities 
available to parties to seek review in international investment arbitration are 
rather limited. The lack of substantive review in international investment 
arbitration is in large part due to the prominence of the principle of finality which 
has long been regarded as one its fundamental pillars. Finality is thought to 
promote efficient, cost effective investment dispute settlement. In international 
investment dispute settlement, finality has traditionally been favoured over the 
principle of correctness and justice. However, this traditional balance of favour 
might have run its course; perhaps it is time to give greater emphasis to 
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correctness and justice at the expense of the principle of finality. Ensuring 
justice, as well as greater consistency and coherence would be some of the 
greatest potential advantages of the establishment of an appeal mechanism in 
international investment arbitration. This chapter has discussed these potential 
advantages and indeed others in great depth, highlighting that the 
establishment of an appellate mechanism could remedy many of the problems 
associated with the system of international investment law (as discussed in 
previous chapters) and furthermore, significantly improve the system. The 
chapter has also emphasised that there is considerable support for the 
suggestion to introduce an appeal facility in international investment arbitration 
from many experts in the field of international investment law. 
 Despite the numerous purported benefits of the establishment of an 
appeals mechanism and the amount of support for such a mechanism from 
prominent international investment law experts, others have questioned the 
basis of the call for such an appeals facility, and contended that there might be 
important disadvantages to its establishment. Concerns about fragmentation, 
increase in caseload, politicisation of the system et cetera have been raised. In 
my opinion, such concerns might be legitimate, however, many of the alleged 
potential disadvantages or problems associated with the establishment of an 
appeals mechanism could be minimised or completely avoided by carefully 
considering how the appellate facility might best be introduced. The appeals 
facility would need to be carefully crafted in order that it should bring about all 
the purported benefits, but also avoid the potential disadvantages about which 
concerns have been raised. For example, fragmentation could be avoided by 
making all international investment awards potentially subject to review by the 
appeals facility. Costs and delay can be kept to a minimum by ensuring strict 
deadlines are adhered to as part of a streamlined, efficient appeals process. 
Finally, the anticipated increase in caseload and automatic appeal of every case 
could be avoided by requiring the deposit of a bond as security for the appeal.  
 What is clear then is that the establishment of an appellate mechanism in 
international investment arbitration would need to be carefully considered. The 
manner in which the appeals process is introduced and how it would function 
are central to the success of the future appellate facility. Several different 
methods of establishing an appeal mechanism in international investment law 
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have been identified and discussed to varying lengths. Undoubtedly the most 
publicised of these methods is the introduction of appeal mechanism in 
international investment arbitration under the auspices of ICSID. There has 
been much debate about this possibility from international investment experts, 
academics and even the ICSID Secretariat itself. Ultimately, ICSID determined 
that instituting an appeals process under its framework for arbitration might be a 
positive future step, but that this would only be considered if an ICSID appeal 
mechanism would be the only appeals facility in international investment 
arbitration.161 The ICSID Secretariat felt that an ICSID appeals facility amongst 
several other investment arbitration appeals facilities would not remedy the 
current problems associated with international investment arbitration, in 
particular the often cited problem of inconsistency and incoherence. The 
operation of several appeal mechanisms would only result in more 
inconsistency and incoherence.  
 Other methods of introducing an appeal mechanism into international 
investment arbitration have also been discussed. For example, making use of 
the WTO’s dispute settlement appellate body has been suggested. Though 
ultimately, this would probably be unfeasible due to complications involving 
access to the tribunal and problems regarding the locus standi of private 
individuals as investors. Another appellate possibility which has been discussed 
is simply adding an extra layer to the numerous already existing arbitral 
procedures. This would undoubtedly be the simplest of all the methods to 
introduce, as it would simply require the augmentation of existing dispute 
settlement facilities. However, the introduction of several different appeal 
mechanisms would do little to resolve the issues of inconsistency and 
incoherence in international investment arbitration. 
A final suggestion which has been put forward is to introduce a supreme 
international investment ‘world court’. This general concept has been advocated 
by several prominent international investment law experts, whom have each 
provided ideas about how such a court could be introduced and how it might 
function. However the court would be established, its creation would require a 
significant overhaul of the system of international investment law and arbitration. 
For this reason, some commentators have branded the creation of such a court 
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as unfeasible. The establishment of a world investment court would certainly not 
be easy to achieve, however it is certainly not impossible to accomplish. The 
starting point for the establishment of such a court would have to be the 
negotiation of a multilateral investment treaty which would provide a clear, 
coherent and detailed framework for international investment law, which up to 
present has been lacking due to the existence of the thousands upon thousands 
of bilateral investment treaties and agreements. It must be acknowledged that 
previous attempts to negotiate multilateral investment treaties have failed. The 
reasons for these failures would obviously need to be addressed before any 
further negotiations may take place. One of the main reasons for the failure of 
multilateral negotiations was developing nations’ concerns about being 
pressurised into agreeing to potentially detrimental obligations (with developing 
nations typically being the capital importing investment host state in 
international investment). Developing nations were concerned that any future 
multilateral investment agreement should not become a vehicle for the 
protection of investment and investors to their detriment. Another concern of 
developing nations was the forum for the negotiation of the multilateral 
agreement, with the WTO for example being perceived as biased towards richer 
nations. It will therefore be necessary to create a completely new institution, a 
WTO for the investment sphere perhaps, in order to initiate the negotiations for 
a multilateral investment agreement. The newly negotiated agreement would 
contain provisions for the creation of a world investment court, which functions 
in a way similar to the WTO’s dispute settlement body, and which of course 
would integrate an appellate process. 
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CHAPTER VII: COULD ANY EXISTING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISMS ACT AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the proposal to establish an appeal 
mechanism in international investment arbitration in great depth. Having 
concluded that the introduction of an appellate process would be a positive step 
for international investment law, the chapter proceeded to consider how such a 
process might best be integrated into investment arbitration. Numerous 
suggestions were examined in this regard, including the possibility of 
establishing an appeal mechanism under the auspices of the ICSID framework, 
incorporating an appeal process into the various existing tribunals, and creating 
a world investment court. It is clear that the establishment of an appellate 
mechanism will not be easily accomplished, and there are many important 
considerations which will need to be taken into account. Bearing this in mind, it 
may be easier and quicker to model reforms of the system of international 
investment arbitration on an existing dispute settlement mechanism. 
In the past, a handful of experts have suggested that the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO could serve as a model for international 
investment arbitration. Although this has been proposed by some academics, 
there is relatively little literature on the proposition itself.1 This chapter seeks to 
explore this suggestion in greater depth, examining the WTO’s DSB and indeed 
several other international and regional dispute settlement mechanisms and 
institutions, considering whether any of these could serve as a model for 
international investment arbitration.  
The chapter will consider the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO, 
ICSID, WIPO, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, PCA, 
ASEAN, Mercosur, NAFTA, and the EU. A brief overview of the functioning of 
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International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing 2008) 
208. 
223 
 
each of the dispute settlement mechanisms will be given, followed by an 
evaluation of each of them. Having given a brief overview and evaluation of 
each institution, the final section of this chapter will reflect on whether any of the 
international or regional dispute settlement institutions that have been 
discussed could act as a model for international investment arbitration. 
 
7.2 International dispute settlement mechanisms 
 7.2.1 World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Body 
i) Overview 
Before the WTO came into existence, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)2 regulated certain aspects of trade. The old GATT agreement 
also provided a primitive dispute settlement process which was called upon to 
settle trade disputes. However, the dispute settlement system itself was of 
limited utility because of the length of the process; cases could, and often did 
drag on for a number of years. Furthermore, the losing state could easily block 
an unfavourable ruling, making the dispute settlement process entirely 
redundant. It is fair to say that the GATT dispute settlement process was 
ineffective and inefficient.3  
Following the eighth round of negotiations of the GATT (known as the 
Uruguay round), the WTO came into being. The WTO was formally established 
on 1st January 19954, and at present has 157 member states5. The WTO is 
responsible for the supervision and liberalisation of world trade.6 In order to 
carry out its mandate, the WTO performs many functions; from administering 
                                            
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (full text) available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm> accessed 25 August 
2012. 
3 See W Davey, ‘Dispute settlement in GATT’ (1987)11 Fordham International Law 
Journal 51 and R Read, ‘Dispute settlement, compensation and retaliation under the 
WTO’ in W Kerr and J Gaisford (eds), Handbook on International Trade Policy (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2007) 497. 
4 ‘Understanding the WTO: who we are’ 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm accessed 28 
September 2011. 
5
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<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed> 15 August 
2012. 
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WTO agreements, providing a forum for trade negotiations, monitoring national 
trade policies, providing technical assistance to lesser developed nations, co-
operating with other international organisations and handling any trade disputes 
that may arise.7 The settlement of trade disputes is seen as an essential aspect 
of the WTO’s work in order to ensure the proper functioning of the system as a 
whole, and is often referred to as the ‘central pillar of the multilateral trading 
system’8. Trade disputes arise when one member state alleges that another has 
breached its WTO obligations.9 Dispute settlement is required in order to make 
sure that the WTO rules and obligations are enforced, because if the rules were 
not enforced the whole system would be rendered useless.10  
 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism strives to ensure that the 
settlement of any disputes that arise is equitable, fast, effective and mutually 
acceptable.11 Disputes typically arise out of broken promises or breaches of 
obligations. WTO member states agreed that if they believe a fellow member 
state has violated the trade rules under the WTO agreements, they will take 
action through the dispute settlement system (rather than act unilaterally 
outside of the WTO). This means that members agree to follow designated 
dispute settlement procedures and abide by any decisions made during that 
process.12 
 Settling trade disputes is the responsibility of the dispute settlement body 
(DSB, basically the General Council), which consists of all 157 WTO members. 
It is the dispute settlement body which has the sole authority to establish panels 
of experts to consider the case and it is the DSB which must either accept or 
reject the panel’s findings or the result of the appeal. The DSB must also 
monitor the implementation and enforcement of decisions and it has the power 
to authorise retaliation in cases of non-compliance with the decision.13  
                                            
7 ‘Understanding the WTO: who we are’ (n 4). 
8
 ‘Understanding the WTO settling disputes: a unique contribution’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm> accessed 28 July 
2009. 
9 ‘WTO: dispute settlement’ <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm> 
accessed 25 August 2012. 
10 ‘Understanding the WTO settling disputes: a unique contribution’ (n 8) 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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 The first formal stage of the dispute settlement procedure is consultation. 
A process which may take up to 60 days, consultation requires the two 
disputing parties to engage in dialogue in order to try to sort the dispute out 
between themselves. The complaining state must notify the responding member 
and also the WTO DSB if it wishes to start consultations. If the responding state 
does not reply, the complaining member has direct access to panel proceedings. 
If consultation takes place but the discussions fail, the parties are entitled to ask 
the WTO Director-General to mediate or help in any other constructive way.14  
If consultation and mediation is unsuccessful, the second stage of formal 
procedure is the panel stage. The complaining state must ask for a panel to be 
appointed, which must be completed within a 45 day period. The defendant 
country is able to block the constitution of the panel once, but the second 
constitution is undisputable. Panels usually consist of three (sometimes five) 
experts who are appointed to examine evidence and decide which party is right 
and which party is wrong. Panellists are chosen from a pool of experts usually 
nominated by WTO members. Panellists are not affiliated with any government; 
they are appointed to serve in their individual capacity. Panellists must be 
impartial and knowledgeable. The panel collectively produces a report which is 
then passed onto the DSB, which can either accept the report or reject it by 
consensus. The preparation of the panel’s report is based on written 
submissions by the parties and oral hearings. The panel officially assists the 
DSB in settling the dispute, however, the requirement of consensus means that 
panel decisions are practically very difficult to overturn. The panel’s report is 
usually completed and delivered to the parties within 6 months (though in some 
cases, such as with perishable goods, this deadline is reduced to 3 months). 
The report is then circulated to all member states. If the report finds that the 
WTO rules have been broken, it recommends that measures are taken to 
ensure compatibility and sometimes the panel may make suggestions as to how 
this may be achieved. The report automatically becomes the ruling of the DSB 
within 60 days, unless it is rejected by consensus.15  
The final stage of the WTO dispute settlement process is appeal. The 
original panel’s report may be appealed by one or both parties. Appeals must 
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be based on points of law only; existing evidence or new issues cannot be 
examined. The appeal is heard by three members of an appellate body which 
consists of seven permanent members. The seven members are chosen so that 
they broadly represent the range of WTO membership and each serve four year 
terms. The seven members have to be veritable experts in the fields of 
international trade and law and they must not be affiliated with any government. 
The three members of the appellate panel can choose to uphold, modify or 
reverse the findings and conclusions of the original panel. Appeals must 
normally be fully completed within 60 days, though they may exceptionally take 
up to a maximum of 90 days. Once the appeal report is completed, the DSB has 
30 days to accept or reject the decision, and once again, rejection is only 
possible by consensus.16  
After the dispute settlement process has been completed and the case 
has been concluded, if the defendant state is found to be at fault, it must 
remedy the situation by ensuring that the measure or measures in question are 
adapted or removed so that the state is not in breach of its WTO obligations. If 
the state does not immediately remedy the problem and continues to breach 
WTO obligations, it should offer compensation or suffer some other suitable 
penalty (such as trade sanctions). Compensation normally takes the form of 
tariff reductions and is voluntary (as the suspension of concessions is the usual 
punishment). The state is usually given a reasonable amount of time to remedy 
the situation before compensation is due or trade sanctions are applied. The 
DSB will monitor the implementation of its rulings in order to ensure that they 
are complied with. An outstanding case will remain on the DSB agenda until the 
issue is resolved.17 
 
ii) Evaluation 
 The approach of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the WTO 
brought about a period of reflection and evaluation of what the organisation had 
achieved and its general functioning. In 2003, Peter Sutherland chaired a 
committee which was established to generate a report on the operation of the 
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WTO in its first ten years. The Sutherland report18, as it became informally 
known, devoted an entire section to the functioning of the DSB. The report 
praised the DSB for its unique contribution to the WTO recognising the security 
and predictability that it fosters. Nevertheless, the report then went on to 
suggest that the DSB may be at a crossroads, and some reforms might be 
required improve on the work it had already done. The report suggested several 
areas which may need to be reformed, including the strengthening of the 
implementation procedures for DSB awards and the use of monetary 
compensation. A number of other reforms were also suggested.19 
 
- Advantages 
The Sutherland report, and indeed the tenth anniversary of its creation 
encouraged academics and other experts to weigh in on the achievements of 
the WTO DSB. In fact, Zimmermann20 notes that the ‘WTO dispute settlement 
system has attracted a remarkable amount of academic attention.’21 He goes on 
to say that, ‘in this literature, the system received a particularly warm, if not 
enthusiastic welcome.’22  The DSB has been hailed as the ‘crown jewel’ or 
‘linchpin’ of the multilateral trading system.23 
Accordingly, the dispute settlement mechanism is widely regarded as one of 
the WTO’s biggest successes. During the first ten years of its existence, the 
WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) dealt with some 332 cases.24 The high 
caseload is viewed as a sign of the dispute settlement mechanism’s success, 
There are strong grounds for arguing that the increasing number of disputes is 
simply the result of expanding world trade and the stricter rules negotiated in the 
                                            
18 P Sutherland et al (Consultative Board of the WTO), ‘The Future of the WTO: 
addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium’ (2004) full text available at 
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19 Ibid. 
20 T Zimmermann, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement at Ten: Evolution, Experiences and 
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21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 R Bhala, ‘The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a 
Trilogy)’ (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 845, as cited in T 
Zimmermann (n 20). 
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Uruguay Round; and that the fact that more are coming to the WTO reflects a 
growing faith in the system.25 
Although the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole is highly 
praised by academics, a number of specific aspects of the system are 
particularly commended. Zimmermann cites the introduction of precise time 
limits throughout the dispute settlement process as one such aspect. Under the 
old GATT dispute settlement system, such precise time limits were not imposed, 
and accordingly disputes often dragged on for years. Additionally, the 
establishment of a permanent appellate body composed of highly-qualified 
lawyers was seen as an important contribution to ‘improved legal quality of 
decisions and as a further step towards the rule of law in trade matters.’26 
Furthermore, Zimmermann states that the appellate mechanism was hailed as 
an ideal potential model for dispute settlement procedures in other areas of 
public international law.27 
Zimmerman’s praise of the WTO appellate body has been echoed by 
many other commentators. It has generally been accepted that the appeal 
mechanism is one of the major successes of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Ehlermann (a member of the WTO appellate body) believes that the 
appeal mechanism, 
seems to me still today an extraordinary achievement that comes close to a 
miracle. It seems to be to be wise not to take its existence for granted, and to 
be guaranteed forever, but to contribute to its consolidation and further 
development in pursuing with circumspection and caution, but also with courage 
and in total independence , the road which has been taken, and which has 
proved so far to be a notable success.28 
Ehlermann is not the only proponent for the success of the appellate 
mechanism. Lockhart and Voon are of the opinion that ‘appellate review in the 
WTO is working well,’ 29  and that ‘commentators have remarked on its 
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effectiveness and efficiency, and have complimented its contribution to the 
development of international trade law.’30 
Similarly, Yanovich and Voon believe that the WTO dispute settlement 
system and the appellate body are generally regarded as having worked well 
over the last ten years.’31 
 
- Disadvantages 
Zimmermann does however recognise that the WTO dispute settlement 
system is not perfect, and goes on to explain a number of its downfalls. He 
believes that the rate of compliance with DSB decisions is not 100%. The 
stringent compliance procedures imposed by the DSB do not guarantee its 
success rate. States will sometimes default from the decision, and tough 
enforcement procedures will never be enough to stop this. The biggest 
influence on states to comply under GATT was political pressure, and this will 
undoubtedly continue to be so under the WTO. This was highlighted by a 
number of high profile early cases such as the EC - Bananas32  and EC - 
Hormones33 cases respectively.34 Other problems cited include lack of respect 
for the deadlines imposed by the process itself, the lack of a remand procedure 
(which would enable the appellate body to return certain issues back to the 
panels for clarification), and a number of problems associated with developing 
countries wishing to play a more active role within the system.35 
Yanovich and Voon have also stated that there is one problem with the 
functioning of the appellate body at present; the practice of limiting appeals to 
issues of law. The authors argue that allowing the appellate body to consider 
                                                                                                                                
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931318> accessed 16 August 
2009. 
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both issues of law and fact, and introducing the possibility of remand might 
further enhance the WTO appeal process.36  
 
- Could the WTO serve as a model for international investment 
arbitration? 
The WTO dispute settlement system is widely celebrated as one of the 
great successes of the multilateral trading system. The success of the WTO 
dispute settlement system has some experts wondering whether the system 
could serve as a model for international investment arbitration. Some 
academics have argued that the WTO framework of international trade law is 
similar enough to the framework of international investment law for a dispute 
settlement system such as that of the WTO to be successfully employed in 
international investment arbitration. For example, Subedi believes that the 
creation of a quasi-judicial body which would be responsible for the settlement 
of international investment disputes, and which would take on a role broadly 
similar in nature to the WTO’s role in the settlement of international trade 
disputes, could be a positive step towards remedying some of the problems 
associated with international investment law and arbitration at present. 37 
Dimsey is also an advocate for the idea that the WTO dispute settlement 
system could serve as a model for international investment arbitration. She 
asserts that the WTO dispute settlement system could provide an important 
source of inspiration for international investment arbitration.38 
 Although the idea that the WTO system could serve as a model for 
international investment arbitration does have merit and is supported by a 
number of academics, other experts have expressed concern in this regard. For 
example, Qureshi believes that the WTO’s dispute settlement system should 
not be viewed as a ‘guiding star’39 because doing so would mean ‘presupposing 
that the investment field and trade field are the same’40 . For Qureshi, this 
presupposition would be incorrect; he views the investment sphere and trade 
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sphere as too different, and that different considerations should be applied to 
the investment field.41  
 The central problem with the idea that the WTO dispute settlement 
system could serve as a model for international investment arbitration is that the 
framework of WTO law is highly centralised through the network of WTO 
multilateral agreements. International investment law on the other hand is highly 
decentralised, operating through thousands of individual BITs. For this reason, 
the WTO dispute settlement system might not be able to serve as a model for 
international investment arbitration; perhaps the multilateralism is key to the 
success of WTO dispute settlement system. In order for the WTO model to work 
in the field of international investment law, its framework may need to become 
more centralised like the WTO’s. Essentially, a multilateral investment 
agreement would be required in order to utilise a dispute settlement mechanism 
modelled on the WTO’s dispute settlement system. 
 
7.2.2 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
i) Overview 
 Disputes being heard under the auspices of ICSID often take place at 
ICSID’s headquarters in Washington D.C.42 However, the parties may agree to 
hold the proceedings at any other place, subject to certain conditions. ICSID 
has individual arrangements with a number of other arbitration institutions, 
including (but not limited to) the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, 
the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre in Sydney, the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre, the German Institution of Arbitration, and the 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre.43As of August 2012, there are 15844 
member state signatories to the Convention. ICSID is completely unique, being 
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the only forum which is completely dedicated to the settlement of international 
investment disputes. 
 ICSID itself does not arbitrate or conciliate in international investment 
disputes; rather it provides the institutional and procedural framework for ad hoc 
tribunals which are constituted on a case by case basis.45 ICSID has two sets of 
procedural rules which may be used in arbitration: the ICSID Convention, 
Regulations and Rules46 and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.47  
The original Regulations and Rules govern disputes arising between 
member states and investors who are nationals of other member states. The 
Rules basically provide for conciliation and arbitration in cases concerning 
international investment.48 
Conciliation proceedings begin when a member state submits a request 
for conciliation to the Secretary-General, who will duly send a copy of the 
request to the other state party involved, and who will then register the 
conciliatory proceedings. A conciliation commission will then be constituted. The 
commission may consist of a sole conciliator, or an uneven number (as agreed 
by the parties). If the parties fail to agree, a three conciliator commission will be 
constituted. One conciliator is to be chosen by each of the parties, and the third 
conciliator who will be the president of the commission is chosen by mutual 
agreement of the parties. If the commission is not constituted within 90 days of 
the Secretary-General being notified of the request for conciliation, the 
chairman shall appoint the commission. It is the commission’s responsibility to 
clarify the issues in dispute and bring about a mutually acceptable agreement 
between the parties. In order to achieve this aim, the commission may make 
recommendations as to the terms of the settlement of the dispute. If agreement 
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is reached, the commission will draw up a report stating the issues in dispute 
and the agreement reached. If a mutually acceptable agreement is not reached, 
the commission is to close proceedings and prepare a report stating the issues 
in dispute and recording the failure to reach agreement.49 It is interesting to note 
that ICSID sees very few conciliatory proceedings each year; only around 2% of 
proceedings take the form of conciliation.50  
Arbitration proceedings may be initiated under the original convention 
Regulations and Rules by the submission of a request for arbitration by any 
member state or a national of any member state made to the Secretary-General. 
The Secretary-General will send a copy of the request to the other party and 
register the dispute with the Centre. The arbitral tribunal is then appointed; it 
may consist of a sole arbitrator or an uneven number of arbitrators, as agreed 
by the parties. If the parties fail to agree, three arbitrators will be appointed. One 
arbitrator will be chosen by each party, and the third (who will be the president 
of the tribunal) will be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties. If the tribunal 
has not been appointed within 90 days of the Secretary-General receiving the 
request for arbitration, the Chairman of the Administrative Council will appoint 
the arbitrators. The majority of the arbitrators should be nationals of other states 
than those who are party to the dispute. The tribunal must first be the judge of 
its own competence and decide if it has jurisdiction in the case. If the tribunal 
does decide it has jurisdiction and that the case may have merit, it will go on to 
consider the merits. It is the tribunal’s responsibility to decide the dispute in 
accordance with the rules of law that have been agreed by the parties. Unless 
the parties agree otherwise, the tribunal may, at any stage of the proceedings, 
call upon the parties to produce documentary evidence and visit the scene 
connected with the dispute and conduct appropriate enquiries. Unless the 
parties agree otherwise, the tribunal is able to recommend some provisional or 
interim measures, pending its final decision. The tribunal decides any questions 
submitted to it by majority vote. The final award of the tribunal must be in writing, 
recording how each member of the tribunal voted. Individual opinions of the 
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arbitrators may be attached to the award. The award will not be published 
without the consent of both parties. The Secretary-General must distribute 
copies of the award to the parties. The award is deemed to have been rendered 
on the date which they were dispatched. There is no possibility of appeal of the 
final award; however there may be some scope for review under the ICSID 
annulment procedure provided for by Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.51  
Although there is no possibility for the appeal of decisions under the 
ICSID Convention, there is some scope for the review of decisions under Article 
5252 which provides an annulment procedure. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the grounds for annulment under Article 52 are based upon abuse of 
process or some problem with the legitimacy of the procedure. The grounds for 
annulment do not cover doubts as to the substantive correctness of the decision. 
 The application for annulment must be submitted within 120 days of the 
award being rendered, or within 120 days of the corruption being discovered (if 
that is the ground upon which annulment is being requested). Once the 
application for annulment has been received, the Chairman will appoint an ad 
hoc committee of three arbitrators who will examine the request. The committee 
members must not have sat on the original tribunal panel which rendered the 
award, nor must they be a national of the same state as the original arbitrators. 
Furthermore, they must not be nationals of the same state as either of the 
parties and they must not have acted in a conciliatory capacity throughout the 
original case. The ad hoc committee has the power to annul all, or any part of 
the original award. The committee may also temporarily stay the enforcement of 
the original award, pending its own decision. If the committee does choose to 
annul the award, the parties may request that the case be submitted to a newly 
constituted tribunal which will completely re-hear the case.53 
 In 1978, the Centre adopted its Additional Facility Rules54 which enable 
ICSID to administer proceedings between states and individuals which fall 
outside the scope of the original Convention and the Regulations and Rules. 
The Additional Facility Rules come into play when an investment dispute arises 
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where either the state party or foreign investor is not an ICSID member state. 
The Additional Facility Rules enable the Centre to administer conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings as well as fact finding proceedings. In order for 
Additional Facility proceedings to be initiated, the Secretary-General must 
approve the proceedings. The parties may apply for such approval by 
submitting to the Secretary-General the document in which the parties agree to 
settle their dispute using the ICSID Additional Facility, together with any other 
documents requested by the Secretary-General. If The Secretary-General 
grants approval, the parties are notified and the approval is registered with the 
Centre. Conciliation, arbitration and fact-finding proceedings are administered in 
accordance with the requisite rules set out in Schedule A, B or C.55 
 Fact-finding proceedings are initiated by the request of one or both of the 
parties to the Secretariat. If the request is approved by the Secretary-General, 
the proceedings are registered on the fact-finding register. Any objections to the 
request by the other party must also be sent to the Secretary-General. An 
attempt to resolve the objections by agreement is made. If this is unsuccessful, 
a special commissioner is appointed to rule on the objections. If the special 
commissioner rules that the proceedings should continue, a commission is 
established by agreement of the parties. It is customary for a one person 
committee or a committee of an uneven number to be appointed. In the 
absence of agreement, a three person commission is established by the 
chairman. The committee shall meet as and when required to conduct 
investigations. Meetings are closed to the public in order to ensure 
confidentiality. The committee’s decision is usually undertaken by majority vote. 
After all investigations have been conducted, the committee draws up its final 
report and closes the proceedings. The report is not binding on the parties.56 
 Conciliation proceedings under the Additional Facility rules are governed 
by Schedule B of the Additional Facility Rules. Conciliation proceedings under 
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the Additional Facility Rules are identical to the conciliation proceedings under 
the original Convention and Regulations and Rules.57  
 Arbitration proceedings are provided for by Schedule C of the Additional 
Facility Rules. Arbitration proceedings under the Additional Facility Rules are 
broadly similar to those under the original Convention. Parties wishing to initiate 
such proceedings must send a written request to the Secretary-General who will 
register it. A tribunal is then constituted by the agreement of the parties. If the 
parties fail to reach agreement on the method of constituting the tribunal, three 
arbitrators should be appointed. One arbitrator should be chosen by each party, 
and the third should be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties. Arbitration 
proceedings must be held in states recognised by the UN; the venue will be 
determined by the tribunal in consultation with the parties. The tribunal will meet 
as and when necessary, and all parties will be notified of meetings within good 
time. The tribunal may hold written and oral stages in the proceedings. Once all 
evidence has been seen and heard, the tribunal shall deliberate in private and 
any awards must be made by majority vote. Once the decision has been 
communicated to the parties, the proceedings shall be declared closed. The 
final award is considered binding on all parties.58 
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 There are 15859 signatories to the ICSID Convention, with some 24960 
cases having been settled under the auspices of the Centre, and 15061 cases 
are currently pending. If ICSID’s membership and caseload are to be 
considered the main measure of the Centre’s success, it would undoubtedly be 
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hailed as a huge triumph. Whilst the Centre’s membership and caseload is 
indeed a measure of its success, other factors such as the opinions of experts 
should also be considered.  
 ICSID has been praised by experts in the past for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it represents a completely self-contained mechanism for the settlement 
of disputes.62  Also, it offers a clear and reasonable approach to the costs 
involved in arbitration.63 Another advantage of ICSID is that it provides privacy 
and transparency simultaneously; party submissions and oral hearings are 
private and confidential, but ICSID maintains a public register of proceedings 
and publishes final awards (with the parties’ consent).64 Furthermore, ICSID’s 
settlement and enforcement rates are relatively high compared with other 
dispute settlement institutions. 65  ICSID may also be praised for its review 
process; access to annulment provides at least some form of reviewing 
decisions. The addition of the Additional Facility Rules may also be praised as it 
enables ICSID to settle disputes that would otherwise have fallen beyond the 
scope of its jurisdiction. 
 
- Disadvantages 
 Despite offering such advantages, ICSID has been criticised for a lack of 
legitimacy, lack of consistency of jurisprudence and for having a complicated 
cost structure and long average length of proceedings.66 ICSID has also been 
criticised by some academics who feel that the annulment process falls short of 
the appeal procedure they would prefer to see.67 
 
7.2.3 World Intellectual Property Organisation Dispute Settlement 
Body 
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i) Overview 
 The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is one of sixteen 
specialised UN agencies. WIPO was established by the 1967 Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation.68 It was designed ‘to 
encourage creative activity [and] to promote the protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world.’69 WIPO’s mandate is to develop and maintain a 
balanced and accessible system of intellectual property which ‘rewards 
creativity, stimulates innovation and contributes to economic development whilst 
safeguarding the public interest’.70 In order to carry out its mandate effectively, 
in 1994 WIPO established its Arbitration and Mediation Centre. The centre is 
based in Geneva, Switzerland, and offers alternative dispute resolution options 
(including arbitration and mediation) in case of international commercial 
disputes between private parties involving intellectual property issues. Since its 
establishment in 1994, the centre has administered over 280 cases, with the 
last five years witnessing a particular increase in the centre’s caseload.71 
 This analysis of the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism in this chapter 
will focus exclusively on the arbitration procedures offered by the Arbitration and 
Mediation Centre. The centre offers two forms of arbitration; expedited and 
normal arbitration. Normal arbitration is initiated by filing a request for arbitration 
within 30 days. Following an answer to that request, arbitrators are selected 
within another 30 day period. 30 days is then permitted for the submission of a 
statement of claim, followed by 30 days for a statement of defence to be 
submitted by the defendant. Further written and witness statements are then 
submitted, and a hearing will take place. The proceedings are closed within 
three months, and the award becomes final. It is the aim that normal arbitration 
proceedings be completely concluded within 12 months. Expedited arbitration 
follows a similar, albeit slimmed down procedure with tighter deadlines which 
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should normally be completely concluded within 6 months. Under both 
processes, the final award is binding and there is no possibility of appeal.72  
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 One unique aspect of WIPO dispute resolution is that it offers the parties 
the choice between mediation and arbitration. The parties may opt for mediation 
initially, in order to resolve the dispute more quickly and economically. If 
mediation is unsuccessful, the parties may move towards arbitration procedure.  
The fact that WIPO offers two versions of its arbitration procedure 
(normal and expedited) could be considered an important advantage. An 
expedited process may be extremely desirable to the parties involved in a 
commercial dispute, as they often wish to settle any arising disputes as quickly 
as possible and in the cheapest manner possible. Offering an expedited 
process allows parties to settle their dispute in an average of 6 months, half of 
the average 12 months it takes to settle a dispute using the normal process. 
Moreover, it offers the parties increased control over the dispute, enabling them 
to make the choice of which procedure to use, and tailoring it to their individual 
dispute.   
Once a decision has been made by the arbitrators it is binding on the 
parties. As such, there is no possibility for the review of that decision. This may 
be seen as an advantage because the parties can move on from the dispute 
quickly and limit the costs incurred.  
It is standard practice in WIPO arbitration to ensure the confidentiality of 
the parties and the dispute itself. This may be advantageous for the parties, 
especially in intellectual property disputes, as it could prevent the revealing of 
trade secrets and loss of commercial advantage. 
 
- Disadvantages 
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The WIPO dispute settlement system may be praised for its relative 
simplicity; it offers a fast and inexpensive means for settling disputes. However, 
its main advantage may also be its downfall: the WIPO dispute settlement 
procedure is final and binding, leaving no scope for the review of awards. An 
annulment or appeals facility might be a welcome addition to the WIPO dispute 
settlement system, as it would provide a means of reviewing decisions. At 
present, if there was some abuse of process, or if the parties feel that the wrong 
decision was made, they have no form of recourse.  
 
7.2.4 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
i) Overview 
 The international Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was established by the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea73. The tribunal’s role is 
to adjudicate disputes arising under the Convention, including all matters of 
interpretation and application of the Convention itself. Part XV of the Convention 
sets out the manner in which disputes are to be dealt with by the Tribunal. In the 
first instance, the Convention signatories are required to try and resolve any 
disputes that may arise regarding the law of the sea by peaceful means. If the 
states cannot reach a peaceful agreement, they are required to submit 
themselves to the compulsory dispute settlement process described in the 
Convention. The Convention actually provides four alternative means of settling 
disputes; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, an arbitral 
tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention, and a 
special tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII to the Convention. A 
member state is free to choose which of the four dispute settlement processes 
they wish to take part in by notifying the Secretary-General of the UN in 
writing.74  
This section will focus on the process by which the dispute is settled by 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The first case was submitted in 
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1997, and to date, nineteen cases have been submitted to the tribunal in total.75 
The tribunal is composed of twenty one independent elected experts; members 
are selected for their reputation for fairness and integrity and outstanding 
expertise in the field of the Law of the Sea.76 The judges are elected by state 
parties who are signatories to the Convention for a renewable term of nine 
years. The elected members must fairly represent the legal systems of the 
world, ensuring that the nationalities of judges represent an equitable 
distribution. A party to a dispute may request for a particular person to sit as an 
ad hoc judge if the tribunal does not include a judge of the same nationality as 
that party. 77  The tribunal is divided into five different chambers, each with 
particular expertise and competency in a particular area of the wide field of the 
Law of the Sea. There is a Seabed Chamber, Chamber of Summary Procedure, 
Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes 
and the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes. Additionally, parties may 
request the composition of an ad hoc chamber for a particular dispute.78 
  Parties to the establishing UN Convention may submit a dispute 
unilaterally, or by special agreement between the two disputing parties. The 
tribunal may be called upon to give an advisory opinion, or make a binding 
decision through the procedure of arbitration. Arbitral proceedings before the 
tribunal have two distinct phases; written and oral. Proceedings are completed 
without unnecessary delay and cost. The parties themselves may, by mutual 
agreement decide to make modifications or additions to the process itself. The 
disputing parties must each bear their own arbitration costs, unless the tribunal 
specifically decides otherwise. The tribunal is based in Hamburg, Germany, and 
has physical facilities there for the oral procedure to take place.79  
 The dispute is submitted to the tribunal by one or more of the parties or 
through compulsory jurisdiction. This is followed by the written stage of the 
process, where the tribunal collects written evidence from both parties as well 
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as third parties. This stage should normally be completed within 6 months, 
however extra time may be granted by the tribunal upon receipt of the requisite 
request for an extension. Before the oral proceedings begin, the tribunal will 
meet in order to exchange views on the evidence presented at the written stage 
of the process. Following these initial deliberations, an oral hearing is scheduled 
to take place usually within a 6 month period of the close of written proceedings. 
Hearings are normally open to the public, unless the tribunal takes the decision 
that the oral stage should take place in private. Oral proceedings usually consist 
of oral statements from both the disputing parties and oral statements given by 
witnesses and experts. After this, the judges will deliberate and produce a 
judgment which is read at a public sitting of the tribunal. The decision is binding 
on the parties from the date of the public reading, and there is no formal right of 
appeal of the decision. However, a party may ask for a judgment to be revised if 
there is some discovery of a fact which may have proven a decisive factor in the 
decision making process, provided that the fact was undiscovered at the time of 
the judgment and that this lack of discovery was not due to negligence. A 
request for review must be submitted within 6 months of the discovery of the 
new fact, and before the tenth anniversary of the date of the original judgment.80 
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 A strong advantage of the dispute settlement process of the Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea is that the parties to the dispute are authorised to make any 
changes that they see fit to the dispute settlement procedure by mutual 
agreement. This enables the parties to retain control, and for the dispute 
settlement procedure to be flexible. This is advantageous to the parties because 
it allows them to tailor the dispute settlement procedure to the specifics of their 
dispute.  
 Another positive aspect of this dispute settlement process of the Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea is that the tribunal has various different chambers which 
hear different types of disputes within the broad field of the Law of the Sea. This 
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presumably allows the judges in each chamber to become highly specialised in 
the aspect of the subject which they must deliver judgments. 
 
- Disadvantages 
 One negative aspect of the procedure of the tribunal is the limited scope 
available for the review of decisions. Awards are binding unless some fact is 
discovered which was not discoverable at the time and which may have been a 
decisive factor in the decision making process. There is no right of appeal 
available to the parties once the tribunal has rendered its decision. Thus, if 
there has been some abuse of process or mistake made, there is no opportunity 
available to right the wrong. 
  
7.2.5 International Court of Justice 
i) Overview 
 The ICJ was established after the Second World War in June 1945, and 
began its work in April of the following year as the principal judicial organ of the 
UN.81 The Court is the only one of the six main UN Organs which is not based 
in New York; rather it is seated in the Peace Palace, The Hague, in The 
Netherlands. The Court performs a dual function; not only does it settle 
international legal disputes in accordance with international law, it can also be 
called upon to provide advisory opinions on legal issues which may be referred 
by other UN organs or authorised agencies.82 The Court consists of fifteen 
judges, each of which is elected for a period of nine years by the UN General 
Assembly and Security Council.83  
 As briefly mentioned above, the ICJ has a dual functionality; settling 
contentious cases and giving advisory opinions when called to do so. Obviously 
different procedures are followed depending on what type of case the Court is 
considering. This section will first consider the procedure in contentious cases, 
then go on to explore the procedure in advisory opinion cases.  
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- Contentious cases 
Only states may be parties to a contentious case before the ICJ. States do 
not have any permanent representation at the ICJ, and as such communication 
with the Court normally takes place through the state’s foreign minister. Where 
a state is to be a party in a contentious case, they are usually represented by a 
(government appointed) agent who plays the same role as a solicitor in 
domestic legal cases. The agent is responsible for communications between the 
Court and the state party in matters concerning the case. In public open 
hearings, the agent is also responsible for submitting the opening argument of 
the state which he/she represents. Agents may be assisted by co-agents, 
deputies or assistants in preparing oral arguments and pleadings.84 
Contentious cases may be instituted bilaterally (if both parties agree that 
there is a dispute) through the notification of a special agreement, or unilaterally 
(where one party alleges that the other party has breached its international 
obligations) by means of an application. The date that the registrar receives the 
special agreement or the application marks the official start of the proceedings. 
Contentious proceedings consist of two distinct phases; the written stage and 
the oral stage. During the written stage, the ‘parties file and exchange pleadings 
containing a detailed statement of the points of fact and law on which each 
party relies.’85 After the written phase is completed, the oral stage takes place. 
During the oral stage public hearings take place, during which the parties’ 
agents and counsel address the court. The two official languages of the Court 
are English and French, so all communication (written and oral) in one language 
is then translated into the other. The written communications are kept private 
until the commencement of the public hearings, and are only then released to 
the public (provided that the parties have no objections). After completion of the 
oral stage, the judges sit in private to deliberate and then the judgment is 
delivered in a public sitting. The judgment is final, meaning that it is not open to 
appeal, and it is binding on the parties. The parties, being signatories to the UN 
Charter, must adhere to any judgment of the Court to which they are party. If 
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one party believes that the other has failed to implement the decision of the 
Court, the state may refer the matter to the Security Council. The Council has 
the power to recommend or decide on measures which must be taken in order 
to ensure compliance with the decision of the Court.86 
The preceding paragraph describes the normal procedure of the Court in the 
majority of disputes. However, in some cases the Court may deviate from the 
process. The most common deviation arises when one party raises preliminary 
objections preventing the Court from delivering its judgment on the merits of the 
case. This may occur when the state alleges that the Court does not have the 
necessary jurisdiction. The Court itself will make a decision on this before going 
on to consider the actual merits of the case. Another deviation from the ordinary 
procedure described above may occur when one state requests provisional 
measures. If the applicant state believes its rights are in immediate danger of 
being violated, the state may request that the Court implements provisional 
measures as a sort of interim before the final judgment is delivered. A third 
deviation from the usual procedure might occur if the Court finds that two or 
more disputes against the same defendant state involve very similar or the 
same facts, pleadings and arguments. In this case, the Court may order the 
joining of the separate proceedings into one.87  
 
- Advisory opinions 
Five UN organs and sixteen specialised agencies of the UN may call upon 
the ICJ to give advice.88 The UN General Assembly and the Security Council 
may call upon the ICJ for advisory opinions on any legal question whatsoever. 
The other authorised organs and agencies are only permitted to request an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ on legal questions concerning the scope of their 
own activities. When the ICJ receives a request for an advisory opinion, it may 
require written and oral proceedings (similar to those which take place in a 
contentious case) to take place in order that it can deliver its opinion in full 
possession of all relevant facts. In theory, the Court is not obliged to hold any 
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formal proceedings, however it usually does so. After the initial request for 
advice is received, the ICJ will create a list of states and organisations which 
can provide information on the matter to the Court. The states who become 
involved in advisory proceedings are not bound by the decision of the Court, 
unlike in contentious cases. However, it must be noted that it is rare for the ICJ 
to allow international organisations (other than the one having filed the request 
for the advice) to participate in the advisory proceedings. The written and oral 
proceedings generally take the same format as they do in a contentious case; 
however, they are generally much shorter. After the written and oral stages 
(should they take place) the Court will deliver its advisory opinion during a 
public sitting. The opinion has no binding effect, and as such the party 
requesting the opinion is free to give effect to it or to ignore it. In practice, the 
requesting party usually adheres to the opinion, because of the prestige of the 
Court with the view being that the decision has been ‘sanctioned in international 
law.’89  
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 The ICJ’s high caseload could be considered testament to the Court’s 
success.90 One advantage of the ICJ as a dispute settlement mechanism is that 
it provides advisory opinions, as well as judgments in contentious cases. This 
means that a state can ask for advice on the legality of a matter before it is 
brought before the court. This may save a significant amount of time and money 
because court proceedings will not become necessary. 
 
- Disadvantages 
 The procedure of dispute settlement provided by the ICJ has been 
criticised. One criticism that the ICJ has suffered is that it takes too long to settle 
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a case. The delay involved in ICJ cases may be due to its heavy caseload; the 
court has settled 152 cases since its post-war establishment in 1947.91 
 
7.2.6 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
i) Overview 
 As briefly mentioned in an earlier chapter, the PCA is based in The 
Peace Palace, The Hague, in The Netherlands. It was established in 1899 by 
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes92, in order to 
facilitate peaceful dispute settlement between states. The Convention 
establishing the PCA has over one hundred member state signatories and has 
evolved into a modern arbitral institution.93 The PCA settles different types of 
disputes involving states, state entities, intergovernmental organisations and 
private parties on matters not limited to, but including territorial issues, human 
rights, and commercial and investment disputes.94 The PCA administers fact 
finding, conciliation and arbitration. In order to establish whether the PCA could 
serve as a model for international investment arbitration, the present section will 
focus exclusively on the role of the PCA in its administration of arbitration. The 
PCA founding convention contains information regarding basic rules of 
procedure, however parties are free to choose (by mutual agreement) their own 
rules, or indeed adhere to the PCA’s model rules which are based on the 
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration.95 Due to the fact that the PCA offers disputing 
parties a high degree of flexibility and a choice of several detailed procedural 
rules (and indeed the opportunity to choose their own), it is very difficult to 
describe the typical process for the settlement of a dispute under the auspices 
of the PCA. Each set of procedural rules may have similar, but slightly different 
procedures and deadlines for each stage of the process. As such, it is difficult to 
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describe the ‘usual’ procedure of the Court, as it will depend on which 
procedural rules are employed in the case. The PCA appears to be taking on an 
increasing role in investment arbitration; of the 69 pending PCA cases in 2011, 
40 were investor-state arbitrations.96  
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 The dispute settlement mechanism provided by the PCA enables 
disputes to be settled using a number of different procedural rules, the choice of 
which can be made by the parties. This enables the parties themselves to retain 
a high degree of control over the dispute and provides flexibility which may be 
attractive to the parties.  
 
- Disadvantages 
In the case of the PCA, its greatest advantage may also be its biggest 
downfall: the parties to PCA arbitration have a huge amount of control over their 
dispute, which may not always be a positive thing. For example, enabling the 
parties to select arbitrators may lead to the selection of arbitrators who parties 
may feel will be more sympathetic to their argument thus making them more 
likely to win, rather than objectively based on the experience and knowledge of 
the person. Additionally, parties may not have enough detailed knowledge on 
the matter at hand to be able to make the best decisions regarding the 
resolution of the dispute because they are not experts. Furthermore, the parties 
may choose to keep their arbitration completely confidential, which ultimately 
has a negative impact upon the creation of a consistent body of jurisprudence. 
 
7.3 Regional dispute settlement mechanisms 
 A number of regional dispute settlement mechanisms have been put into 
place. This section will examine whether any of these regional mechanisms 
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could serve as a model for international investment arbitration. The dispute 
settlement mechanisms of the ASEAN, Mercosur, the NAFTA and the EU will 
be examined in this section. 
 
7.3.1 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
i) Overview 
ASEAN was established on 8th August 1967 by the ASEAN 
Declaration.97 The Declaration states that the primary aims and objectives of the 
Association were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development of its members. Other objectives were to promote peace and 
stability, and promote collaboration and assistance. The Association was 
strengthened by the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter in 2008, which 
established a new legal framework for the Association and created a number of 
new ASEAN organs. The Charter is a legally binding agreement which 
established a more rules-based system, similar to that of the WTO. In order to 
ensure compliance to the agreed rules and obligations, the ASEAN Charter 
established a dispute settlement mechanism.98  
The dispute settlement mechanism provides for the resolution of disputes 
in a number of different ways. The advisory stage enables disputes to be 
resolved ‘on a legally non-binding basis within a relatively short period through 
the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues’. 99  The 
Consultation is an internet based instrument which has been adapted for use in 
ASEAN dispute settlement from the European Union SOLVIT mechanism. 
Alternatively, ASEAN member states may request that the Agreements and 
Compliance Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat make non-binding legal 
interpretations and offer advice on potential disputes.100  
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The consultative stage enables the ASEAN Compliance Body to make 
use of peer adjudication, and imposes a 90 day deadline for the resolution of 
disputes in this manner between member states. Although this adjudication is 
not legally binding, ASEAN Compliance Body findings can be submitted to the 
more formal dispute settlement body. Interestingly, the Compliance Body is 
based on the WTO’s Textiles Monitoring Body. Also, the consultative stage 
allows member states to resolve their differences either through conciliation or 
arbitration at any time, as long as there is mutual agreement to do so by the 
parties to the dispute. Article 23 of the ASEAN Charter advises that the 
Secretary-General may act in an ex-officio capacity to provide ‘good offices, 
conciliation or mediation.’101 
The adjudicatory stage provides a formal process, with a strict timetable 
for the judicial settlement of disputes. The first stage of the process is pre-
adjudicatory consultation and mediation, which can last for up to 60 days. If this 
is unsuccessful, within a 45 day period, a dispute settlement panel is convened 
by the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM), and panellists are appointed. 
Within 60-70 days, the panel produces a report which consists of legally binding 
findings and recommendations which is submitted to SEOM. Within 30 days, 
the SEOM can decide to either adopt the report, or initiate appeal proceedings. 
If appeal is initiated, within 60- 90 days, the Appellate Body reviews the case 
and submits a report on its findings to the SEOM. The SEOM then has 30 days 
to decide whether to adopt the report of the Appellate Body. The member states 
who are party to the dispute have 30 days (or longer in some cases, if it has 
been agreed that the timeframe for compliance should be lengthened) from the 
adoption of either the first panel’s report or the Appellate Body’s report to 
comply with the findings and recommendations.102 
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 Several aspects of the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism could be 
considered advantageous. Firstly, the fact that the dispute settlement process 
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involves three distinct stages (advisory, consultative and adjudicatory) is 
positive as it enables disputes to be solved wherever possible through 
negotiation and conciliation. This means that the parties can try to form an 
agreement before the dispute reaches the arbitration stage. This has a number 
of advantages, not least that it will almost definitely be more cost effective and 
less time consuming than arbitration.  
 If the parties are unable to agree on how to settle the dispute, it may be 
submitted to arbitration. ASEAN arbitration imposes strict deadlines at each 
stage of the process, allowing the dispute at hand to be settled in the quickest 
possible manner.  
 Another positive aspect of the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism is 
that it incorporates an appeals facility. Thus, any errors that may have been 
made at first instance may be rectified. 
 
- Disadvantages 
 The ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism may be criticised for its lack 
of effective enforcement procedures. After a decision has been delivered, there 
is no incentive to comply with the decision because the enforcement measures 
are so poor. It has been suggested that the ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism would benefit from introducing suspension of privileges or sanctions 
on states that are refusing to comply with a ruling.103  
 
7.3.2 Mercosur 
i) Overview 
 On 26th March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed 
the Treaty of Asuncion which created the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur)104. Mercosur’s primary aim is to accelerate economic growth and 
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social equity through the creation of a single, common market.105 Pursuant to 
this objective, the original agreement contained provisions establishing a 
dispute settlement mechanism. Under Annex III of the Treaty of Asuncion, and 
later the Brazilian Protocol, ten disputes were resolved. The innovative Olivos 
Protocol106 was signed on 18th February 2002, and entered into force on 1st 
January 2004. The Olivos Protocol currently governs the dispute settlement 
procedure under Mercosur.107 
 When a dispute between member states arises, it may be submitted to 
the dispute settlement procedure contained within the Olivos Protocol. However, 
the agreement does allow a member state that is party to another relevant 
dispute settlement agreement to submit the case to the other dispute settlement 
procedure. However, if proceedings are initiated under the dispute settlement 
procedure established in the Olivos Protocol, they cannot be withdrawn and 
submitted elsewhere.108 
 The Mercosur dispute settlement process established by the Olivos 
Protocol begins with compulsory negotiation between the two disputing parties. 
Article 4 of the Protocol states that the parties to the dispute must try and 
resolve their differences through direct negotiations. The member states are 
obliged to inform the Mercosur Secretariat when they enter into such 
negotiations, and of the eventual outcome of the process. If the negotiations are 
unsuccessful, the parties may utilise an optional conciliation stage under Article 
6 of the Olivos Protocol. Under Article 6, the Common Market Group organ of 
Mercosur will analyse the arguments of the parties and make non-binding 
recommendations on the matter. If the parties are unhappy with the outcome of 
the conciliation, or wish to bypass the conciliation stage, they can submit the 
dispute directly to arbitration. An ad hoc committee is constituted to hear the 
dispute at first instance. The committee comprises three arbitrators, two of 
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which are selected individually by each party, and the third, selected by the 
parties by mutual agreement. The arbitrators are selected from an accepted list 
of experts. The ad hoc committee will hear the dispute and make a decision on 
the matter. Either of the parties may request provisional or interim measures (if 
the matter is sufficiently serious or may cause irreparable damage) by the 
committee. The parties may request that the eventual decision rendered by the 
committee be clarified. If one or both of the parties are still unhappy with the 
decision, they can initiate an appeal to the Permanent Review Court. If no 
appeal is lodged, the decision will be final and binding on both parties.109  
 The Permanent Review Court (PRC) was established by the Olivos 
Protocol, and is situated in Asuncion, Paraguay. The PRC carries out three 
important functions; it hears cases that have been appealed from the ad hoc 
tribunals and it may also be called upon to hear urgent and exceptional cases at 
first instance by mutual agreement of the parties. Furthermore, it may be called 
upon to act as a consultative organ.110  
 The court may act in its appellate function under Article 17 of the Olivos 
Protocol. Article 17 provides that either (or indeed both) of the parties to the 
dispute may request the appellate review of the decision of the ad hoc tribunal. 
However, the review of ad hoc decisions is limited to questions of law. Once the 
PRC has made a decision on the matters referred, its decision replaces that of 
the ad hoc tribunal and it is binding and final.111  
 Very occasionally, the PRC may be called upon to act in the first instance. 
Through the common agreement of the parties to the dispute, and if the nature 
of the dispute is such that it is highly exceptional or urgent, the parties can 
bypass the ad hoc requirement, and present the case directly to the PRC. In 
this case, the decision of the PRC will be final and binding, with no possibility of 
appeal. The final decision on the dispute (be it at first instance if no appeal is 
lodged, or the decision of the PRC in appellate cases) must then be 
implemented by the member states involved.112  
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 The third function of the PRC involves it acting in a consultative capacity. 
The Court may be called upon by any of the member states, any of the 
Mercosur executive organs, and the highest courts of the member states to 
provide advisory opinions about the interpretation of any aspect of Mercosur law. 
These opinions are not binding authority; simply representing the Court’s 
interpretation of the relevant legal questions.113  
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 The Mercosur dispute settlement mechanism relies heavily upon 
diplomatic solutions; parties are encouraged to settle any arising disputes 
through conciliation and negotiation before committing to arbitration. This 
means that the highest number of disputes is solved before reaching arbitration, 
which is advantageous to the parties involved as it allows them to settle their 
differences in the quickest and most economical manner possible.  
 If arbitration is necessary, the decision reached by the arbitrators may be 
appealed which enables parties who feel that the tribunal reached the wrong 
decision at first instance have some recourse. This means that the likelihood of 
reaching the correct and just decision is increased. 
 The Permanent Review Court may also act in a consultative capacity, 
providing advisory opinions on legal questions posed by the Mercosur member 
states. This is advantageous because it enables states to clarify the relevant 
law, perhaps before it is contravened and a potential dispute may be avoided 
altogether. 
 
- Disadvantages 
The parties to the dispute have the choice of where to submit their 
dispute, thus they are not bound by the Mercosur convention to utilise the 
Mercosur dispute settlement mechanism. In effect, this is perpetuating one of 
the great problems of arbitration: multiplicity of fora which can and often does 
lead to forum shopping. Forum shopping usually involves the parties submitting 
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their dispute to the forum which has the most lenient rules, or allows them to 
retain the highest degree of control over the dispute, or simply the forum which 
they believe will afford them the highest chances of winning. 
 
7.3.3 North American Free Trade Agreement 
i) Overview  
NAFTA114 is a trilateral agreement, signed by the governments of the 
United States, Canada and Mexico. The agreement came into force on 1st 
January 1994. The main objective of the agreement was to remove barriers 
(tariff and non-tariff) to trade between the USA, Canada and Mexico115. In order 
to ensure compliance with the agreement, NAFTA also established a dispute 
settlement mechanism.116  
 NAFTA actually includes three dispute settlement mechanisms under 
chapters 11, 19 and 20. Chapter 11 establishes a mechanism for the settlement 
of disputes arising between a party and an investor of another party to the 
agreement. The investor who alleges that the host government has breached its 
NAFTA obligations may, under chapter 11, have recourse to ICSID, ICSID 
Additional Facility and the UNCITRAL Rules. Alternatively, the investor may 
choose to take the dispute to the domestic courts of the host state.117  
 Under Article 1904 (chapter 19), an alternative to judicial review by 
domestic courts of final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty 
cases is established, through the use of bi-national panels. A request for panel 
review must be submitted to the NAFTA Secretariat by an industry asking for 
review of an investigating authority’s decision regarding imports from a NAFTA 
member. Each NAFTA member state has its own national investigating 
authority, whose decisions are reviewable in this way. The decision of the panel 
is considered binding, however, a government may initiate the review of the 
panel decision in extraordinary circumstances. The Extraordinary Challenge 
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Committee can review decisions in certain situations where there may have 
been an abuse of procedure. Either government may invoke an extraordinary 
review by a three person committee. Extraordinary Challenge Committee 
decisions are binding. Article 1905 provides a mechanism for the safeguarding 
of panel review procedures, stating that a three person special committee may 
be established to review one party’s allegations that the other party’s domestic 
law has interfered with the proper operation of the panel system.118 
 Chapter 20 contains dispute settlement provisions that are applicable to 
all disputes concerning the interpretation and application of NAFTA. The first 
stage of the process is negotiation; the governments of the two parties are 
encouraged to consult with each other to remedy the dispute amicably. If the 
dispute remains unresolved after the consultations, one party (or indeed both 
parties) may request a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (which is 
comprised of the Trade Ministers of the parties). If the Commission is unable to 
resolve the dispute, the parties may call for the establishment of a five person 
arbitral committee. Arbitrators are selected from a roster of pre-approved 
persons. Each member state may appoint two panellists, and the fifth is chosen 
by the common agreement of the parties. The arbitral panel is established using 
a reverse selection process by which each party is required to select its two 
arbitrators of choice, but they must be nationals of the other member state that 
is party to the dispute. The fifth arbitrator, the chair of the panel can be a citizen 
of any state. Chapter 20 also provides for scientific review boards to be 
established which may be called upon to give expert opinions in disputes, 
should they be required.119 
 Disputes have different (yet arguably similar) procedures depending on 
whether they are filed under chapter 19 or chapter 20 of NAFTA. Both chapter 
19 and 20 procedures impose strict deadlines: chapter 19 decisions must be 
rendered within 315 days of the filing of the report requesting a panel, whilst 
chapter 20 decisions are awarded within 5 months of the filing of the report. 
Proceedings under both chapter 19 and 20 have two distinct stages; written and 
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oral. The parties to the dispute normally submit written documents, such as 
pleadings and arguments, before an oral hearing takes place.120 
 The decision of the panel under chapter 19 is binding. In its decision, the 
panel may either uphold the findings of the investigating authority, or it may 
send it back for reconsideration. If the panel does the latter, the panel may later 
issue a second decision on the investigating authorities’ second findings. The 
arbitral panel’s decision under chapter 20 is essentially a presentation of the 
findings of fact, determining whether the contested measure is or would be 
inconsistent with the parties’ obligations under NAFTA. The decision will also 
present the panel’s recommendations as to how the dispute might be 
resolved.121 
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 One aspect of the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism is that it affords 
the parties the opportunity to settle the dispute under the ICSID framework, the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the domestic courts of the host state, or under the 
mechanism provided in NAFTA itself. This choice enables the parties to retain a 
high level of control over the dispute and allows flexibility so that the dispute 
settlement process can be tailored to the particular dispute at hand.  
NAFTA awards are also enforceable through domestic courts and under 
the New York Convention.122 This is hugely advantageous because winning a 
dispute is rendered meaningless if the other party chooses not to comply with 
the award and they cannot be forced to do so. NAFTA is often praised for 
offering a regional dispute settlement procedure that is complemented by 
international mechanisms.123 
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- Disadvantages 
 The choice of rules and fora available to the disputing parties may also 
be a downfall of the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. This choice 
encourages the ‘cherry picking’ of rules and fora; the disputing parties may 
choose to settle their dispute in the way in which they believe will afford them 
the highest chances of success. 
 
7.3.4 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
i) Overview 
After the Second World War ended in 1945, attention turned to creating a 
peaceful Europe. It was envisaged that peace might be achieved and 
maintained through the establishment of economic, social and political co-
operation. 124  Accordingly, in 1950, six founding member states (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) set up the European 
Coal and Steel Community125. Co-operation continued to flourish, and in 1957, 
the European Economic Community (EEC), which created the common market, 
was established by the Treaty of Rome 126 . In the 1970’s, the EEC was 
expanded when the UK, Ireland and Denmark acceded to the Treaty of Rome. 
European co-operation continued, and in 1993 the single market was completed 
with the establishment of the four fundamental freedoms (movement of goods, 
services, people and money). The Treaty of Maastricht127 and the Treaty of 
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Amsterdam128 formalised the European Union.129 More states later acceded to 
the European Union, which today has 27 members.130 
 Disputes which arise concerning the interpretation and application of EU 
law are referred to the self-contained EU dispute settlement institution, the 
European Court of Justice, since its establishment in 1952.131 As part of its 
mandate, the Court ‘reviews the legality of the acts of the institutions of the 
European Union, ensures that member states comply with obligations under the 
treaties, and interprets European Union law at the request of the national courts 
and tribunals.’132 Reflecting the diverse membership of the EU, the Court is a 
multilingual institution. Cases may be heard in any of the member states’ official 
languages. The Court is seated in Luxembourg, and actually consists of three 
courts; the Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal. 
This section will focus on the procedure of the Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ 
is composed of 27 judges (one from each EU member state) and 8 Advocate 
General. The judges and Advocate Generals of the Court are appointed by 
consultation with the member state’s governments for a renewable term of 
office of 6 years. They are chosen because their impartiality and competence is 
assured, and they are often the most highly qualified judges in their respective 
nations. The judges elect the president from amongst themselves for a 
renewable term of 3 years. The president directs the Court and presides over 
hearings taking place in the Grand Chamber. The Advocate Generals assist the 
Court by presenting an opinion on the case at hand. The Court may sit as a full 
court, a Grand Chamber of 13 judges, or in chambers of 3 or 5 judges, often 
depending on the complexity of the case at hand.133 
                                            
128 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts (Treaty of Amsterdam), 
signed 2 October 1997 (full text) available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html> accessed 26 August 2012. 
For more information on this treaty see ‘Treaty of Amsterdam Comprehensive Guide’ 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/
index_en.htm> accessed 26 August 2012. 
129 ‘EU History’ (n 124). 
130 ‘EU Countries’ <http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm> accessed 9 
November 2011. 
131 ‘Court of Justice of the European Union: general information’ 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/> accessed 9 November 2011  
132
 Ibid. 
133
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 The ECJ administers several different types of proceedings which fall 
under two distinct categories: preliminary reference proceedings and direct 
action proceedings. The domestic courts of the EU member states may call 
upon the ECJ to clarify the interpretation of a point of EU law in order that the 
state may ascertain whether some aspect of domestic legislation is in 
compliance with EU obligations. This procedure is known as preliminary 
reference. The decision rendered by the ECJ is not merely an opinion; rather, it 
is a binding interpretation of the law, to which the state must adhere. The 
decision also binds other member states where the same issue arises. 134 
Preliminary reference procedures are initiated by member states’ submission of 
a question to the Court, which generally takes the form of a domestic court 
judicial decision. Once the submission is received, it is registered and 
communicated to the parties involved in the national proceedings, as well as all 
the EU member states and EU institutions. Written observations from the 
parties, states and EU institutions are submitted.135 
 Direct action cases can take many forms: actions for the failure of a 
member state to fulfil EU obligations; actions for the annulment of a measure 
adopted by an organ of the EU; actions for the failure of the EU institutions to 
act; appeal on points of law of decisions of the general court; actions for the 
review of decisions of the general court on appeals against the decisions of the 
EU Civil Service Tribunal may exceptionally be brought to the ECJ.136 Direct 
actions commence with the submission of an application to the registry. The 
application is registered and the party being sued is notified. The defendant 
party has one month to lodge its defence. 137 
 In both preliminary reference proceedings and direct action proceedings 
once the above written documents have been submitted, the Judge-Rapporteur 
draws up a preliminary report, and there is a meeting of the judges and 
Advocate General that have been assigned to the case. Then, a date is fixed for 
a hearing, should it be required by the parties. This marks the beginning of the 
second stage of dispute resolution, the oral stage. At the hearing, the judges 
and Advocate General listen to the arguments of the parties and have the 
                                            
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Ibid. 
261 
 
opportunity to pose questions. Once the hearing has taken place, a report 
summarising the hearing is produced which is made available to the public. The 
Advocate General assigned to the case then gives his opinion should it be 
required by the judges. Following this, the judges deliberate. Decisions are 
made by majority vote. Following the vote, a judgment is rendered in an open 
court.138   
 In some cases, special or exceptional procedures are required. If in a 
preliminary reference procedure, the same legal question is posed that has 
already been considered in a previous case, a simplified procedure takes place. 
Usually, the Advocate General refers the parties to the previous judgment, and 
the case does not reach the Court. Furthermore, in extremely urgent cases, the 
ECJ procedure can be expedited through the reduction of deadlines for 
submissions so that particularly urgent disputes are settled without excessive 
delay. Finally, the procedure may be altered in order to accommodate an 
application for interim or provisional measures. Such measures are 
implemented in cases where there may be a threat of serious and irreparable 
damage to one of the parties.139 
 
ii) Evaluation 
- Advantages 
 An advantage of the ECJ process is that it offers a normal speed 
procedure as well as an expedited one which allows urgent cases to be settled 
without excessive delay. Furthermore, due to the framework of European law in 
place, enforcement of ECJ decisions is usually not problematic, which is a 
distinct advantage of the system; decisions and judgments are only valuable if 
they are implemented and effectively enforced. 
 
- Disadvantages 
If a decision merits the hearing of a case by the grand chamber of all 
thirteen judges and the case is to be decided on a majority basis, seven judges 
could vote one way and the remaining six the other way, which effectively 
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means that the decision rests on just one judge and could mean that six judges 
are actually against the decision. Though, this is the nature of majority decisions; 
trying to work on a consensual basis will be practically impossible. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
The central aim of this chapter is to assess whether any existing 
international or regional dispute settlement mechanisms could serve as a model 
for international investment arbitration. In order to attempt to answer this 
complex question, the chapter has given a brief overview of the dispute 
settlement procedures of a selection of international and regional institutions. 
Each of these institutions has its own distinct dispute settlement process that is 
unique in itself. Although aspects of the different procedures might share some 
similarities, there are obviously a number of marked differences. Each of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms that have been discussed has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, and it is clear that none of the mechanisms are 
completely perfect. In terms of whether any of them could serve as a model for 
international investment arbitration, the answer must surely be no. The 
framework of international investment law and international investment 
arbitration is completely unique, and it would therefore be extremely difficult, 
and probably wholly undesirable to try and fit it into the mould of existing 
mechanisms. International investment law is completely unique because it is 
based upon thousands of BITs between different nations. Each treaty may 
contain similar provisions, however subtle differences may be present, making it 
virtually impossible and undesirable to harmonise interpretations of key 
international investment law principles. Thus it is practically impossible to create 
a body of jurisprudence based on the jurisprudence, which is what would need 
to happen if one arbitral institution was to attempt to take over the hearing of all 
international investment related disputes. Thus, it may not be possible to create 
a permanent institutional which would have the sole responsibility for settling all 
international investment disputes until such a time as a multilateral investment 
treaty can be established.   
Despite this, examining the dispute settlement mechanisms of existing 
international and regional institutions is not a futile task. Even if the mechanisms 
discussed in this chapter cannot realistically serve as a complete model for 
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international investment arbitration, they can at least serve as inspiration. 
International investment arbitration could do a lot worse than to import certain 
characteristics of these bodies in the future. Examining these existing 
international and regional arbitral institutions has revealed that many of the 
institutions that have been discussed in this chapter have common features. For 
example, most of the institutions make use of a two-stage dispute settlement 
procedure which includes both a written and oral phase. Furthermore, all of the 
bodies provide for the settlement of disputes in a wide range of languages and 
make use of strict deadlines at each stage of the procedures. These common 
features are undoubtedly very general; however, they could be incorporated into 
international investment arbitration in the future. It is also interesting to note that 
many of the international and regional arbitral institutions discussed in this 
chapter make use of general procedural rules; international investment 
arbitration could also do this. For example a number of arbitral institutions make 
use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of Procedure rather than having their 
own specific rules. The UNCITRAL Rules could be used in international 
investment arbitration in the future. The advantage of using rules such as 
UNCITRAL is that they are already well known in international arbitration which 
means that states and parties will be more familiar with them, and perhaps 
more likely to want to settle their disputes in accordance with them. This would 
also save time and effort drafting a completely unique set of procedural rules. 
Also, this chapter highlights the fact that many arbitral institutions seem to 
incorporate different types of procedures, such as contentious/direct procedures 
as well as a procedure for preliminary reference/advisory opinions. International 
investment arbitration could do the same. It would seem that this is a 
particularly good thing because then parties can ask for advice before they act if 
they are concerned about the legality of proposed measures, therefore checking 
legality before it arises in a dispute; prevention is better than cure. This would 
also save valuable time and money. 
As we have seen in the preceding paragraph, many of the general 
features common to the dispute settlement institutions could be incorporated 
into international investment arbitration in the future. However, it is not only the 
general features which could be imported; some of the unique features of the 
institutions discussed in this chapter could also be adapted and imported into 
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international investment arbitration. For example, the International Tribunal for 
Law of the Sea has several special chambers, each of which deals with a 
particular type of dispute connected with the law of the sea. A similar idea could 
be imported into international investment arbitration; a number of chambers 
could be set up, each of which could deal with a particular type of international 
investment dispute. The major advantage of this is that the judges/arbitrators of 
each chamber can become real experts in the field in which they are to settle 
disputes.  
To conclude, this chapter has established that none of the international 
and regional dispute settlement mechanisms that are already in existence could 
serve as an outright model for international investment arbitration. The 
framework of international investment law and its particularities prevent this 
possibility. However, it is possible, and probably advantageous to try to 
incorporate different aspects of these institutions into international investment 
arbitration in the future. Thus, rather than providing a perfect model, these 
existing arbitral institutions could serve as inspiration for international 
investment arbitration. This would be particularly important if, as suggested in 
the preceding chapter, attempts are to be made to create a world investment 
court. The creation of such an institution would not be an easy task, therefore 
being able to take inspiration from other arbitral institutions throughout the 
process would be a great help to those charged with the task and undoubtedly 
save a lot of time and effort.
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Answering the central research questions 
8.1.1 Summary of findings 
 The introductory chapter of this thesis defined the central question which 
the research sought to address; examining whether the creation of an appeal 
mechanism in international investment arbitration is actually necessary. This 
primary question inherently raised other important issues such as the adequacy 
(or rather inadequacy) of the current system of international investment 
arbitration, and whether any alternative suggestions (other than the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism) for the improvement of the system 
might address some or all of the deficiencies within the current system.   
 The system of international investment arbitration suffers a number of 
important limitations, the most important of which being the alleged crisis of 
consistency. In recent years, a number of high profile investment disputes 
involving similar or the same facts have produced diametrically opposing 
outcomes.1 This inconsistency is possible due to the number of different fora 
available to parties in dispute; there are literally hundreds of tribunals and 
organisations to which parties may turn to settle their dispute. In order to 
remedy the problem of inconsistency, a number of suggestions have been put 
forward. One such suggestion is the establishment of an appeal mechanism. 
The suggestion has been and continues to be hotly debated; experts have 
failed to agree on basic issues such as the need for and desirability of such a 
mechanism. 
 
                                            
1 See CME Czech Republic B.V. v Czech Republic, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, Partial Award of 13 September 2001 and IIC 62 (2003), Final Award of 14 
March 2003, Lauder v Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2001 (Ad hoc- 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) 42 ILM 1290, SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 
(2004), Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 
(2000), S.D. Myers v Canada (2000) ILM 1408 (NAFTA Arb), Metalclad Corporation v 
United Mexican States (2000), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000) and Pope & 
Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada (2002) ILR 293 for examples of inconsistent 
decisions in international investment arbitration. See also discussion of these cases in 
this thesis in chapter three. 
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 8.1.2 Conclusions 
 The findings of the research which have been discussed in previous 
chapters support a number of specific conclusions:  
 
i) The basis of the call for an appeal mechanism has been established 
and the benefits of such a mechanism would greatly outweigh any 
potential costs 
It is widely accepted that the basis of the call for an appeals facility in 
international investment law is attributed to the alleged crisis of consistency in 
international investment arbitration.2  
Nonetheless, a number of international investment experts argue that the 
supposed crisis of consistency is yet to occur. Legum3 and Paulsson4 are both 
of the opinion that international investment arbitration has not suffered from 
inconsistency and incoherence as yet. In relation to its own jurisprudence, even 
ICSID asserts that significant inconsistencies have not featured.5 
However, a string of infamous investment awards have been rendered in 
recent years which provide evidence of the existence of significant 
inconsistencies in international investment arbitration. The Lauder6, SGS7 and 
NAFTA8 sets of cases9 involved similar or the same facts, yet different tribunals 
reached diametrically opposing decisions about how they should be settled. 
Thus, it would seem that inconsistencies are occurring in international 
investment arbitration, meaning that the need for an appeal mechanism has 
                                            
2 See for example M Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: 
International Commerce and Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 35 and 
M Sornarajah, ‘A coming crisis: expansionary trends in investment treaty arbitration’ in 
K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP 2008) 
73. 
3 B Legum, ‘Options to establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes’ in K 
Sauvant, ibid.  
4 J Paulsson, ‘Avoiding unintended consequences’ in K Sauvant, ibid.  
5 ‘Possible improvements of the framework for ICSID arbitration’ (2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm> accessed 20 July 2009. 
6 CME Czech Republic B.V. v Czech Republic (n 1) and Lauder v Czech Republic (n 
1). 
7 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Pakistan (n 1) and SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Philippines (n 1). 
8 S.D. Myers v Canada (n 1), Metalclad v Mexico (n 1) and Pope & Talbot v Canada (n 
1). 
9 See chapter three of this thesis for in-depth discussion of these cases. 
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been established, contrary to other opinion. Furthermore, due to the ever 
increasing number of international investment disputes, there is even greater 
potential for more inconsistencies to occur in the future. Statistics show that the 
number of international investment disputes has risen massively over the last 
thirty years. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, approximately 5 international 
investment disputes were recorded annually.10 Fast forward to the early 2000’s 
and that figure had risen to 40 – 45 cases being recorded annually.11 The 
number of cases being recorded has fallen slightly in the last couple of years12, 
though this is probably due to the global economic crisis. It is expected that the 
number of cases will continue to rise once the effects of the global financial 
crisis subside. 
The establishment of an appeal mechanism would undoubtedly promote 
greater consistency in international investment arbitration. An appeals facility 
could ensure that the trend towards creative interpretation13 of key principles of 
international investment law is reversed, ensuring the consistent interpretation 
of such principles and thus avoiding conflicting outcomes in cases with 
similar/the same facts.14 As well as addressing the issue of inconsistency, an 
appeal mechanism could have other important benefits. For example, it would 
act as a corrective mechanism in cases where the tribunal of first instance may 
have made a mistake.15  Additionally, an appeals facility could enhance the 
sustainability of the system of international investment arbitration16 as well as 
provide greater sensitivity to legitimate governmental concerns17. Finally, an 
                                            
10 K Sauvant, ‘The rise of international investment, investment agreements and 
investment disputes’ in K Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment 
Disputes (OUP 2008) 8-9. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 ‘UNCTAD: FDI Statistics’ 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88> accessed 9 
March 2012. 
13 For discussion of the trend toward creative interpretation see S Subedi, International 
Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing 2008) 135. 
14 K Yannaca- Small, ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement an 
overview’ (2006) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/36052284.pdf> accessed 16 July 
2009. 
15 Ibid. 
16 D Bishop, ‘The case for an appellate panel and its scope for review’ in F Ortino et al 
(eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Legal Studies 2006). 
17 A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in P 
Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008). 
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appellate facility could enhance the objectivity 18  and predictability 19  of the 
system of international investment arbitration and prevent distortion20 through 
treaty, nationality and forum shopping.21 
Even if we do accept that inconsistency is prevalent in international 
investment arbitration, critics of the proposed appeal mechanism have asserted 
that the establishment of an appeals facility is not the answer. Paulsson22 states 
that inconsistency is a mere fact of life, not a cause for great concern and 
should simply be ignored. Gill 23  is of a similar opinion, asserting that 
inconsistency is inevitable and it is important to remember that it is not unique to 
international investment arbitration, though inconsistency in international 
investment arbitration does seem to receive much more publicity. Paulsson and 
Gill do concede that inconsistency may be viewed by some as undesirable, but 
suggest that doing nothing is the best course of action. They both advocate a 
laissez-fair policy, claiming that over time, naturally one solution will be 
preferred over the other by tribunals and thus the inconsistency will remedy 
itself in due course. Paulsson goes on to stress specifically that the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism is not necessary to combat 
inconsistency.24 
Additionally, critics of an appeal mechanism have been quick to point out a 
number of purported disadvantages of creating such a facility. One of the major 
arguments of investment experts against the creation of an appeal mechanism 
is that it would cause a loss of flexibility in international investment arbitration. 
Flexibility is heralded as one of the main pillars of investment arbitration; 
particularly with ad hoc arbitration where the disputing parties have a great deal 
of flexibility to determine how their dispute should be settled. For example, they 
are free to choose the arbitrators who will settle the dispute, choose where the 
arbitration will take place as well as which law or rules should be applied in the 
case. This high degree of flexibility was ideal for the settlement of traditional 
                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid see also S Subedi (n 13) 179-182. 
22 J Paulsson (n 4). 
23 J Gill, ‘Inconsistent decisions: an issue to be addressed or a fact of life?’ in F Ortino 
et al (eds), Investment Treaty Law Current Issues: Volume 1 (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 2006) 23. 
24 J Paulsson (n 4). 
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commercial disputes. However, nowadays international investment arbitration 
can involve the tribunal’s pronouncement on complex issues of public 
international law such as human rights. Therefore, one could argue that a high 
degree of flexibility is no longer desirable in international investment arbitration 
due to the nature of disputes which are now arising.25 
Other purported disadvantages of the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism include fragmentation of international investment law26, particularly 
if some awards are subject to appeal whilst others are not. Additionally, the 
creation of an appeal mechanism would destroy the principle of finality27 which 
is based upon the idea of resolving disputes in the quickest, most economical 
manner possible. Moreover, it is feared that an appellate mechanism could 
cause a huge increase in caseload28 due to automatic appeals by the losing 
party in each case, and also the risk of re-politicising 29  the system of 
international investment arbitration. 
On balance, it would seem that the existence of the cases discussed earlier 
in this section provides indisputable evidence that inconsistencies have 
occurred in international investment arbitration in the past and the potential for 
further inconsistencies in the future is real, especially given the ever increasing 
number of investment disputes. Thus, it would seem that the basis of the call for 
an appeal mechanism has been established in international investment 
arbitration. The arguments of certain authors that inconsistency is not 
problematic and should simply be ignored do not carry much weight. 
Inconsistency can and has led to injustice in the past and leads to lack of 
respect for the rule of law.  
Inconsistency can be remedied by the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism, and such a facility could have several important benefits. It must be 
acknowledged that there are a number of potential drawbacks to an appeal 
mechanism as well. However, most if not all of the potential downfalls of an 
                                            
25 See chapter six of this thesis for more in depth discussion of issues of public policy 
and international investment arbitration. 
26 ‘Possible improvements to the framework of ICSID arbitration’ (n 5). 
27 J Clapham, ‘Finality of investor-state arbitral awards: has the tide turned and is there 
a need for reform?’ (2009) 26 Journal of International Arbitration 437. 
28  I Penusliski, ‘A dispute system design diagnosis of ICSID’ in M Waibel et al (eds), 
The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 2010) 
530. 
29 K Yannaca- Small (n 14). 
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appeal mechanism can be avoided if careful thought and consideration is 
applied to the mechanics of establishing the appellate body. 
 
ii) The best way to establish an appeal mechanism appears to be 
through the creation of a world investment court 
Having established that there is a need for the introduction of an appeal 
mechanism and that the potential benefits of such a mechanism would greatly 
outweigh any purported costs, the thesis went on to examine how an appeal 
mechanism could and should be created.  
Chapter six considered the wide ranging suggestions that have been put 
forward by international investment experts in this regard. Accordingly, the 
chapter went on to examine such suggestions as utilising the appellate body of 
the WTO, adding an extra layer of arbitration on to each of the dispute 
settlement mechanisms already in existence and several others. In the past, 
one of the suggestions that has attracted much discussion is the 
implementation of an appeals facility within the ICSID framework. 
International investment experts appear to be somewhat divided on the 
issue of an ICSID appeals facility. Supporters of the idea have asserted that an 
ICSID appeal mechanism would address the crisis of consistency in 
international investment arbitration 30 , ensure the correct decisions are 
reached,31 enhance predictability of the law32, create a more sustainable system 
of investment arbitration 33  as well as increase the authority of international 
investment awards34. 
Despite the purported advantages of an ICSID appellate mechanism, critics 
have argued that an additional layer of ICSID arbitration will have a negative 
impact. Concerns have been raised about unnecessarily lengthening the ICSID 
dispute settlement procedure by eroding finality and subjecting awards to 
                                            
30 C Tams, ‘An appealing option? The debate about an ICSID appellate structure?’ 
(2004) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341268> accessed 18 
January 2011. 
31 Ibid. 
32 I Penusliski (n 28) 530. 
33 Ibid. 
34 C Tams (n 30). 
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appeal.35  Experts worry that the losing party will always pursue an appeal, 
thereby lowering the value of decisions of first instance.36 There is also concern 
that regardless of the desirability of an appeal mechanism, the idea is actually 
unfeasible. There is concern that ICSID member states will withdraw from the 
ICSID Convention at even the slightest hint of the introduction of an appeals 
facility.37 
Whichever side of the debate individual opinion falls as regards to the 
creation of an ICSID appeals facility, it cannot be denied that in reality, the 
establishment of appeal through ICSID seems to have been the only seriously 
credible option for the creation of an appeals facility in international investment 
law in the past. This is purely because it has, to date, been the only suggestion 
to have moved beyond being merely that; it went further than simply being 
debated by experts in international investment law. ICSID itself weighed in on 
the debate surrounding the possible addition of an appeals facility.38 For ICSID 
to discuss the possibility as an institution serves to emphasise the credibility of 
the suggestion. 
In its discussion, ICSID did highlight a number of problems with the 
establishment of an appeals facility within its own framework. In its 2004 
Discussion Paper, ICSID stated that the creation of an ICSID appeals facility 
would be useless if other appeals facilities were also to be established; multiple 
appellate mechanisms would potentially cause greater inconsistency and 
incoherence in international investment arbitration rather than ameliorate the 
situation.39 For this and other reasons, the creation of an appeal mechanism 
under the auspices of ICSID is no longer on the agenda of the ICSID 
Secretariat. Accordingly, any hopes of an ICSID appeals facility appear to have 
been quashed. 
So with the most credible option for the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism having been indefinitely abandoned, the alternative suggestions 
must be considered. The other possible methods of introducing an appeals 
                                            
35 Ibid. 
36 I Penusliski (n 28) 530. 
37 C Tams (n 30). 
38
 ‘Possible improvements to the framework of ICSID arbitration’ (n 5). 
39 Ibid. See also ‘Suggested changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations’, Working 
Paper of the ICSID Secretariat, May 12 2005 <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-
sgmanual.pdf> accessed 27 May 2011. 
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facility in international investment arbitration were examined in great depth in 
chapter six of this thesis. As such, a lengthy discussion of the merits and 
shortcomings of each is not valuable here. Suffice it to say that some of the 
options discussed in chapter six have too many downfalls to be serious 
contenders in this regard. 
Making use of the World Trade Organisation’s Appellate Body would raise 
important questions within the WTO about the locus standi of private individuals 
in trade disputes (seeing as they would necessarily need to be granted access 
in investment disputes). Furthermore, budgetary concerns would not be easy to 
allay, due to the fact that the WTO is entirely funded by the contributions of 
member states. The issue of who should bear the costs of arbitration would be 
complicated to resolve.  
Creating an additional layer of arbitration to existing dispute settlement 
mechanisms would also generate problems. The basis of the call for an appeal 
mechanism is largely based on concerns surrounding the inconsistency and 
incoherence associated with the current system of international investment 
arbitration. Simply creating an additional layer of arbitration to the tens, if not 
hundreds of arbitral processes in existence will do little to promote greater 
consistency and coherence in the system. Thus, it is not a credible option for 
the establishment of appeal in international investment law. 
With the creation of an appeal mechanism off ICSID’s agenda, and the 
numerous problems associated with the other options for the establishment of 
an appeal mechanism, there is only one final option to consider; the creation of 
a world investment court. The establishment of a world investment court would 
enable all the international investment disputes to be handled by one single 
authoritative body, delivering fair and consistent judgments. The court will 
undoubtedly harmonise the law of foreign investment by providing consistent 
interpretations of key investment terms, ultimately creating a coherent body of 
jurisprudence in the field. 
Numerous international investment experts have expressed their support for 
the proposal to create a world investment court. Van Harten 40  asserts that 
states should ‘support a multilateral code that would establish an international 
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 G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 179-180. 
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court with comprehensive jurisdiction over the adjudication of investor claims.’41 
He believes that the new investment court should have mandatory jurisdiction 
over all claims filed by foreign investors who’s national governments are 
signatories of the multilateral agreement. 42  Qureshi 43  and Goldhaber 44  are 
supportive of the view articulated by Van Harten.  
 
iii) A world investment court will probably only work if it is established as 
part of wider reforms 
 Legum argues that the current system of international investment law is ill-
adapted to appeals due to the lack of a comprehensive multilateral treaty.45 This 
is a valid argument; asking an appellate body to interpret the similar, yet slightly 
differently worded thousands of BITs and investment agreements will do little to 
achieve the as yet elusive goal of consistency within international investment. 
Furthermore, the current system of international investment arbitration is ill-
adapted to appeals due to the number of different fora available for the 
settlement of investment disputes. There are tens, if not hundreds of tribunals 
and organisations offering to settle arising disputes. Encouraging each of them 
to offer an extra layer of appeal will also do little to improve consistency in 
international investment arbitration. Appeal for the sake of it will not ameliorate 
the current situation at all. It is therefore crucial that the system of international 
investment law is adapted so that it is better suited and better equipped to 
enable appeals.46 
Firstly, in order to make international investment arbitration more appeal 
friendly, as Legum suggested, a multilateral treaty must be put into place which 
will replace the thousands of BITs and investment agreements that are currently 
in operation. Negotiations for such a multilateral treaty have taken place several 
times before and have all failed. In order to be successful where there has been 
failure in the past, it is necessary to understand the reasons for the previous 
                                            
41 Ibid 180. 
42
 Ibid. 
43 A Qureshi, ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ (n 17) 1157. 
44 M Goldhaber, ’Wanted: a world investment court‘ 3 Transnational Dispute 
Management 26. 
45 B Legum, ’Options to establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes‘ (n 
3) 231-240. 
46 Ibid. 
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lack of success. It is often claimed that the previous negotiations stalled for the 
same reason; failing to take into account the needs and desires of developing 
nations.47 Perhaps the forum for the negotiations is in part responsible for this 
bias against developing nations. The WTO for example, which has hosted past 
negotiation attempts, is often criticised for being predisposed to prioritising the 
needs and desires of developed nations who have more control over its 
operation. In order to overcome this problem, future multilateral treaty 
negotiations will need to be initiated by an entirely new institution which will be 
free of any prejudice and injustice. The new organisation could become the 
WTO of the investment world. Ensuring that there is a place for the developed 
and developing nations to speak and be heard might just be what is needed in 
order to succeed.  
Once the new international investment organisation has been established, 
attention can be turned to the negotiation of a multilateral investment agreement. 
The agreement could define key international investment law terms, from the 
relatively simple ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ to more complicated expressions 
such as ‘expropriation’. The current myriad of BITs, each with similar but 
perhaps slightly different wording precludes the consistent interpretation of such 
key terms which is desperately needed in order to achieve the greater 
consistency that is required in investment arbitration. Of course the new 
multilateral agreement would provide a dispute settlement procedure, as all 
investment agreements should. The new dispute settlement mechanism could 
create a dispute settlement body, akin to that of the WTO DSB. Like the DSB of 
the WTO, the international investment dispute settlement body could 
incorporate an appellate body. This structure has been successful in the past in 
the field of trade law with the creation of the WTO system itself, and it could be 
imitated for international investment. 
 
iv) The needs and wishes of developing nations must not be overlooked 
This issue has been briefly mentioned above, though it does merit more 
thorough treatment. Developing countries are extremely important in 
international investment law, not least due to the fact that they are more often 
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than not the states in receipt of foreign investment. This is because foreign 
investors typically hail from developed states, and the states that they invest in 
are frequently lesser developed (where there is often a greater potential for 
profit). The inflow of investment is seen as desirable to lesser developed 
nations as it has traditionally been thought to contribute to speeding up the 
development process and lead to an increase in the general wealth of the 
receiving nation.48 
Although developing nations have an important role to play within 
international investment, their needs and wishes are often overlooked. This is 
particularly important in terms of dispute settlement, because, typically being 
the recipients of international investment, their governments frequently find 
themselves as the defendants in cases of dispute. A fair system of international 
investment arbitration would obviously be a priority for developing nations, as 
they will want to avoid paying what can often amount to huge sums of 
compensation if the tribunal finds in favour of the investor. An appeal 
mechanism would probably be attractive to developing nations, because as 
defendants in disputes, if they feel that the decision is unfair, there is currently 
very little they can do about it. As this thesis has demonstrated, the scope for 
the review of investment awards is very limited. Usually, cases are only 
reviewable where there has been some alleged abuse of process, rather than 
on substantive issues. An appeal mechanism offering the review of awards on 
the merits of the decision will be desirable to lesser developed nations, and 
would ultimately lead to the creation of a fairer system of international 
investment arbitration.  
International investment host states need to be able to regulate their internal 
affairs without the fear of the threat of arbitration every time they act in a way 
which is not beneficial to foreign investors. If a multilateral investment treaty is 
                                            
48 There is a widespread belief that FDI increases development in the investment host 
country, though this has been debated in recent years. For a more in-depth discussion 
of this see K Sauvant and L Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (OUP 
USA 2009), J Salacuse and N Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral 
investment treaties and their grand bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard Journal of International 
Law 67, E Neumayer and L Spess, ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign 
direct investment to developing countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development 1567 and P 
Egger and M Pfaffermayr, ‘The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct 
investment’ (2004) 32 Journal of Comparative Economics 788. 
276 
 
produced, it will need to be more balanced than existing treaties. BITs are often 
thought to be biased in favour of protecting the investor at the expense of the 
investment host state, because the developed nations have more power in the 
bargaining process. As such, the negotiations for any multilateral agreement on 
investment will need to enable developed and developing nations to negotiate 
on an equal footing.  
 
v) International investment law will have to strengthen its place in the 
broader framework of international law 
This research has highlighted the fact that the nature of international 
investment disputes has changed over recent years. Disputes traditionally 
involved the examination of narrow points of law that were very technical in 
nature and seldom had effect outside of the particular context within which they 
were brought up, that is, the single dispute that had arisen. This is no longer 
true of international investment disputes. International investment disputes 
typically arise when the investment host state government enacts legislation or 
brings in new policies which adversely affect the foreign investor’s investment. 
Often, environmental protection and human rights legislation can affect the 
investor’s investment, perhaps making it (at the very least) more costly for the 
investor to carry out his or her business. At the very extreme, such legislation 
can render the investor’s business or investment illegal, prohibiting them from 
carrying out their commercial activities altogether. The investor will then bring a 
dispute, often alleging that the host state government’s actions are prohibited by 
an investment agreement, more often than not, a BIT between the host state 
and the investor’s home state. Such investment agreements usually provide for 
the settlement of the dispute through arbitration. 
 In such arbitration, the arbitrators have to consider the reasons why the 
state government enacted the new legislation which is subject to challenge, 
delving into issues of public policy. Sometimes a state may have been forced to 
enact the new legislation in order to comply with its obligations under 
international treaties. It is therefore becoming increasingly important for 
international investment law and arbitration to strengthen its position within the 
broader framework of public international law. With such important issues 
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coming into play in international investment disputes, it is imperative that they 
are settled in accordance with the principles of public international law. 
The issue of how international investment law and arbitration can and should 
fit into the broader framework of public international law brings us back to the 
consideration of the amount of flexibility within the system of international 
investment arbitration. Traditionally, flexibility of the system has been widely 
recognised as one of the strengths of the system. However, such wide flexibility 
is surely no longer justifiable, given the important issues which are now at stake 
in international investment disputes, and the apparent overlap into public 
international law.  
Furthermore, the fact that issues involving public international law are being 
pronounced on in international investment arbitration by arbitrators is worrying. 
Arbitrators are often chosen at the will of the parties to the investment dispute, 
and selected based on how likely they are to agree with the choosing parties’ 
arguments. Yet these people are often deciding disputes involving important 
aspects of public interest. The question of whether they are qualified and should 
be able to do so in any case must be answered. Perhaps the way forward is to 
institutionalise international investment arbitration through the establishment of 
a single court-like body. A world investment court will enable a permanent pool 
of arbitrators (akin to traditional judges) to be assembled, thereby providing less 
choice to the parties to the dispute regarding who should be appointed to 
preside over the case. In this way, we can be sure that the most qualified 
people are hearing the dispute, and should the case involve public international 
law principles, suitable arbitrators may be selected. 
 
8.2 Further research 
 This work has focused on the debate surrounding whether the need for 
an appeal mechanism has been established. Indeed, the research findings 
suggest that such a need is present, and that the creation of an appeal 
mechanism would be a positive move for the system of international investment 
arbitration.  The work did move on to examine how an appellate mechanism 
might best be introduced. Specifically, chapters six and seven investigated a 
number of the most prominent suggestions that have been put forward in the 
278 
 
past. Accordingly, chapter six investigated suggestions such as introducing an 
appeal mechanism under the auspices of ICSID, making use of the WTO’s 
appellate body, creating an appeals facility added to existing international 
investment arbitral mechanisms which would be ring-fenced from other systems 
as well as creating a world investment court. Chapter seven examined whether 
any existing dispute settlement mechanisms could serve as a model or 
inspiration for international investment arbitration. 
 A preliminary analysis of the proposals suggested that the creation of a 
world investment court might provide the best means of establishing an appeals 
facility in international investment arbitration. However, much more research will 
need to be undertaken in order to make an informed decision about how an 
appeals mechanism should be established. Even if a more detailed analysis 
does provide support for the creation of a world investment court, many more 
questions will need to be answered before such an organisation could be 
established. Intensive research will need to be carried out into how a world 
investment court should function, its processes, its seat et cetera. There is still a 
great amount of work which will need to be completed before a world 
investment court can come to fruition. The present research suggested that the 
current framework of international investment law might not be particularly well 
suited to the creation of a world investment court; perhaps more fundamental 
reforms to the system will need to be effected before a court-like body can be 
introduced. The research suggested that the current network of thousands of 
bilateral investment treaties might need to be replaced with an overarching 
global multilateral treaty, and a dedicated international investment organisation 
(akin to the WTO) might need to be in place for this to happen. The creation of a 
world investment organisation and a multilateral treaty could take years to 
negotiate and establish, and would be no mean feat. Thus, it would appear that 
there may be a lot of work to do in the field of international investment before 
the creation of a world investment court.
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